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Economic Empowerment and Political Participation: 
The Political Impact of Microfinance in Senegal  
 
Patrice Z. Howard 
 
  
In recent years there has been significant attention paid to microfinance not only 
as an anti-poverty and economic empowerment tool, but also as a socially transformative 
process by which poor and marginalized men and women can become empowered to 
change the social landscape and power structures in the societies in which they live. More 
technically, Microfinance refers to an industry that offers a range of financial services 
including small loans (micro-credit), savings, insurance products and more to markets not 
previously serviced with banks or other formal lending institutions. In an era in which 
international development is linked to transforming undemocratic societies, an important 
question for social scientists is how and whether economic development programs affect 
the political behavior and attributes of program participants. This study addresses that 
question in the context of microfinance and explores whether participation in 
microfinance programs has affected the political behavior and opinions of microfinance 
recipients.  
Microfinance is oft associated with Muhammed Yunus and the Grameen Bank 
and both became well known when they were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their 
work with the rural poor in Bangladesh in 2006.  As a result, many people believe that 
microfinance began with the Grameen Bank and that most microfinance programs follow 
the Grameen Bank model of lending to women’s groups who must meet regularly and 
adhere to a set of stringent rules and requirements set forth by a lending organization. The 
 positive, non-economic externalities of microfinance are thus often credited to the social 
capital generated within the group borrowing experience. This project explores the 
political impact of microfinance on individual clients by investigating the political 
attitudes and behaviors of microfinance clients and non-microfinance clients alike. It 
makes a case for taking into consideration the significant variation of lending and 
borrowing practices within the micro-credit component of the microfinance industry by 
exploring the microfinance industry in Senegal, West Africa were microfinance has been 
operating in both the formal and informal economies for decades.  
This study joins the growing research in social science centered on exploring the 
political implications of individual-targeted development programs by empirically 
examining the political behavior and attitudes of program participants. It also joins the 
established literatures in political theory and political science on what motivates 
individuals to become politically active, and the effect of economic inputs on an 
individual’s propensity to engage in political activities. Using an original survey of more 
than 700 Senegalese citizens in the administrative department of Guediawaye, Senegal, 
the study finds that microfinance in Senegal is vastly different from more popular notions 
of microfinance. The overwhelming majority of microfinance clients in Senegal borrow 
as individuals, and not as members of groups. Both men and women are active in the 
micro-credit industry and more than 18% of adults in Senegal have experience with 
micro-credit loans.  
By using econometric analysis to compare the political activities of microfinance 
borrowers and non-microfinance borrowers, group and individual microfinance 
borrowers, and pre-microfinance borrowing political participation to post-microfinance 
 political participation, this study offers a more nuanced and accurate understanding of the 
relationship of microfinance to political participation. It explores how ideas of political 
and economic empowerment and what motivates people to become politically active 
translates across different contexts. The study concludes that microfinance is positively 
and significantly associated with political participation, and social capital, that 
microfinance and the various forms of social capital matter more for some forms of 
participation than for others, and that microfinance experience does not systematically 
cause an increase in political participation, through social capital or any other 
mechanism.  
Chapter One provides an overview of the project, its research questions, 
hypotheses and fundamental motivations. It introduces the concept of microfinance and 
offers a brief discussion of the theoretical contributions of the study. Microfinance is part 
of a development paradigm that places the economic development program at the level of 
the individual, rather than aid to the state. Due to the popularity of Muhammed Yunus 
and the Grameen Bank, a singular conception of microfinance is often at work in 
narratives on microfinance and economic empowerment, which includes a group-lending 
structure. That microfinance programs should politically empower program participants 
has been attributed to the dual processes of economic empowerment and social 
transformation embedded in the Grameen Bank model. The wide variation in the 
microfinance industry and the research on political participation in the field of political 
science call into question the current assumptions about the affect of individual-focused 
economic empowerment programs and individual-level political participation. 
 Chapter Two reviews the literatures on microfinance and political participation, 
social capital and political participation, and individual characteristics and attitudes 
towards political participation. This chapter emphasizes that the current literature and 
policy attitudes towards microfinance and political participation focus mainly on the 
group-borrowing model and its potential for generating increased trust and mutual 
cooperation among members of the same borrowing group. It demonstrates that both 
small and large-scale studies have neglected to consider the diversity of organizational 
and lending structures within the microfinance community as well as what political 
scientists and political theorists have said (and established) about individual 
characteristics that affect a person’s propensity and attitude toward political participation. 
This chapter lays out those theoretical arguments and relates them to microfinance and 
political participation. This chapter also presents empirical evidence concerning relevant 
individual indicators of political participation in the context of Senegal, West Africa, 
which were heretofore understudied. 
Chapter Three provides an explanation of Senegal as the setting for the research 
project. It presents relevant background information on political, social and economic 
features of life in Senegal and on the department of Guediawaye where the survey for the 
study was implemented. This chapter also includes the existing theoretical arguments and 
hypotheses about the relationship between microfinance and political participation and 
outlines my own argument about how microfinance may affect political participation in 
the Senegalese and other contexts. 
Chapter Four details the survey methodology and describes the data collected for 
the research project. Using random, multi-stage cluster sampling, the data collected for 
 the survey is close to national census demographic data. The data reveal that 
microfinance borrowers in Senegal overwhelmingly borrow as individuals and not in 
groups, which affects the ways we think about the relationship of microfinance to social 
capital and microfinance to political participation. Microfinance borrowers are more 
likely to take part in political activities than are non-microfinance borrowers. 
Microfinance borrowers are also more likely to be employed and have, on average, 
higher levels of income than non-microfinance borrowers. The data in this chapter reveal 
that there are grounds for drawing a positive association of microfinance to political 
participation, but that further analysis is necessary to develop a causal story.  
The sections in Chapter Five include tests of the current hypotheses about the 
nature of the relationship of microfinance to political participation using the dataset 
compiled for this research project. Recall from previous chapters that the current 
literature on microfinance and political participation emphasizes social capital as the 
exclusive mechanism by which microfinance and political participation are linked. As a 
result, higher participation rates seen among microfinance borrowers are attributed to 
improved attitudes of trust and mutual cooperation among microfinance borrowers. The 
data reveal that only certain forms of social capital are linked to microfinance and 
political participation. The data also show that the extent to which microfinance and 
certain dimensions of social capital increase the likelihood of participation depends on 
the activity in question. Microfinance matters more for some activities than others, and 
certain forms of social capital matter more for some political activities and less for others. 
This chapter also includes tests of other explanations of political participation from the 
political science literature including the role of individual characteristics such as age, 
 gender, income, education and employment status as well as the effect of political party 
affiliation. The data show that the importance of these individual characteristics also 
varies across different modes of participation. Microfinance remains an important 
determinant of participating in politics at the local level but loses its significance as a 
predictor of participation activities that have more national-level consequences. 
Questions in the survey asked all 703 respondents about pre-and post-microfinance 
political participation activities. The data reveal that microfinance borrowers were not 
more likely to participate in various activities after exposure to microfinance than before 
exposure to microfinance. Although statistically significant relationships between 
microfinance and political participation exist, claiming the existence of a causal link is 
premature. 
The final chapter summarizes how neither microfinance nor social capital solely 
explains the political participation tendencies or policy attitudes of microfinance 
participants or non-microfinance participants alike. A complex blend of individual 
characteristics and various forms of social capital affect an individual’s propensity to 
engage in political activities in varying degrees. The chapter reviews theories of 
economic empowerment and political participation, summarizes the present studies 
findings, and their implications. 
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“Being confident of this, that He who began a good work in you will carry it on to 
completion until the day of Christ Jesus” 
 
 
-Paul and Timothy’s Letter to the Church in Phillipi,  




Chapter One: The Microfinance Era – Direct Development for Direct 
Democracy 
  
This chapter provides an overview of the project, its research questions, hypotheses and 
fundamental motivations. It introduces the concept of microfinance and offers a brief discussion 
of the theoretical contributions of the study. Microfinance is part of a development paradigm 
that places the economic development program at the level of the individual, rather than aid to 
the state. Due to the popularity of Muhammed Yunus and the Grameen Bank, a singular 
conception of microfinance is often at work in narratives on microfinance and economic 
empowerment, which includes a group-lending structure. That microfinance programs should 
politically empower program participants has been attributed to the dual processes of economic 
empowerment and social transformation embedded in the Grameen Bank model. The wide 
variation in the microfinance industry and the research on political participation in the field of 
political science call into question the current assumptions about the affect of individual-focused 






“If the physiological needs are relatively well gratified, then there emerges a new set of needs, 
which we may categorize roughly as the safety needs (security; stability; dependency; protection; 
freedom from fear, anxiety, and chaos; need for structure, order, law and limits; strength in the 
protector, and so on).” 
 




 In the summer of 2007 I was invited to Manchester, England to serve as a research 
assistant and rapporteur for task force meetings on economic development in Africa and Latin 
America. I sat among finance ministers and some of the world’s leading development economists 
and was repeatedly asked the same question, “What type of development work do you do?” At 
the time, my most recent experience had been working with a non-profit organization in rural 
Senegal, which also served as a micro-lending institution so I replied, “Microfinance.”  I had not 
known that the previous year was a big one for microfinance and that microfinance had become a 
hot topic in development circles. I quickly learned that I was behind the times.  
2 
  
 Microfinance refers to an industry that offers a range of financial services including access 
to small loans (micro-credit), savings, insurance products and more to markets not previously 
serviced with banks or other formal lending institutions.1 These areas had been stigmatized as 
being “unbankable” and unable to utilize credit and finance effectively. At the task force 
meetings and throughout the conference, I overheard microfinance being referred to as ‘good for 
democratization,’ or ‘related to democratization.’ Microfinance was considered a uniquely 
empowering development tool because aid was given directly to individuals to increase their 
capacities as entrepreneurs; because microfinance was believed to serve the poorest of the poor 
who previously had not access to credit or other financial services; and because microfinance 
builds the capacities of women by organizing them into groups meant to encourage trust and 
mutual cooperation. These assumptions about microfinance in no way reflected my experience in 
Senegal and I was unable to find empirical evidence of microfinance as a politically empowering 
development tool. 
 For more than a decade, Microfinance has continued to gain worldwide popularity as an 
innovative approach to combating poverty and fostering entrepreneurship in the world’s poorest 
regions. Prior to that, however, microfinance was gaining traction in the international 
development community as an effective, multifaceted, anti-poverty development tool. In 
December 1998, the United Nations (UN) Organization passed a resolution (53/197) declaring 
that 2005 would be the ‘Year of International Microcredit.’2 A previous UN resolution in 1997 
(52/194) highlighted the advances made in the fight against poverty by the activities of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs).3 The resolution emphasized 
                                                
1 Having acknowledged this difference this study will also employ the terms microfinance and microcredit interchangeably, 
especially when referring the survey results and in the data and analysis sections of the dissertation. 
2 1998 UN Resolution 53/197 
3 1997 UN Resolution 52/194 
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...the role of microcredit and microfinance as an important anti-poverty tool that 
promotes asset creation, employment and economic security and empowers 
people living in poverty, especially women...  
 
That microfinance empowered borrowers and program participants had become standard 
mantra in the international development community. Close to ten years later, in 2006, 
microfinance achieved even greater prominence when Muhammed Yunus and the Grameen 
Bank received the Nobel Peace Prize for their work providing access to credit for millions of 
poor women in Bangladesh. In the adjoining press announcement, the Norweigan Nobel 
Committee released this opening statement: 
The Norweigan Nobel Committee has decided to award the Nobel Peace Prize for 
2006...to Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank for their efforts to create 
economic and social development from below. Lasting peace cannot be achieved 
unless large population groups find ways in which to break out of poverty. Micro-
credit is one such means. Development from below also serves to advance 
democracy and human rights.4 
 
The above press release statement can serve as a quick snapshot of the popular ideas 
about the positive effects of microfinance, be they economic, social, or political, at the micro- or 
macro-levels. In conjunction with the international recognition that microfinance was making 
strong headways in the global fight against poverty and was contributing greatly to development 
efforts in poor countries, a plethora of studies emerged from the research departments of 
influential policy institutions evaluating the effect of micro-credit on the economic and social 
well-being of program participants. For example, in 1995 the United States Agency for 
International Development launched the Assessing the Impact of Microfinance Services (AIMS) 
                                                
4 Press Release 1996 Nobel Committee 
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Project and published a how-to guide for evaluating the individual-level impact of microfinance 
services in November 1997.5  
The foundational and subsequent AIMS evaluation studies reported on a variety of 
outcomes attributed to microfinance services including the economic, social, and health benefits 
gained by program participants (Chen and Mahmud 1995, Schuler and Hashemi 1993, Barnes, 
Koegh and Nemarundwe 2001, Chen and Snodgrass 2001, Cheston and Kuhn 2001). In addition, 
several industry and scholarly articles and books have been published about the feasibility of 
microfinance from an anti-poverty, business model perspective (Aghion, Armendariz, and 
Morduch 2007). However, less work has been done on analyzing the heavily assumed, positive 
political impact of microfinance programs, as reflected in the above press release statement and 
in the ‘women’s empowerment’ paradigm of microfinance.6 Studies that do highlight the 
political impact of microcredit programs have focused on female borrowers or those who borrow 
as a group. They do this to stress that the link between microfinance and political participation is 
due more to the creation of social capital in women’s groups, than to microfinance’s impact on 
an individual’s independent political assessments (See Hashemi et.al. 1996; Mayoux 1999; 
Sebstad and Cohen 2000; Cheston and Kuhn 2001; Simnowitz 2002; Pitt et.al 2003; Mosley et.al 
2004; Johnson 2005, Bayulgen 2006). 
Part of the reason that microfinance has gained so much attention and received 
such considerable amounts of investment is because scholars and development policy 
makers are in search of institutions that promote democracy and development. Almost 
simultaneously to the upswing in the popularity of microfinance in the development 
                                                
5 See Martha A. Chen, A Guide for Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Services at the 
Individual Level. USAID AIMS Project (Novemver 1997) 
6 Several versions of this paradigm float about but nice consolidated versions of the hypotheses 
in this paradigm can be found in Chen 2001, pp. 6-8 and Mayoux 2005, p. 4) 
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arena, was the boom in the theory that social capital was a necessary, intangible good 
possessed by democratically and economically developed communities across the world. 
Many scholars and policy makers have become preoccupied with finding ways to 
measure, bolster and augment social capital. The microfinance movement is perhaps the 
most quintessential combination of these trends in international development. We need to 
establish whether in fact microfinance is a development program that fosters the 
processes democratization. If it is, the next steps are to disentangle where microfinance’s 
impact on the processes of democratization is located: whether it be in the promotion of 
social capital, or in some other mechanism. 
Using findings from a study of microfinance and political participation in 
Senegal, West Africa this dissertation explores the nature of the claims about the political 
effects of microfinance and finds that although exposure to micro-credit loans has a 
strong association with individual-level political participation, microfinance experience is 
not a catalyst for political participation. The analysis uses a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative evidence to describe and estimate the relationship of microfinance to 
composite indicators of social capital, socioeconomic status and political participation. It 
addresses variation in the structure of microfinance lending and discusses how the 
differences in the lending practices of microfinance firms matter for the political behavior 
of the microfinance borrower.  
I argue that in order to understand how microfinance impacts political 
participation, we need to look beyond gender-biased and group borrower-based studies. 
We also need to look beyond social capital theory as the main explanatory mechanism for 
microfinance borrowers’ political empowerment for two reasons. First, the social capital 
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link relies heavily on the institutionalized structure of group lending. This is problematic 
because many microfinance institutions provide loans to individuals without the group-
loan structure requirement.  Even in the group-loan model however, individuals who do 
receive their loan as part of a group model can have self-interested incentives to pressure 
other members into making timely payments in order to keep the loan secure and increase 
the likelihood of larger loan grants in the future. In addition, the social capital argument 
rests on the premise that there is a strong and uniform structure to group lending across 
microfinance institutions, which consists of regular, social interactions at group meetings 
that are enforced by the microfinance institutions and by the borrowers themselves in a 
manner similar to the Grameen Bank model. This is not always the case. Because of the 
variations of microcredit loans in the microfinance industry, we need a theory – beyond 
social capital -- that can encompass the link between microfinance and political 
empowerment for all microfinance borrowers, irrespective of the structure of the loan 
(i.e. individual or group borrowers) and/or gender of the borrower.  
This dissertation explores the political impact of microfinance using micro-level 
survey data collected from Guediawaye, Senegal, a department of the country’s capital 
city, Dakar. In addition to testing the existing hypotheses on the link between 
microfinance and political participation, I test common explanations of political 
participation in the political science literature. The research presented here is, to my 
knowledge, the first systematic large-scale, random survey on the political impact of 
microfinance and as such, it offers new insights into the links between economic 
development and democratization. The dissertation is divided into six chapters and their 
interior sections. This chapter includes an overview of the development of the 
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microfinance movement into an industry beyond the provision of micro-credit. Next is a 
section on the overview of the microfinance industry in Senegal, briefly explaining how 
the microfinance environment in Senegal provides a fruitful area for research on the 
political impact of microfinance.  
 
1.1 The Microfinance Movement 
 As previously stated, Microfinance gained worldwide prominence as an important anti-
poverty development tool when the Grameen Bank of Bangledesh and its founder, Muhammad 
Yunus won the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize. Microfinance is often used synonymously with micro-
credit--a program that makes small amounts of credit available to the poor. But Microfinance 
refers to an industry that offers a range of financial services including access to small loans 
(micro-credit), savings, insurance products and more to markets not previously serviced with 
banks or other formal lending institutions.7 These areas had been stigmatized as being 
“unbankable” and unable to utilize credit and finance effectively. 
 Providing credit to underserved areas was certainly not a new idea when the Grameen 
Bank and Muhammad Yunus won the Nobel Prize in 2006. Much of what is known about the 
history and development of the microfinance industry is from the research departments of 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
Studies show that communities without access to formal financial services have long relied on 
loans from family members, neighbors or other private lending groups for centuries (Helms 
2006). According to analysts, what is novel about the microfinance model is “the effect of the 
rapid innovation that has taken place over the last 30 years” in the finance industry (The 
                                                
7 Having acknowledged this difference this study will also employ the terms microfinance and microcredit interchangeably, 
especially when referring the survey results and in the data and analysis sections of the dissertation. 
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Economist, 2005).  Originally, the unique idea of microcredit involved extending small 
uncollateralized loans to the poor, (implicit in that scheme was the assumption that what was 
needed for the poor was capital) but the industry has found room for growth in meeting a wide 
variety of financial demands among the poor, including insurance and savings deposits (The 
Economist, 2005). It is precisely because microfinance is hailed as a program that empowers the 
poor that the concept of making financial capital available to the poor has been applied to 
developing and developed nations alike including the United States, Latin America, Asia, Africa, 
and the Caribbean. Microfinance firms operate in diverse social, political and economic 
environments. Because these landscapes tend to be areas where there is much room for growth 
and development on several fronts -- gender issues, health, poverty, and political and civil rights 
-- practitioners and scholars alike are interested in the effects of microfinance programs on the 
social, political and economic landscapes of their host communities and the relationship of 
microfinance institutions to the areas in which they operate. 
Structures of Microfinance: The Grameen Model and Beyond 
 The term microfinance is often used interchangeably with The Grameen Bank. This 
implies that a majority of microfinance firms operate like Grameen Bank, using social capital as 
collateral and as a substitute for physical capital by emphasizing the group structure, and lending 
mainly to females. The microfinance movement however, is extremely diverse, and the Grameen 
Bank model does not adequately capture the diversity present among microfinance firms. Many 
microfinance institutions grant loans to individual borrowers and require that borrowers, whether 
borrowing as an individual, or as a member of a group, show proof of collateral. For example, 
the Zambuko Trust of Zimbabwe is run this way and the Microfinance Centre for Central and 
Eastern Europe and the New Independent States (an international grass-roots network of more 
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than 90 microfinance firms) refer to four different MFI models in the region: credit unions, non-
governmental organizations, “downscaling” commercial banks, and microfinance banks. Each 
model has its own structure, legal framework, business model, client base and range of products 
and services offered. The fact that there is variation in the structure of microfinance firms is an 
important caveat if we are to gain a true understanding of the social, economic, and political 
impact of microfinance firms in any particular area. This is especially important if our 
understanding of the way microfinance affects social and political development is rooted in the 
assumption that group-based and female-centered borrowing structures are universal, mandatory 
profiles of microfinance firms. 
 In addition, microfinance institutions are not completely insulated from the societies in 
which they operate, nor are they free from the influx of their funding sources. That microfinance 
institutions function completely independent of social organizations and structures such as 
religious groups, political parties and caste systems is often automatically assumed. This 
assumption is cast aside in this study, and the relationship between the policies of the MFI’s and 
the geography of the human relational network where the firm operates is explored. In order to 
truly understand how and to locate where the services provided by microfinance firms have 
transformative power for clients lives, it is necessary to have an understanding of the social, 
business and political environment in which firms operate. Empowerment may have a very 
different profile in Bangladesh than it does in Senegal. This dissertation takes into consideration 
both the interstate and intrastate variations of the social climates in which microfinance firms 
operate and builds them into the survey, in order to 1) develop a theory that can encompass the 
link between microfinance and political empowerment for individual and group borrowers and 
male and female borrowers and to 2) develop a research model that can capture the political 
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impact of microfinance on its participants across several contexts. 
It is not widely known that there exists substantial variation in the process of obtaining a 
microfinance loan. There is also enormous variation in the structure of microfinance loans. This 
is true for Senegal, as well as in the global Microfinance market. Most people are familiar with 
the Grameen Model of microfinance, mainly because Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank 
won the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize for the contribution of the Grameen Bank to the fight against 
poverty. In the Grameen model, borrowers are female and belong to a pre-formed group of five 
friends who must be unrelated. When one member of the group desires a loan, the other four 
members of her group must approve it. Several (10-12) of these groups convene for mandatory 
weekly meetings at a center where a Grameen branch officer collects loan repayments and 
applications for new loans.  Because of its exposure and popularity, microfinance has become 
synonymous with the Grameen Model and ideas about the potential impact of microfinance 
programs hinge on the Grameen Model. As this dissertation will show, Microfinance is a varied 
and thriving industry in Senegal (and globally), with multiple loan structures and lending 
models. Therefore, ideas about the potential impact of microfinance programs would do well to 
take this variation into consideration.  
The next section provides brief case studies of microlending organizations operating in 
Guediawaye, Senegal and describes a set of processes by which firms structure their microcredit 
lending. The overview is divided into two subsections. The first subsection begins with a 
discussion of the general consensus on various types of microfinance firms. The second section 
compares this consensus to the profiles of a small sample of the microcredit firms relevant to this 
study.  Microlending firms in Senegal tend to operate outside of the categories by which 
microfinance firms are usually classified.  
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In his recent book, Creating a World Without Poverty, Yunus proposes separating 
microfinance programs into two categories. In Type 1 he places the “Poverty-Focused 
Microcredit Programs” and Type 2 are what he identifies as “Profit-Maximizing MicroCredit 
Programs.” The names of the categories are pretty self-explanatory but they have important 
differences in the requisites for loan applicants. According to Yunus, Type 1 loans are “poverty 
focused, collateral-free and low interest.” These programs are further divided by Yunus into two 
“zones” ‘Green’ and ‘Yellow’ according to the rates of interest charged on the loan. For 
Microfinance firms in the Green Zone interest rates are equal to the firms operating costs at 
current market rates, plus up to an additional ten percent. Those firms operating in the “Yellow 
Zone” charge interest rates that equal the firm’s market rate operating costs plus up to an 
additional fifteen percent. “Profit-Maximizing,” or Type 2 microcredit programs charge interests 
rates that are higher than those charged by firms operating in the “Yellow Zone.” They belong in 
what Yunus calls the “Red Zone” He makes these firms synonymous with moneylenders because 
of their high interest rates. Yunus promotes viewing these firms as commercial enterprises, 
beholden to their profit-maximizing goals of the shareholders. Yunus offers two important 
caveats to his typology. First, this classification would not apply to situations where “high salary 
costs make operating expenses unusually heavy” nor would the classification be applicable in 
situations where the microcredit firm is owned by the borrowers. This latter caveat is the case for 
the vast majority of microcredit organizations in my dataset. A few of those firms will be 









1.2 Microfinance in Senegal 
 The microfinance industry in Senegal is dynamic, profitable, and growing. According to a 
2002 report by the World Bank, 280 microfinance firms were regulated in Senegal and twice as 
many households were serviced by the microfinance market in Senegal than were served by 
formal banking institutions.8 In a survey of informal savings groups of women, also known as 
tontines, an estimated $125 million per year were channeled by these organizations.9 The 
expansion and importance of the microfinance industry in Senegal and throughout West Africa 
prompted the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) to establish a legal framework for 
microfinance institutions. Member countries adopted what is now known as the PARMEC Law 
in 1993, which provided a basic legal and regulatory framework for microfinance institutions in 
member countries. 
 In accordance with the regulatory framework set forth by PARMEC, the government of 
Senegal established a ministry for domestic oversight of the industry in 2007.10 This ministry is 
now referred to as the Ministry of Female Entreprenuership and Microfinance. In order to be 
eligible for recognition from the State, Microfinance firms must have the objectives of 
combating poverty and improving the quality of life of Senegalese citizens. After more than five 
                                                
8 World Bank. (2002). Country Assessment Report: Senegal. 
9 Tontines are savings groups in which women gather at agreed upon tie intervals (daily, weekly, 
monthly or otherwise) and each bring a fixed amount. The total deposits collected on the meeting 
day are then distributed to one member of the tontine until each member has had her turn. Once 





years of active operation, microfinance firms are eligible for competitive government funding.11 
According to a 2008 estimate, more than 18% of the adult population of Senegal was using some 
form of microfinance.12  
In a study on the impact of regulations on the microfinance industry in Senegal, Hatice 
Jenkins presents a concise typology of the five largest microfinance firms in Senegal. Jenkins 
reports that there are three principle types of microfinance institutions in Senegal: 1) savings and 
credit cooperatives, 2) savings and credit associations and 3) semi formal institutions, which 
include financial NGOs and development projects that include a credit component. The first 
category, savings and credit cooperatives (also called savings and credit mutuals, or credit 
unions) are membership-based. They collect savings of members and provide loans exclusively 
to other members of the cooperatives. Savings and credit mutuals and cooperatives receive the 
majority of funding from members’ savings and/or from members’ capital contributions; tontines 
fall into this category. Savings associations differ in the sense that they pre-date mutualist 
institutions and do not adhere to the same principles. Because of this, they do not have full legal 
status with the Ministry of Finance under the PARMEC Law but are encouraged to register with 
the Ministry of Finance for a five-year interim period with the expectation that they will become 
a mutualist organization.13 The third type as reported by Jenkins includes semi formal institutions 
such as financial NGOs and development projects that have outside funding which is used to 
                                                
11 www.portailmicrofinance.org. *This information was obtained from the website in April 2008. 
Unfortunately, the website is no longer active. At the time the information was obtained, the 
website was extremely thorough and listed registered microfinance firms by region of the 
country; the site also included firms’ websites and a list of chief officers. A newly established 
alternate site www.microfinance.sn does not offer the same information. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Jenkins, p. 7 
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grant micro loans (Jenkins, p.8). In the table below, the development of savings institutions into 
micro-credit firms as a result of regulation is made clear. 
  
Jenkins’ outline of firms in the microfinance industry differs slightly from my findings on 
the firms offering micro loans in Senegal. The original dataset compiled for this project includes 
information about the lending organizations servicing the survey respondents. These institutions 
include banks, credit unions, non-governmental organizations, charities, and private, self-formed 
groups or associations. Credit unions dominate the supply of loans however, and more than sixty 
percent of borrowers, (95 respondents) who reported the source of their Microfinance loan, 
identified either 1) CMS (Credit Mutual of Senegal) or 2) PAMECAS (Partnership for the 
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Mobilization of Savings and Credit in Senegal) as their lending institutions.14 Both of these 
organizations are listed as credit unions or cooperatives by Microfinance Information Exchange15 
(also known as MixMarket), which places them outside of the dichotomous, color-coded 
categorization of microfinance firms offered by Muhammed Yunus.  
CMS and PAMECAS are antipoverty-focused, semi-profit driven, mainly self-owned 
microfinance organizations. Although CMS and PAMECAS receive considerable amounts of 
outside funding, PAMECAS achieved financial autonomy in 2004. It is unclear whether it is the 
mission of CMS to become entirely supported by the savings of the firms’ members; it already 
dominates the savings market with 42.4% or total savings held by microfinance firms (Jenkins: 
11). The data from my survey reveal that in the overwhelming majority of cases it was necessary 
for individuals to be a member of PAMECAS or CMS in order to receive a loan from either 
organization. In this way, CMS and PAMECAS meet the basic criteria for being classified as 
owned by the borrowers. Table 2 (see below) illustrates this fact. A few microfinance borrowers 
however, (15%) were, for some unknown reasons, exempt from the requirement that one be a 
member or PAMECAS or CMS to qualify for a microfinance loan. I will present these firms in 





TABLE 1.2  
Credit Union Membership and Microfinance Loans 
 
                                                
14 This amount is probably greater than 65% given that some borrowers identified different forms 
of these organizations as their lender such as “PAMECAS/MEZCOP” and “CMS/UMECdef.” In 
his study of the effect of regulation on Senegal’s microfinance firms, Jenkins reports that CMS 
and PAMECAS have a 65.4% share of the market (Jenkins, p.11).  
15 MixMarket is an organization that provides on-line portfolio and performance information for 
more than 1900 microfinance firms across the world. See www.mixmarket.org 













 In the table above 74 respondents listed PAMECAS as their lending institution and 18 
listed CMS as the source of their microfinance loans. The survey included 164 respondents who 
indicated they had experience with microfinance loans. Of the 74 PAMECAS clients, 65 (or 
88%) were required to be members of the credit union (have active savings accounts with 
PAMECAS for at least three months) before becoming eligible for a loan. Of the 18 CMS 
clients, 14 (78%) were required to be members of the credit union in order to receive their loan. 
In some cases individuals were excluded from that requirement: 9 PAMECAS clients and 4 CMS 
clients. This illustrates that there is inter-firm variation of the lending policies, as well as intra-




PAMECAS is perhaps the most visible microfinance service organization in the area 
where the data for this project was collected. This is echoed by the fact that more than forty-five 
percent of survey respondents identified PAMECAS (or PAMECAS and a partner organization) 
as the source of their microfinance loans. The organization invests considerable resources into 
advertising, mainly in the form of billboard displays and television commercials. PAMECAS 
branches tend to be large and assuming buildings. They are easily identifiable by the pale-green 
tiles that overlay the outer-surface of PAMECAS buildings and the large placards, written in 
either white or green letters, displaying the full name of PAMECAS: “Partenariat pour la 
LoanSource Yes No Total 
      
PAMECAS 65 9 74 
      
CMS 14 4 18 
        
Total 79 13 92 
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Mobilisation de l’Epargne et le Crédit au Sénégal” or, Partnership for the Mobilization of 
Savings and Credit in Senegal. PAMECAS was founded in 1994 as a Program for the Support of 
Mutual Savings and Credit in Senegal (PAMECAS) and was the result of an aid agreement 
between the Senegalese government and the Canadian Agency for International Development 
(ACDI) governments in 1994.16 ACDI provided major financing for PAMECAS until it became 
financially autonomous in 2004. It continues to receive external funding from the United Nations 
Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). 
PAMECAS offers several savings and credit products to its customers. The savings 
services that are linked directly to gaining access to credit are offered in three forms. The first, 
L’epargne nantie is a savings account established strictly with the goal of gaining access to CMS 
credit services. The next, L’epargne obligatoire is a mandatory savings account established at 
the time of loan repayment. Third, is a savings account called, Le Plan Epargne Projet. This is a 
special savings account by which savers can be rewarded with access to credit to fund special 
projects such as Tabaski (a Muslim holiday), and Christmas celebrations as well as other events 
such as marriages, baby dedications, funerals, and health and education expenses. Once any of 
these savings accounts are opened, members generally have access to a number of PAMECAS 
credit services. The first, Le credit regulier is available to members who have made regular 
deposits to their savings accounts over a three-moth period and hold at least twenty-five percent 
deposit the amount the wish to borrow in their account. Le Credit AFSSEF is a special credit 
program for the purpose of providing women with increased access to financial services. This 
credit program distributes loans for small businesses to female entrepreneurs, individually or in 
groups, who seek to develop and expand their commercial activities. The last, Le credit Dioni 




Diono is for those individuals holding a Le Plan Epargne Projet savings account who need 
immediate dispersal of funds at one and a half to five-times greater than the amount currently in 
their accounts. PAMECAS publishes the interest rates of their loans as being dependent upon the 
type of credit, but fixed at a monthly rate that varies between 1 and 1.16 percent. The time 
allowed for repayment varies between one month and five years depending on the type of 
credit.17 
 
Credit Mutuelle du Senegal (CMS) 
 
Credit Mutual of Senegal was launched in 1988, in Kaolack, a region to the southeast of 
the capital city, Dakar through a partnership between the government of Senegal and a catholic 
charity. Its initial installment was called the Caisse Popularaires d’Epargme et de Credit 
(People’s Bank of Savings and Credit). Its mission, then and now, is to mobilize savings among 
Senegalese citizens and distribute loans to its members. In terms of its outreach to the 
respondents of the survey, it is a far second from PAMECAS, providing credit for close to 
thirteen percent (21) of borrowers in the survey. 
CMS has expanded from savings and agricultural credit and now offers a wide range of 
financial services. In addition to savings and loans, the organization is also popularly used as a 
money transfer agency. In terms of savings and loans, CMS’ website advertises 4 types of 
savings plans and 13 various forms of credit.18 Many of these credit services are available only at 
select CMS locations, but it is unclear if any of CMS’ lines of credit are formally restricted to 
large-scale borrowers.  
Some examples of the lines of credit that borrowers have access to include: 
                                                
17 Author obtained information from PAMECAS materials but the information on these and 
other forms of savings and credit can be accessed on the PAMECAS website: www.pamecas.org. 
18 See http://www.cms.sn/produitsservices/comptelivret.php 
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Credit Investissement: a line of credit reserved for financing of all kinds of professional 
equipment and to assist local professionals in their efforts to increase their productivity and 
profits. It is open to members whose accounts have been in good standing for at least three 
months. Credit Relai ou Soudure is a specific type of credit designed to protect the CMS member 
from insurmountable and expensive debt. This is exclusively for CMS members who are 
involved with groundnut production. Credit Fonds de Roulement, or revolving credit funds, is a 
short term credit option designed to finance momentary working needs of CMS members 
involved in commercial activities, such as transportation, skilled artisans, fish-salesmen, or other 
professionals. Credit Automatique, is a line of credit that permits CMS members to realize a 
diversity of goals, without impacting their current savings with CMS. It is different from other 
forms of credit in two ways. Members have immediate access to the funds and a guarantee that 
their savings are 100% protected from their debt. Members have to be in good, regular standing 
with CMS to be eligible. Credit PEP, is credit that matches the amount raised by a savings 
group, in order to help them achieve a project. It can be used for entrepreneurial or consumption 
purposes. Members are eligible who have been in good standing for three months. 
In addition to CMS and PAMECAS, other smaller organizations who service individuals 
included in my survey study, each have their own lending and assessment strategies. In this 
survey study, close to thirty percent of borrowers who reported their funding sources obtain 
microfinance loans from organizations such as these. The directors of two such firms located in 
Guediawaye were interviewed about their lending and recruitment strategies during field 




The mission of MEC-A.D.F.A.P. (Savings and Credit Union of the Department of 
Female Artisans) is to work to fight against poverty by organizing female artisans, into a 
professional organization, collecting members’ savings and granting them loans. The origination 
date of MEC-ADFAP is unclear but in 2001 the organization became formal, and registered with 
the Ministry of Microfinance. 
Funding Source: MEC-ADFAP received an initial investment of 10,000,000 f.CFA from its 
partnership of many organizations which the director indicated she was unable (perhaps 
unwilling) to identify. 
Organizational Structure: There are 2 structures to this organization, the Association and the 
Credit Union. The association assists women in their agricultural and alphabetization efforts; the 
second is a savings firm that collects the savings of members and non-members of the 
association, and redistributes them in the form of loans. 
Lending Policy: One must be a member of the credit union in order to obtain a loan. There are 
three increments to membership:  
1. 1,000 f.CFA is the minimum to open an account 
2. 2,000 f.CFA, at this amount, the depositor has the right to accrue interest and borrow; 
3. 3,000 f.CFA is a group account for groups collecting money for various purposes (ex. 
Savings, or loan repayment). 
 
Once a loan application is completed and submitted, a credit agent is sent to the 
applicant’s home to conduct a full review of the applicant. The director of MEC-ADFAP 
described the process in this way, 
“The credit agent must evaluate each person, or members of the group interested 
in obtaining a loan. Loan applicants must submit two photos and proof of 
identification. Applicants must show that they have some collateral and have a 
proper address and telephone number. All of the applicant’s debt is assessed to 
evaluate the morality of the potential creditor. Again, the service of micro credit 




Refusing a Loan: Loans are refused on the basis of the credit agent’s evaluation of the client or 
the group. The credit history of the client, his/her personal assets and the nature of their project 
are all taken into account. 
Portfolio: There are currently 1,878 people who are receiving a microloan from the organization. 
The organization loans out about 15,000,000 FCFA per month. 
Partnerships: The organization partners with DAHILA, a religious organization, but there are 
many organizations that borrow money for a particular event or purpose, such as Des Jeunes, a 
youth organization that supports a youth football league. 
Service Area: All the clients and groups served by MEC-ADFAP reside in the Guediawaye 
Department of Dakar. Clients now include men, women and young people who have been 





The Anti-Poverty Initiative (API) was founded in January 2006 by Mr. Sebastiane Ujereh, 
the former Director of Economic Empowerment Programs for the United Methodist Church. In 
2008, when he was interviewed for this project, he had been living in Senegal for seven years. 
He claims that the Anti-Poverty Initiative is very well-known in this area of Senegal. The 
organization uses mainly word of mouth, which Mr. Urejeh identified as very effective 
recruitment strategy. API intentionally forgoes the use of publicity, or signs, because it is unable 
to absorb the demand for its credit services. The mission of API is three-fold. It seeks to: 
1. Help to reduce poverty in the female community in urban Senegal 
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2. Expand into the regions and rural areas outside of Dakar 
3. Use microfinance, micro-credit, and business education in the area of asset-building as 
tools to empower women to fight poverty 
 
To accomplish these tasks API employs four methods of intervention. The first is providing 
its beneficiaries with training in business, entrepreneurship, basic accounting, competitiveness, 
record keeping, and the practice of separating business from personal finance. Next, API 
provides micro-loans and savings opportunities to individual members of the groups who they 
have already provided credit. Finally, API provides key administrative services to its clients 
including managing and providing paperwork to clients and assisting with administrative record-
keeping, In an interview with Mr. Urejeh, he provided key details of the organization which are 
recorded below. 
Funding Source: API is funded with Sebastiane’s savings and help from his family. In an 
interview with Mr. Urejeh he remarked upon the uniqueness of his organization in regard to its 
source of funding 
“ Normally in these cases outside funding is used but waiting for funding can 
often be arduous. First it is necessary to build a reputation to present the case [of 
API] to donors. Some help also comes from former colleagues and church 
organizations” 
 
Obtaining a loan: When asked how to gain access to a loan from API, Mr. Urejeh  
 
outlined the following process: 
 
“An individual will come on behalf of a women’s group to inquire about a loan. 
She will describe the group size, goal and history of formation. If the Initiative is 
prepared to absorb a new women’s group an orientation date is arranged and the 
Initiative will travel to the group to discuss the program and objectives of the 
Initiative. The rules and regulations of partnering with the Initiative are laid out 
and at the end of the presentation there is a question and answer period. At that 
time, no decision is yet made by the inquiring group or by the Initiative. The 
group may decide not to accept the terms of agreement laid out by the Initiative. If 
the group decides to participate they have to abide by the following agreements: 




2.  Each week the total amount of money must be given to one or two members of the group, 
who must then return the money (this is to acquire savings) 
3. This practice shall continue until each member of the group has been responsible for the 
total collection 
4. After observing and evaluating the group’s progress, the Initiative will decide whether to 
absorb the group into the API program 
5. If the Initiative decides yes, it will give the group 3 times the group’s final endowment” 
 
Refusing a loan: Mr. Urejeh indicated that loans are refused based on a number of factors, which 
include an evaluation of weekly savings meetings, where a form of risk assessment is conducted 
to see if members of the group are prompt, reliable, and committed. API encourages groups to 
shed negligent member(s) after observing groups over a pre-determined period. Repayment of 
the loans is made by groups, not individual(s) so all members must demonstrate commitment and 
reliability. If a group decides to keep negligent a person(s), no loan is granted 
Portfolio: API currently funds approximately eighteen groups, which total about 500  
 




When asked about repatriation of groups or individuals into the API savings and loan 
programs, Mr. Ujereh responded in this way,  
“After a certain period of time, groups graduate from the 
Initiative, normally this takes a few years. On average, groups 
remain affiliated with the Initiative for about 4 yrs and the 
Initiative encourages them to save on their own.” 
 
The API office in Dakar provides business education seminars for women who are entrepreneurs, 
and sometimes to graduates of the API program. Most women participate in collective 
borrowing; they may share in resources but not in entrepreneurial endeavors. 
The Initiative Partners with churches for donation purposes. Mr. Ujereh also commented that the 
Initiative’s funding has been visibly hurt by the decline in the value of the United States Dollar. 
However, he was extremely happy to report that API’s repayment rate was 100%. 
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1.3 Microfinance and Political Participation 
Overall, microcredit firms in Senegal operate outside of the parameters normally used to 
distinguish microfinance organizations from other lending programs. In some ways, they also 
operate outside of the parameters set for them by PARMEC Law. The firms profiled here are 
sometimes profit-driven, not always member-owned, often externally funded organizations with 
strong anti-poverty mandates. Interest rates vary by firm, and are based on the type of credit 
issued. Borrowers may obtain loans as individuals or as members of groups, pre-formed or not. 
Both men and women can borrow as members of groups or as individuals and sometimes receive 
training and coursework as part of the stipulations of their loans. Finally, microcredit in Senegal 
is not reduced to the strict use of entrepreneurial activity but is often sought out for consumption 
for events such as funerals, weddings and baptisms.  
If microfinance in fact serves as a vehicle for increased political participation, rigorous 
empirical inquiry should help us 1) identify if microfinance and political participation are 
associated at all; 2) whether having had microfinance in fact engenders increased political 
participation; and finally 3) identifying the nature of the relationship between microfinance and 
participation. It is important to note that the relationship between microfinance participation and 
political participation is mediated by the political, geographical, social and economic 
environments in which microfinance firms operate.  
The interaction of microfinance and political participation can take place in pre-formed 
groups (like in the examples of API); in a particular firm that has a great impact on the lives of 
individual borrowers; or merely as a function of the sheer availability of access to small loans 
that serve as an impetus for political involvement. This dissertation explores these various 
channels, as they are made available by the data. It takes into account the variation in the lending 
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structures of microfinance firms to shed light on the issue of the political impact of microfinance 
on microfinance borrowers. The main hypothesis however, is steeped in the minimal criteria of 
microfinance and posits that it is success with microcredit, defined as both loan repayment and 
increasing the economic endowments of the borrower -- regardless of the structure of the loan or 
the lending principles of the firm – that engenders increased political participation. The 
following section outlines the plan of the dissertation in accordance with the objective of the 
research project. 
1.4 Hypotheses 
 This work focuses primarily on assessing the political affect of microfinance on 
individuals who participate in micro-credit programs and illustrates the complexities of linking 
microfinance participation to political participation. This works seeks to identify the extent to 
which microfinance experience affects levels of participation in the political process by testing 
the current assumptions in the literature and policy making arena. 
The survey questions related to experience with microfinance are listed in Appendix 4. They ask 
respondents about the organization which granted them a loan, whether they have an individual 
or group loan, what the loan was used for, whether or not they were able to repay the loan and 
whether or not the loan had contributed to improving their well-being.  The questions used to 
analyze participation trends are also listed in Appendix 4.  Respondents were asked whether or 
not they took part in activities such as campaigning, rallying, voting and contacting a political 
official. The data were used to test the following set of hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals with micro-credit experience are more politically active than their 
non-borrowing counterparts. Microfinance is often viewed as a unique economic empowerment 
tool with several positive externalities, including increased engagement in the political process.  
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Hypotheses 2: Microfinance experience increases social capital, which in turn, increases 
political participation Due to their participation in microfinance programs, respondents with 
microfinance experience will exhibit higher levels of various forms of social capital. This 
hypothesis rests on a particular conception of microfinance — the group and gender-based 
Grammen Bank Model – it also rests on the idea that social capital is related to political 
participation. These assumptions result in additional hypotheses that will be outlined in the 
following chapters. 
Questions related to individual characteristics and attitudes towards political participation 
are listed in Appendix 4. 
This study considers other well-researched and documented indicators of political 
participation in the field of political science and inserts them into the models of microfinance and 
political participation. Multivariate analyses ascertained the extent to which individual 
characteristics and attitudes affected respondents’ political participation.  
 
 
1.5 Chapter Outlines 
Microfinance has become well established as an approach to poverty alleviation 
and economic empowerment, and the basic concept of providing loans directly to poor 
entrepreneurs has inspired several innovative projects that allow individuals in one 
country to directly provide loans to private individuals in another country. This direct 
connection and individual-level impact is what helps make microfinance so attractive to 
those involved. But because microfinance involves loans and not-handouts, part of its 
popularity is the empowering component, which is believed to be about more than 
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money. Because of the nature of microfinance, it is still widely believed to have larger-
social impacts, two of which are social capital and political participation. This project’s 
aim is to determine the nature of the relationship of microfinance to an individual’s 
attitude and propensity towards political participation. Most significantly, this research 
explains how microfinance participation is related to social capital, and feelings of 
political efficacy and how microfinance affects political participation. 
The variations within the microfinance industry present challenging questions 
about the ways in which microfinance is thought to impact participation in political 
activities.  The setting of the dissertation research dissertation will also prove to be 
fruitful for understanding individual characteristics that affect political participation in 
urban Senegal. 
This chapter has provided an overview of the project, research questions, 
hypotheses, and the fundamental motivations that drive the project. It also introduces 
microfinance as a diverse industry in the arena of economic development. This research 
shows that microfinance firms vary in the products they offer, the clients they serve, and 
the way their lending services are marketed and structured. Microfinance is considered as 
an economically and politically empowering. The remaining five chapters of the study 
further explore the relationship between microfinance and political participation.  
Chapter Two reviews the literature relevant to the dissertation topic. It begins 
with a summary of the literature on the political impact of microfinance to date, and 
proceeds with a review of the foundational literature of political science--explaining the 
factors most closely associated with political participation. Determinants of political 
participation in the Sub-Saharan African context, where the broader context of this 
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dissertation research is situated is reviewed in the third section of Chapter Two, followed 
by a brief section on the question of political participation in Senegal. 
Chapter Three lays out the theoretical frameworks of the main arguments central 
to this dissertation: 1) that microfinance is positively associated with political 
participation, 2) that microfinance engenders social capital, which in turn engenders 
political participation and 3) that when microfinance engenders political participation, it 
is only under the conditions in which clients experience success with their loans. Chapter 
Four contains five sections, each of which describes a component of the research 
strategies used to test the claims expressed in Chapter Three. The first section explains 
the usefulness of Senegal as a study case for the research question and more specifically, 
the research site of Guediawaye, Senegal. Section two of Chapter Four describes the 
design and implementation the original survey used to gain valuable information on 
microfinance clients and non-microfinance clients alike. The next section describes 
various components of the survey, including the sampling procedure and the 
measurements used to capture data on the relevant indicators: political participation, 
microfinance participation and resource endowments. Chapter Four closes with 
distributions of responses to participation and other measures. 
Chapter Five presents analysis of the relevant data and results of the empirical 
tests used to evaluate the claims of the main hypotheses. The first section tests the 
foundational claims necessary to explore the main argument: it demonstrates that 
microfinance has a positive and significant relationship with the measure of political 
participation developed in the survey. Section two of Chapter Five explores the 
relationship deeper to explore the nature of the relationship between microfinance and 
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political participation, demonstrating how success with microfinance drives the results. 
Section 5.3 attempts to establish whether or not microfinance is in fact causing political 
participation by using a sub-set of panel data derived from the results of the original 
survey. The concluding section of Chapter Five restates the centrality of success with 
microfinance to the argument and summarizes the findings. Chapter Six, the conclusion 
considers the lessons learned from the project; areas of future research; and policy 




Chapter Two: Intersecting Literatures: Microfinance, Social Capital and 
Political Participation 
 
This chapter includes overviews of the literatures on microfinance and political 
participation, social capital and political participation and individual characteristics and 
attitudes towards political participation. This chapter explains that the current literature and 
policy attitudes towards microfinance and political participation focuses mainly on the group-
borrowing model and its potential for generating increased trust and mutual cooperation among 
members of the same borrowing group. This chapter unpacks the features of social capital and 
lays out the corresponding hypothesis about social capital, microfinance and political 
participation. The chapter juxtaposes these theories in relation to a new argument about how 




2.1 Microfinance and Political Participation 
As previously mentioned, there have been numerous small-scale studies and anecdotal 
evidence used to highlight the politically salient impacts of microfinance programs on micro-
credit recipients. The majority of these findings attribute this political empowerment to the mere 
fact of abiding by the group-borrowing requirements of a micro-lending organization. Examples 
of these narratives include reports of programs funded by Opportunity International, a Christian-
based network of microfinance firms and non-governmental organizations. Clients of an 
Opportunity International Bank in the Philippines, who were leaders of their microfinance 
groups, later went on to be elected to community-level political offices.19 In Honduras, the leader 
of a similar Opportunity Fund microfinance group ran for mayor of her town; and microfinance 
                                                
19 More details of the examples listed here can be found in Cheston and Kuhn, 2001, 
“Empowering Women Through Microfinance” Women’s Opportunity Fund pp. 24-26 
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borrowers of an Operation International partner, AGAPE, in Barranquilla, Colombia organized a 
movement and led protests demanding better sewage systems for their community.20  
 Other reports highlight the educational and training services offered by microfinance 
firms. The Anti-Poverty Initiative of Senegal, profiled in the previous chapter, offers educational 
services such as business seminars and literacy programs to assist female entrepreneurs. Some 
practitioners have claimed that these additional services can make microfinance clients more 
confident in the political arena. World Education in India and Freedom from Hunger in Bolivia 
are organizations that offer literacy programs to their clients, who were found to be more likely 
to run for political office than those who are not in a micro-lending program.21 Other programs, 
such as Working Women’s Forum in India deliberately incorporate political education and 
mobilization efforts into lending structures in order to politically educate and empower clients.22 
Even with these examples however, few studies systematically evaluate clients across different 
microfinance programs to intentionally measure how microfinance program participation affects 
their participation in political activities or their attitudes towards political participation. To my 
knowledge, only two such studies exist which empirically investigate, among other things the 
political impact of micro-credit on program recipients. 
In 1992 Hashemi, Schuler and Riley conducted a study on microfinance empowerment 
among 1,300 married women under the age of 50, living across six villages in rural Bangladesh. 
23 The authors developed eight indicators of empowerment, two of which were related to 
                                                
20 Ibid. 
21 MkNelly and McCord, 11 
22 See http://www.workingwomensforum.org/ 
23 Syed Hashemi, Sidney Schuler, and Ann Riley, “Rural Credit Programs and Women’s 
Empowerment in Bangladesh,” World Development 24, no. 4 (1996): 637. 
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political participation.24 Four separate samples for the study were drawn, using random 
multistage cluster design. The sample groups included women who were: 1) Grameen Bank 
microfinance borrowers; 2) Bangladesh Rural Action Committee (BRAC) microcredit 
borrowers; 3) women residing in a Grameen Bank village who were eligible for, but not 
receiving a micro-loan from Grameen; and 4) a control group living in a village without a 
Grameen or BRAC bank who would have qualified for microfinance.25 The authors found that 
the minimal microfinance programs of Grameen and BRAC do in fact politically empower 
women by increasing their political and legal awareness and increasing their participation in a 
protest/march/demonstration.26 The political impact of BRAC programs, which deliberately 
incorporates political awareness into the structure of its programs, was found to be greater than 
the effect of Grameen Bank participation.27  
The first five empowerment indicators in the Hashemi, Schuler and Riley study are 
directly related to a women’s economic resource endowments, which can either mean success 
with the microfinance loan for Grameen and BRAC members or higher than average resource 
endowments among non-borrowers, even among poor villages. The authors acknowledge that 
some of the differences in resource endowments, or other indicator scores, may be a direct result 
                                                
24 The eight indicators included 1) mobility--places a respondent had been, especially alone; 2) 
economic security--owning a home or having cash savings; 3) ability to make small purchases--
items for daily food production, especially without husband’s permission; 4) ability to make 
larger purchases--pots, pans, clothing, etc, esp. without husband’s permission; 5) involvement in 
major decisions -- house repair, leasing/buying land, esp. using client’s own money; 6) relative 
freedom from domination by the family –not having money or other things taken from her by 
male family members; 7) political and legal awareness--knowing the names of government 
officials and their titles; 8) participation in public protests and political campaigning. A woman 
was considered empowered if she had a composite score of 5 or more (i.e., scoring 1 on five or 
more indicators) (Hashemi et al. 638-39). 
25 Ibid. 637 
26 Minimal microfinance programs are those which provide minimal training or minimal 
supplemental educational services to clients. 
27 Ibid. 649 
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of participation in the micro-credit programs. But the authors do not acknowledge that these 
resource endowments could also be related to higher levels of political participation either 
independent of, or as a result of participation in a microfinance programs. The authors do 
acknowledge the problem of selection bias in their study, indicating that women who are already 
more empowered may, for undiscovered reasons, be more likely to join the credit programs.28 
In a similar study conducted on the INTEGRA Foundation and the FORA fund in the 
eastern Europoean countries of Russia, Slovakia and Romania, authors Mosley, Olejarova, and 
Alexeeva conducted a study on the contribution of microfinance to social capital and political 
participation.29  The authors begin with a hypothesis that microfinance influences (as opposed to 
creates) social capital through three channels of pre-existing forms of social capital. These pre-
existing forms of social capital are linked to the benefits accrued from access to financial 
resources free of state control. Those three channels are:  
1) Encouraging mutual trust and interdependence among borrowers in a group 
2) Providing an alternative means to financial and credit service, esp. in a corrupt 
environment 
3) Establishing support services for borrowers including financing transportation, 
childcare and legal service/advice.30 
 
To test their hypotheses, the authors conducted a survey of a clustered sample of 
borrowers from two microfinance firms: FORA (a microfinance firm sponsored by Opportunity 
International that focuses on making credit quickly available to micro-businesses) and 
INTEGRA (a Slovakian based-NGO focusing on corruption-free credit to the socially 
marginalized). The study subjects included men and women who were divided into three 
                                                
28 Hashemi et al. 639 
29 Paul Mosley, Daniela Olejarova and Elena Alexeeva, “Microfinance, Social Capital Formation 
and Political Development in Russia and Eastern Eurpoe: A Pilot Study of Prgorammes in 
Russia, Slovakia and Romania.” Journal of International Development. 16, (2004) pp. 407-427  
30 Ibid. 411 
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categories: 1) those receiving group loans, 2) those receiving individual loans, and 3) a control 
group of newly enrolled entrepreneurs.31 Mosley et al. measured the impact of microfinance on 
six key dimensions including:  
1. Levels of activity in voluntary associations (educational, religious, athletic, union, etc) 
2. Access to, and awareness of government support programs and other 
organizations 
3. Degree of trust in various entities (family, customers, government, etc.); 
4. Experience with corruption 
5. Exposure to various media sources 
6. Three forms of political participation (general participation, party membership and 
campaign contributions) 
 
The authors found that as it relates to political participation, which was low among all groups but 
highest among microfinance borrowers, microfinance tended to be associated with informal 
modes of political participation rather than with the more formal activities such as party 
membership or financial support to a political campaign.  
To illustrate their findings the authors recount the case of a client in Slovakia who 
transformed an association of entrepreneurs into a political entity that bargained with the 
government on a host of issues. The nature of those issues is not specified in the article, however. 
The authors conclude that microfinance generates headway in the area of community building 
which the authors closely relate to political participation and that certain features of 
microfinance, specifically the feature of state-free access to credit, appears to generate demand 
on the part of borrowers for increased political influence.32 
The Hashemi et al., and Mosley et al. studies represent, to my knowledge, the most 
empirically rigorous studies on the question of the political impact of microfinance programs to 
                                                
31 It is unclear from the article how the samples are drawn, whether from a particular city, from a 
roster of borrowers and applicants from microfinance firms or otherwise. The total number of 
respondents appears to be 367. In addition, the questions or measures associated with the 
independent variables are not clearly defined in the article. 
32 Mosley et al., 412 
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date.  These studies, while pioneering, are extremely limited in two important ways. First, these 
studies are limited in the forms of political participation examined. However, it should be noted 
that the political context in which the studies took place (Russia, Slovakia, Romania and 
Bangladesh) might not be conducive to what many consider basic forms of political 
participation, such as voting. The political context in which microfinance firms operate plays an 
important role in how clients are able to exercise any increased sense of empowerment be it 
political or otherwise. Secondly, both models rely heavily on the idea that microfinance 
politically empowers clients through engendering increased levels of trust and social capital 
among microfinance clients, whether through group or individual-focused borrowing programs. 
This overlooks the link that studies of this nature share with the vast literature in political science 
about historically important indicators of political participation including socioeconomic status. 
 
2.2 Explaining Political Participation 
Systematic investigations to capture and identify the factors that can predict, or are most 
closely associated with various forms of political participation are foundational to the field of 
political science. With the introduction and spread of electoral politics; the subsequent 
development of universal suffrage in the modern world; and the phenomenon of democratization, 
a central question to the field is “When, and under what circumstances do people take part in 
political activities?” After Downs’ seminal work, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) 
pointed out the irrationality of voting, and the opportunity costs associated with political 
participation why people do vote (or participate) and who does vote (or participate) are 
consistent topics of research in political science.  
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One of the most reliable indicators of voting and other forms of political participation in 
the United States is an individual’s socioeconomic status, which includes a person’s education, 
wealth, and income levels. Increases in education levels support the skills, and networks 
necessary to reduce the information costs associated with participation and bolster the additional 
resources, such as wealth and income that promote political engagement (Downs 1957; Lane 
1959; Wolfinger and Rosentstone 1980; Verba, Schlozmna & Brady 1995). These consistent 
empirical findings in social science have led those familiar with it to refer to it as the SES Model 
of political participation. SES (socio-economic status) has been shown to be applicable in other 
nations, though the effects of the different dimensions of the SES construct-either education, 
income or wealth- are often context specific, as Norris (2002) found in data pooled from the 
1996 International Social Survey Programme.  
 Why socioeconomic status matters at all for political participation has been linked to an 
attitudinal measure known as political efficacy. Political efficacy goes by many names in the 
political science field. It has been called “subjective political competence” (Campbell et al. 1954; 
Almond & Verba 1963), “powerfulness” (Seeman, 1966), and “political effectiveness” (Lane, 
1959). Political efficacy is mainly what is meant by political empowerment in the microfinance 
literature. However called, it is historically defined as the feeling that one’s political action does, 
or can have a meaningful impact on the political process (Campbell, Gurin & Miller 1954). The 
individual-level factors that were found to be associated with political efficacy in the 1950s when 
the term first emerged remain important indicators of political participation today. They are 
gender, education, income, occupational status and region of residence (Lane, 1959). After his 
analyses Lane concluded that, men, endowed with higher levels of education, income, and 
occupational status that live in metropolitan areas, “tend to generalize these sentiments and to 
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feel that their votes are important, politicians respect them, and elections are therefore, a 
meaningful process” (Lane 1959, 149).33 In a review six years later Milbrath concluded that, 
“Persons who feel more effective in their everyday tasks and challenges are more likely to 
participate in politics” (Milbrath 1965, 59). Subsequent factors shown to be associated with 
feelings of efficacy included the political socialization of children. 
 At the time (1950s), the majority of studies on the concept of political efficacy focused 
on the U.S. context. Mathiason and Powell studied the concept in the context of democratization 
and peasant movements in Colombia and Venezuela (Mathiason and Powell, 1972). Their 
investigation centered on determining whether it was political efficacy that preceded political 
participation or if greater feelings of efficacy are a result of prior political participation. The 
findings showed that in Colombia, political efficacy preceded political participation and only one 
variable proved a significant indicator of political efficacy among efficacious peasants-land 
tenure status. The authors outline two hypotheses: the venal landlord hypothesis and the kulak 
peasant hypothesis to explain the findings. The former hypothesis attributes the disproportionate 
feelings of efficacy among smallholder peasants--living in communities with a high presence of 
large landowners--to their independence from reliance on clientelist patronage from large 
landowners for access to agricultural resources (M&P, 312). Their relative weak dependence of 
large landowners frees them from reciprocal obligation including inducements to participate in 
political violence. Squatters, day laborers, tenants and sharecroppers rely heavily on the 
landowner for economically productive and subsistence resources. Consistent with the venal 
landlord hypothesis was the finding that squatters and day laborers had the least amount of 
                                                
33 A closer reading of this quote might indicate that trust in institutions, such as the electoral 
process is a result of feelings of efficacy. While worthwhile to explore, that question is not a 
central question to this dissertation. 
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political efficacy among the sample, but because of their relative independence and mobility as 
compared to tenants, were found to be more resistant to the demands and political mobilization 
efforts on the part of the large landowners (M&P, 312). The latter hypothesis, the kulak peasant 
hypothesis, states that because of their high status relative to other peasants i.e., squatters, day 
laborers, tenants and sharecroppers, small holder peasants [purport to] emulate the attitudes and 
behaviors of large landowners in the political realm. The venal landlord hypothesis however, is 
of greater interest to this study. In chapter three I will outline in further detail how the venal 
landlord hypothesis relates to the theoretical framework around the relationship of microfinance 
to political participation. 
Apart from socioeconomic status, additional individual-level characteristics have been 
shown to have a substantial impact on political engagement including age and gender. Several 
studies have found that being female actually depresses the likelihood of voting and other forms 
of political engagement in the U.S., Zambia, and India (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Bratton, 
1995; Krishna, 2002; respectively). But there are exceptions to this rule as well, such as the 1984 
U.S. Presidential election where voting rates were higher among women than men (Leighly and 
Nagler, 1992).  
Intangible endowments such as institutional trust, political trust, and general trust in 
others are attitudinal dimensions that have been shown to have some bearing on an individual’s 
propensity towards political activity. Cox (2003) found that trust in government institutions such 
as the legislature, the executive branch, local government, and the judiciary, had a positive, 
significant relationship with voter turnout in European Parliamentary elections. On the other 
hand, dissatisfaction with government can also motivate people to become politically active not 
only through voting, but also in social and political movements, or by emigrating to another 
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polity (Hirschman 1970; Radcliff 1992; Kostadinova 2003). Institutional trust, government 
performance and national wealth are often inextricably linked. While they have been shown to 
affect political participation the effects on individual-level participation are difficult to measure.  
More recently, social capital has gained traction as an explanation for an individual’s 
level of political participation. Much of this is due to the amount of attention garnered by Robert 
Putnam’s famous book, Bowling Alone (1993). As introduced by Coleman in 1988, social capital 
referred to the features of social structure that facilitated particular actions and cooperation 
among members of society. Fukuyama (1995) defined social capital as trust among members of 
society. Perhaps the most popular and widely used definition of social capital is that offered by 
Putnam, where social capital refers to “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and 
networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam 
1993: 167). Putnam has also defined social capital as the social good produced through 
individual civic engagement and active membership in voluntary organizations and associations 
(1995a, 1995b, 1995c). Whether individuals can possess social capital is debatable. Typically 
however, social capital is not thought of as an individual characteristic but as a fungible, 
intangible good, produced through structured patterns of social interaction, having various 
consequences for individual behavior (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998: 581).  
The literature on the political impact of microfinance is rooted in social capital theories of 
political participation. In this literature, microfinance’s generation of strong networks and trust 
among group borrowers is regarded as the most important – often only -- catalyst for political 
empowerment and political participation (Bayulgen 2006). This conceptualization is related to 
the literature on the relationship between civic engagement and political behavior, and is steeped 
in the assumption of universality of group-based microfinance programs, which often have 
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structures that deliberately engender trust and group solidarity among its members. For example, 
to be eligible for the microcredit programs of Grameen Bank and BRAC (Bangledesh Rural 
Advancement Committee) featured in the above-mentioned article by Hashemi, Schuler and 
Riley, women and men are asked to form small groups among themselves and collectively save a 
mandatory amount of money. Each individual member of the group must open a savings account 
with a mandatory minimum deposit. Loans are disbursed to individuals but they must meet with 
the members of their group weekly in order to receive loan disbursements and/or make loan 
repayments. If anyone is absent a loan disbursement or repayment cannot be made. Participants 
themselves decide how the loans will be used. Each member of the group must memorize 
Grameen’s Sixteen Promises or BRAC’s Seventeen Promises and agree to adhere to the tenets. 
These tenets include collectively undertaking bigger investments for higher incomes; helping 
group members that are in financial or other difficulty; and taking part in all social activities 
collectively. In this way the microcredit group becomes a point of identity for its members 
(Hashemi, Schuler and Riley, 1996). Such an environment weds the rational interest-seeker and 
the social animal components of individuals that render them more likely to participate 
(Coleman, 1988). With this calculus in mind, it has been shown that membership in similarly 
highly organized or structured, voluntary, civic organizations such as trade unions, non-
governmental neighborhood councils, women’s groups, and youth groups can be equally as 
effective at deterring or encouraging certain forms of political participation. More often than not, 
these groups are co-opted by political entities such as politicians or parties to mobilize voters, 
campaign volunteers and more. 
Mobilization plays an extremely important role in actually getting people to the protest, 
the campaign, or the voting booth. To this end, political participation rates can often be traced to 
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whether or not someone directly asks for your participation or deliberately inhibits your 
participation. Those who desire to be politically active may be institutionally marginalized and 
effectively prevented from doing so and individuals who may have no interest in engaging with 
the political sphere find themselves politically activated because of the efforts of a political 
party, other organization or a local authority. John R. Mathiason and John D. Powell found that 
mobilization efforts on the part of peasant unions in Venezuela were effective in getting peasants 
out to vote (1978). Bratton found that for Zambians, belonging to a political party was the most 
important predictor of political participation (1999). Several scholars have noted the incredibly 
effective mobilization techniques of the Mouride brotherhood in Senegal where the 
recommendation (ndigel) to vote for a particular presidential candidate was often tantamount to a 
religious edict (O’Brien 1983; Villalon 1995; Beck 2008). These religious patrons tended to 
many of the material needs of their followers in the same way that the landlords of Colombia and 
peasant unions of Venezuela did in the examples given by Mathiason and Powell.  
That social capital and material capital interact to motivate individuals to take tangible 
action in the political sphere is not a new concept. But this two-pronged approach is an idea that 
has not yet been applied to the study of the political impact of microfinance. The studies profiled 
above focus mainly on the social capital feature of microfinance as the catalyst for political 
engagement. While social capital is an important feature of political participation among 
microfinance clients, this study argues for broadening the conceptualization about how 
microfinance and political participation might be linked by recognizing that microfinance can 
have an impact on an individual’s material endowments. Increases in certain resource 
endowments such as income, wealth and education are also linked to political participation. The 
next section will discuss social capital in further detail. Using the varying types of social capital 
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as a guide, the next section outlines the adjoining hypotheses about the link between 
microfinance, social capital and political participation. 
2.3 Social Capital and Microfinance 
 Because microfinance is often translated as a development tool with an exclusive 
approach of granting loans to groups of poor female entrepreneurs, the political impact of 
microfinance is often presumed to be a happy by-product of the group structure of the loan. As 
previously mentioned, social capital can be defined in various ways. Perhaps the most popular 
and widely used definition of social capital is that offered by Putnam, where social capital refers 
to “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam 1993: 167). Social capital, then 
can refer to the amount of trust people have in their social networks, be they familial, or 
otherwise, and the mutual cooperation that is a result of the trust generated in those networks. 
But the term social capital doesn’t necessarily connote a positive good and can have many 
downsides.34  
Strong networks have the tendency to be exclusive, creating strong barriers to entry for 
newcomers and excluding newcomers from the trust and mutual cooperation exchanged inside 
networks (Collier 1998). To account for this phenomenon, scholars have identified two distinct 
forms of social capital according to its positive and negative externalities. “Bridging” social 
capital is said to be more favorable, as it refers to ties among people who are unrelated and have 
very little in common. Societies with more bridging social capital are thought to embrace 
diversity, be more accepting and encourage civic engagement (Bayulgen 2006: 21). “Bonding” 
social capital is a product of interaction among persons who share several characteristics, such as 
                                                
34 Foley and Edwards (1999) and Fukuyama (2002) 
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family relatives, school clubs, professional organizations, and gangs (Putnam 2000). An 
additional category, “linking” social capital is meant to capture an individual’s connections to 
persons of authority in the public and private spheres (Grootaert et al. 2004). Societies with a 
large amount of linking social capital have enhanced trust and cooperation between institutions 
and individuals. (Bayulgen 2006: 21).  
All social capital is not created equal, but this is precisely what has happened in the 
literature on social capital and microfinance.35 Microcredit lending structures have been 
presumed to have considerable levels of social capital but the type of social capital is never 
specified. This presumption should be done away with. Even if all microfinance firms instituted 
the same Grameen Model, variation in levels of group solidarity and trust among members 
would remain. In addition, the extent to which interactions among group borrowers have any 
politically salient value will vary. The most obvious reason for this being that many groups fall 
apart, for whatever reason, especially if one member is unable to meet the requirements for a 
host of reasons besides being unable to pay. Groups experience shocks beyond the control of any 
particular group member and beyond the collective capacity of all members of the group to 
correct.  
 Even in cases where all three types of social capital abound, bonding, bridging and 
linking, whether they have political relevance remains a lingering question. When La Due Lake 
and Huckfeldt (1998) investigated how politically relevant social capital (social capital that 
facilitates political engagement) is produced the authors found that politically relevant social 
capital is a function of three items: the size or extent of an individual’s networks (defined as the 
                                                
35 With the exception of Bayulgen, who has emphasized that the variation in forms of social 
capital need to be taken into account when using social capital as the link between microfinance 
and political participation though she relies on social capital as the linking mechanism between 
microfinance and political participation (Bayulgen 2006: 21). 
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number of people with which they discuss important and political issues), the level of political 
expertise within those networks (as perceived by the individual), and the frequency of political 
interaction (as defined as political discussions) within the networks (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 
1998: 567). Individual characteristics such as Income, Education, Employment Status, Age, 
Organizational Membership and Racial Identity were tested to see how they influenced the three 
components of politically relevant social capital. Only education was a consistently significant 
indicator of all three items: personal network size, political expertise within networks and 
political interaction frequency (discussions of political matters). The number of organizations to 
which a person belonged was not associated with political interactions but had positive and 
significant effects on an individual’s network size and the level of political expertise available in 
the networks. Individuals with higher levels of income were more likely to engage in political 
discussions and have larger networks. Even when accounting for these individual level 
characteristics, La Due Lake and Huckfeldt find that the dimensions of politically relevant social 
capital are strong indicators of engagement in political activities surrounding the 1992 U.S. 
presidential campaign, and that politically relevant social capital has an effect that is 
independent and separate from organizational membership and other personal characteristics (La 
Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998: 579). Whether or not this type of social capital is produced in 
microfinance groups remains unknown. 
Below I incorporate these definitions into hypotheses about the political effect of 
microfinance: 
H3: According to social capital as civic engagement, microfinance should positively impact 
political participation in the same manner than increased levels of civic engagement have been 




H4: According to the social capital as trust paradigm, group microfinance programs should 
increase political participation as a result of the increased trust in social networks engendered by 
the group borrowing experience.  
 
H5: According to the politically relevant social capital definition, microfinance should engender 
political participation if microfinance increases and individual’s network size, increases the 
number of political experts in their network(s) and increases the frequency of political 
discussions within the network.  
 
I test these three hypotheses as well as the foundational hypotheses that microfinance 
clients will have higher levels of political participation in Chapter Five. In addition, I offer an 
alternative hypothesis about the relationship between microfinance and political participation 
that takes into account the variation in the microfinance industry in Senegal and the landscape of 
politics and society in Senegal. 
I argue that if and when microfinance leads to higher political participation for a client, it 
is only when a client is “successful” with their loan. In my estimation, all microfinance clients 
are not presumed to become more politically active as a result of microfinance. Some 
microfinance clients may have had high, pre-microfinance levels of political participation; they 
may have been mobilized around an issue or into a political party before microfinance. 
Alternatively, they may have had considerable interest in political affairs prior to becoming 
microfinance borrowers. The goal here is to offer a specification of the process by which 
microfinance engenders political participation. This differs from the current studies on 
microfinance and political participation that assume the universality of group-borrowing 
techniques and rely solely on social capital as the explanatory mechanism that links microfinance 
to political participation.  
Under my estimation, microfinance is related to political participation by improving a 
client’s resource endowments regardless of the structure of the loan. Group borrowers and 
individual borrowers both need success with the loan to activate whatever it is that is making 
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them more politically engaged: political efficacy, social capital, or the production of politically 
relevant social capital. For group borrowers, in order to generate politically relevant social 
capital in the order of La Due Lake and Huckfeldt (1998), group borrowers need to have enough 
regular, repeated interactions in which they 1) feel comfortable discussing political affairs, 2) 
have political expertise among them 3) trust each other enough to share and/or exchange political 
views (unless one person is already confident enough in their expertise or connections that they 
are assertive about addressing the political issues of the day or confronting fellow group 
members as political entities) 4) have enough repeated interactions to develop a consensus on an 
issue or 5) have a mutual interest to converge on a political issue, in the order of Coleman 
(1988). These regular, repeated interactions are only taking place if the terms of the loan require 
it and if members of the group are able to make repayments. In some instances, where these rules 
are strictly enforced, group members will make repayments for others, in the event that someone 
is unable to pay. Loan disbursements for group members are often, but not always contingent on 
each person attending meetings to make payments on the outstanding loan, or making the initial 
savings deposits to secure a loan in the first place.  For individual borrowers, if microfinance is 
causing increased political participation, it is under the condition that the individual is successful 
with their loan and they have the interest, will and extra time (à la Maslow’s hierarchy of needs) 
to invest in 1) a social network, social setting, or civic or voluntary organization which produces 
politically relevant social capital; 2) be mobilized into a politically relevant association such as a 
political party; 3) join with others around a politically relevant issue which requires political 
engagement; and/or 4) take individual political action themselves.  
Success with microfinance is not a given. Although microfinance loans have been 
reported to have much higher repayment rates than the larger, long-term loans distributed by big 
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banks in the formal financial sector, experiences with microfinance loans remain mixed. Studies 
which focus on the income levels of microfinance clients found that income increases as a result 
of microfinance are often small and in some cases negative.36 Activities in which borrowers 
invest their microfinance loans are often low-profit and are in oversaturated markets.37 In 
addition, for social contexts in which gender relations suppress women’s rights and 
responsibilities, involvement in female-biased microfinance programs may be detrimental for 
women in their household and familial relationships.38 Examples abound in which women were 
awarded loans, only to have the loans hijacked by their husbands or be subsequently forbidden 
by their husbands to engage in the activities for which the loan was originally sought.39 As a 
result of the above factors, I would expect that those who were not previously politically active 
and did not have success with microfinance would not experience an increase in political 
participation as a result of microfinance. I do not purport that microfinance is the exclusive 
mechanism of political participation among micro-credit clients, but that microfinance has its 
own separate effects apart from other indicators of political participation. 
The theoretical argument of this dissertation is straightforward. I argue that evaluating the 
political impact of microfinance must necessarily take into two factors. The first being that 
individuals seek out micro-credit activities because of the potential to increase their economic 
well-being; and the second being that socioeconomic status is often an important indicator of 
                                                
36 See Hulme and Montgomery (1994) and Montgomery et al, (1996). Other strong critics of the 
economics of microfinance include Spivak (1996), Rankin (2002), Weber (2002) and Cockburn 
(2006). 
37 In Senegal, it is not uncommon to see more than twenty to thirty mango vendors along the 
same road. At transportation hubs across the country peanut vendors compete quite aggressively 
for potential customers. 
38 Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996 and numerous writings by Linda Mayoux including Mayoux 1998, 
2001.  
39 Mayoux 1998, 2001 
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political participation. Higher levels of resource endowments are historically and empirically 
associated with higher levels of political participation. My argument does not refute the assertion 
that by increasing the strength of social networks and expanding networks of trust, microfinance 
programs can induce borrowers to become more politically active. I simply mean to challenge 
the assertion that it is exclusively through social capital that microfinance may impact political 
participation and to offer the following specification about the link between microfinance and 
political participation for individuals which were politically inactive prior to their microfinance 
loan: If an individual’s experience with microfinance was successful (for the purposes of this 
study, by successful I mean that microfinance has in some way, improved the life of the client 
and they are able to repay their loans) we will see increases in the levels of political participation 
of that microfinance borrower. As such, it is to the extent that the social benefits, educational 
components and other facets of microfinance borrowing interact with the social and economic 
experience of the borrower that microfinance can be a catalyst for political participation.  
Earlier in this chapter I outlined the venal landlord hypothesis as specified by Mathiason 
and Powell in 1972. The authors relate the high levels of feelings of political efficacy among 
peasants in Colombia to land tenure status. The peasants’ smallholder status gives them greater 
independence from reliance on patronage resources by large landowners in their community, via-
a-vis other peasants, including sharecroppers, tenants, squatters and day laborers. Microfinance 
clients can be said to mirror the standing of small landholder peasants in Columbia in many 
ways. Microfinance clients have gained access to financial products—namely, credit--that is 
independent of the clientelist patronage system through which economic opportunities and 
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resources might normally be made available.40 I expect that microfinance clients, who have used 
their loan successfully, will have high levels of political efficacy. The interaction between 
success with microfinance loans and feelings of efficacy are what drives any increase in political 
participation among microfinance clients and not merely a client’s insertion into an environment 
that builds or contains high levels of trust. I contend that this successful client efficacy link holds 
true regardless of the gender of the microfinance client or the structure of the loan (group or 
individual). 
This condition presumes that microfinance clients are in a position where access to credit, 
and other financial services such as interest bearing savings accounts, is traditionally difficult to 
obtain, and a veritable clientelist network and patronage system are in effect. These assumptions 
are not far-fetched. They hold true for most areas where microfinance is at work—Sub-Saharan 
Africa, India, Bangledesh, Russia, Latin America and the Central Asian Caucus States-- and are 
central reasons for the emergence of the microfinance industry and the financial services it 
provides. Microfinance can, to draw an analogy from the Colombian case, transform a 
sharecropper to a small landowner if s/he has relative success with the microfinance experience. 
The next chapter discusses in detail the contextual specifics of the study site with regard to the 
political and economic landscape of urban Senegal and describes why the analogy given above is 
expected to translate in the Senegalese context. 
 
2.3 Politics and Political Participation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
                                                
40 I recognize the possibility that microfinance loans may be, or strongly perceived to be a 
resource distributed by patrons, or big men. I assume however, that in most cases microfinance 




This dissertation project is set in Senegal against the broader context of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Using data from the 2002-2003 round of Afrobarometer Surveys on electoral 
participation in ten Sub-Saharan African countries, Kuenzi and Lambright (2005) find that 
several of the explanations discussed in the previous section can, to some extent, help to explain 
political participation in Sub-Saharan Africa. They find socioeconomic indicators that are 
important predictors in the U.S. and elsewhere are very weak predictors of political participation 
in SSA. In fact, higher socioeconomic status is often associated with lower rates of political 
participation in Sub-Saharan Africa when analysis is refined by country.41 Education and 
political participation have a mixed relationship in the ten countries studied in the Kunezi and 
Lambright article. The authors find that in some cases, education levels and party affiliation are 
inversely related. This similar to Bratton’s (1999) findings that less educated Zambians are more 
likely to follow their party’s vote signals.  
The impact of demographic characteristics such as age, gender, and urban/rural 
residences were also explored across the ten countries. Age is a significant predictor of political 
participation in SSA Africa. As in many other parts of the world, older people are more likely to 
vote than the youth. Gender, like education, exhibited mixed effects across the country cases. In 
some countries women were more likely to vote than men, in other cases men were more likely 
to vote than women. Afrobarometer survey respondents who live in rural areas had a higher 
                                                
41 This finding however, may partly be due to the proxy for income, which asks how often the 
respondent’s family has gone hungry or without food. Hunger is often related to structural 
restraints on food supply, etc, than to a respondent’s actual financial ability to pay for food under 
normal circumstances. In addition, the findings of the low predictive power of socioeconomic 
indicators may be a function of the countries used in the study. When the same model was run 
for different countries using the income proxy and the actual income variable, income was found 
to be a significant indicator for certain types of participation. 
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probability of voting than urban residents and were also more likely to be a member of a political 
party, and/or feel close to a political party. 
Some attitudinal measures were also found to be strong predictors of political 
participation in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as interest in politics, perceptions of government 
performance and perceptions of the health of the national economy. Individuals with an interest 
in politics are more likely to vote, as are respondents who hold favorable assessment of the 
government. Respondents with an unfavorable rating of the national economy were more likely 
to vote than those with a favorable assessment of their state economy. The authors attribute this 
difference to a respondent’s separation of their affections towards the government from how the 
economy impacts their personal lives (K&L, 15).  
Civic engagement or membership in a number of voluntary organizations was a 
consistent, positive predictor of political participation. This is not surprising given that survey 
questions on political interest and those on membership in voluntary organizations were found to 
be highly correlated with one another in the Afrobarometer data (K&L, 15). Related to interest in 
politics and civic association is membership in a political party. Mobilization, used 
synonymously with political party membership, is the strongest predictor of political 
participation across all ten cases. Although parties are relatively institutionally weak in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Kuenzi and Lambright highlight that however weak, political parties perform the 
important function of connecting individuals to the electoral process, such that those affiliated 
with a political party are much more likely (on average, 17 times more likely) to vote than those 
who are have no political party affiliation (K&L, 16). But political parties, as will be explained 
further, are also important access points to basic resources in the Sub-Saharan African context. 
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As previously mentioned, institutional arrangements and other contextual settings can 
either inhibit or assist political participation. Kuenzi and Lambright find that a majoritarian 
election system, concurrent legislative and presidential elections and Freedom House ratings are 
associated with higher participation rates among African electorates (K&L, 17). Lastly, the 
availability of and obtaining access to information resources is important for political 
engagement. Respondents who listened to radio news sources when available were more likely to 
vote in each of the ten countries in the study (K&L, 16).  
Although Senegal is not one of the ten countries included in Round I of the 
Afrobarometer surveys, the country is often referred to in the article to highlight patterns of 
democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Political parties spend most of their mobilization efforts in 
rural areas, where a majority of Afrobarometer survey respondents, and where the majority of 
Senegalese citizens live. As previously mentioned, Kuenzi and Lambright  reported that those 
who live in rural areas are more likely to vote than their urban counterparts. As the authors point 
out, this was also true for Senegal’s previous ruling party, the Parti Socialiste (PS) and is now 
true for the current party in power, the Parti Democratique du Senegal (PDS) (K&L, 11). But 
party affiliation often has very little to do with ideology. As many scholars have noted, people 
join parties and engage in political activities such as voting with the expectation of an individual, 
community or other benefit accrued to them upon the victory of their selected party (K&L 2005, 
Bratton and van de Walle 1999, and Linda Beck 2008). Party affiliation has less to do with 
ideology than expectations of reciprocity. Often referred to as clientelist, patronage or pork-
barrel politics this expectation of reciprocity can drive politicians and voters to switch political 
party affiliations in order to maintain access to the resources held by the state. In the case of 
Senegal, this party-switching technique is referred to as transhumance. One of the most notable 
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cases of transhumance in Senegal took place when politicians, local leaders and citizens 
suddenly left the losing PS party for the PDS party of Abdoulaye Wade in the wake of the 2000 
presidential elections. To maintain access to important resources voters also work to boost the 
status of their respective leader and expand their influence to larger political context, with the 
ultimate goal of widening the pool of resources available to them through their elected officials 
or appointed local leaders. 42  
Microfinance, politics and political participation have characteristics that are unique to 
the Sub-Saharan African context, and to Senegal more specifically. As outlined above, 
microfinance in Senegal caters to a wider range of clientele than the all-female groups 
traditionally associated with the micro-credit industry. In the political realm, political party 
identification is a much more fluid concept in Senegal than in other democratic systems. The 
ways in which the features of the microfinance industry in Senegal interact with the features of 
political participation in the Sub-Saharan African and Senegalese contexts are outlined in the 
following chapter.  
                                                
42 In the Senegalese case, religious leaders, persons with high caste status, wealthy men, or other 
types of patrons are also often politicians, linked to a political leader, and/or endorse a particular 
politician/political party. Baldwin addresses the ability of local patrons, or ‘Big Men’ to 
influence the votes of village residents, even in a secret ballot. See Kate Baldwin (2009). “Big 
Men and Ballots: Experimental Evidence on the Political Power of Patrons” Paper presented to 
the Comparative Politics Workshop, Columbia University. 
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Chapter Three: Social Capital, Political Participation and Microfinance in 
Senegal 
 
This chapter provides an overview of Senegal as a study site for the research project. The 
chapter discusses the social, political and economic climate in Senegal and how these elements 
interact with the citizens of Senegal’s participatory democracy. This chapter also presents 
empirical evidence from AfroBarometer data concerning the relevant indicators of political 
participation in urban Senegal. The chapter outlines relevant background information on 
political, social and economic features of life in the department of Guediawaye where the survey 
for the study was implemented and concludes with an observation about the role microfinance 




3.1 Introduction  
 
To test the ideas about what matters most for the political impact of microfinance I 
selected a study site where there was great variation in the types of micro-credit supplied by 
microfinance firms. In the summer 2004, I conducted an evaluation of a microfinance agency 
called AHDIS located in the region of Diourbel in central Senegal.43 It was there that I was first 
exposed to the microfinance industry in Senegal and its great diversity. As outlined in Chapter 
One, the microfinance industry in Senegal is expansive, diverse and well developed. The two 
largest microfinance firms in the country, CMS and PAMECAS were founded in 1988 and 1994 
respectively, and have grown to national organizations with several branches servicing across all 
14 regions of the country. In 2008, the government reported that approximately 18% of the adult 
population was using some form of short- term micro-credit from a saving mutual organization,44 
which would mean that the number of microfinance clients in Senegal at that time was roughly 
720,000 persons.  
                                                
43 ADHIS Humane Action for the Integrated Development of Senegal receives funding from the 
French Agency for International Development as well as the Canadian Agency for International 
Development. 
44 See Chapter 1, fn. 10 
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Microfinance in Senegal is exceptional for many reasons, not least of them being the 
variation among lending structures. Most microfinance institutions (MFIs) offer several different 
types of micro-loans including individual and group loans granted to both women and men alike. 
The various types of lending firms range from mutual organizations, to private not-for-profit 
firms to government funded entities. Lastly, the extent to which firms have financial autonomy 
from the government and other outside funding sources varies from firm to firm. Thus, 
microfinance in Senegal provides a fruitful place to study the political impact of micro-credit 
across several MFI contexts. Given the variation in the types of credit made available, the 
variation in the structure of group and individual loans, and the diversity of the supply of 
creditors, any theory about the political effects of micro-lending on individual clients that proves 
applicable in the Senegalese context will hold generalizeable power across other settings as well. 
The following sections in this chapter include an overview of the strongest predictors of 
political participation in Senegal informed by analysis of Afrobarometer data; a demographic 
overview of the country of Senegal and sections which highlight important features of the social, 
economic and political makeup of the country. The final sections provide a general overview of 
the urban survey site of Guediawaye and how the microfinance industry interacts with, and 
relates to its Senegalese environs. This chapter explores the unique contextual background in 
which the microfinance industry in Senegal is set.  
 
3.2 Politics and Participation in Senegal 
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According to Freedom House, Senegal is a free, democratic regime with a reasonable share of 
civil liberties and political rights.45 Formally, the Senegalese state is self-described as a  
“Secular and socially democratic state…assuring the equality of 
all citizens regardless of birthplace, ethnicity, gender or 
religion…respecting all faiths. National sovereignty rests in the 
hands of the Senegalese people who exercise this sovereignty 
through their representatives or by a national referendum.”46 
 
The national-level governing institutions of Senegal include the President of the 
Republic; the Government Administration headed by a Prime Minister and Secretary-General; 
the Parliament consisting of the National Assembly and the Senate; the Council of Social and 
Economic Advisors; and the Judiciary. Local governments in Senegal include five various levels 
of administration. These are the Regional Councils, Municipal Councils, City and District 
Commune Councils, and Rural Councils. Each of the fourteen regions of Senegal has a regional 
council. In 1996 the government of Senegal, under the leadership of the country’s second 
president, Abdou Diouf47, instituted a series of reforms that transferred certain administrative 
powers to local government bodies. The 1996 Decentralization Code granted decision-making 
powers to local governments in several areas including revenue procurement (in the form of 
taxes, loans, and/or NGO grants) and various social services such as education and literacy 
programs, healthcare, and housing. Local bodies were also given the authority to develop and 
                                                
45 2007 Freedom House rating based on the minimum requirement of free, competitive multi-
party elections. How free or competitive the elections are debatable. Gellar points out that the 
term democracy has various definitions among the Senegalese public. For example the Wolof 
word demokarassi emphasizes consensus building, reciprocity in resource distribution; elections 
are secondary to this version of democracy (Gellar, 12).  
46 Official website of the Government of Senegal: http://www.gouv.sn/spip.php?rubrique1 
47 Senegal’s first president, immediately following independence in 1960 was Leopold Sedar 
Senghor (as head of the UPS and subsequently PS party), who ruled as president until he 
resigned and named Diouf as his successor in December 1980. Under Diouf, Senegal was 
governed by the PS party for another 20 years until he lost the 2000 Presidential election to 
Abdoulaye Wade and the National Assembly was dissolved by Wade to make room in 
parliament for members of his party, the PDS (Senegalese Democratic Party). 
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implement strategies for economic development, environmental protection, land usage, sports, 
culture and youth activities.48  
Although the decentralization reforms in the 1996 Code des Collectivites locals created 
some 368 new local collectives and new adjacent councils whose members are elected to their 
posts, the reforms were not exactly intended to assuage the grievances or dissatisfactions voiced 
by opponents of then President, M. Abdou Diouf.  The reforms may have had the happy by-
product of generating interests among political hopefuls to seek local, rather than national 
political posts. But, as many scholars have pointed out, rather than devolving power to entities 
closer to the public and civil society, decentralization often increased the presence of the central 
state apparatus whereby the state gained oversight of the administration of rights and resources 
such as land and commercial licenses in the name of ‘harmonizing local development efforts.’49 
At the time of the research for this dissertation the political situation in Senegal appeared 
extremely tense.50 The current and then presumably soon-to-be outgoing President, Mr. 
Abdoulaye Wade was campaigning for his son, Karim Wade, a candidate in the mayoral race of 
Dakar in the March 2009 Departmental and Regional elections. It was believed that Monsieur le 
President Wade sought the office for his son as an interim post until he was able to name Karim 
as successor to the Presidency. After Karim was sorely defeated, President Wade began pushing 
for constitutional reform to run for a third presidential term in 2012, which would overturn the 
constitutional referendum he spearheaded in January 2001 that introduced two-five-year term 
                                                
48 Gellar, p.194 Fn. 36 
49 For more on this topic see Beck 2001; Beck 2008; Gellar 2005; and Juul 2006 
50 It has worsened since the Supreme Court granted M. Abdoulaye Wade the legal authority to 
run for a third term in February 2012. This has sparked fatally violent uprisings across Senegal in 
clashes with anti-Wade demonstrators and the police. 
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limits to the office of president; (following his first seven-year term) a move that helped Senegal 
to regain its status as a starlet among African democracies.51  
Because of these and other political maneuverings, the public seemed incredibly 
disillusioned by President Wade in 2009 and he was often referred to as “menteur” or liar (a 
seriously egregious offense in Senegalese culture) by opposition parties, human rights 
organizations and prominent news organizations. The perception of public disillusionment with 
politics was evidenced by the boycott of the June 2007 legislative elections but is also 
discernible in interviews with ordinary Senegalese citizens who often self-identify as apolitical 
or completely uninterested in politics and political affairs.52 
On the surface, politics and politicians in Senegal promote the ideas of individualism, 
equality, and civic pluralism. Practically however, Senegal’s democracy, even in the more 
advanced and diverse urban areas, rests on very tentative foundations. These include an 
executive office with a considerable amount of power and a fragmented party system made of 
parties that lack ideological or issue platforms, often blur the line between religion and state, and 
rely on a system of patronage and clientelism.53 Citizens have justifiable reasons to either abstain 
                                                
51 On June 16, 2011 Wade indeed introduced a constitutional amendment creating the 
unprecedented role of Vice President (most likely intended for his son Karim Wade) to be 
included on the ballot creating a “presidential ticket.” Wade also called for a reduction to the 
threshold for electoral victory from 50% of votes to 25% of national votes. Several protests 
erupted in reaction to the move, many of them organized by a coalition of opposition forces 
called the June 23rd movement. See “Succession Debate Threatens Stability in Senegal” by 
David Zounmenou for a concise reporting of the Wade succession questions. (Institute for 
Security Studies, July 19, 2011) He succeeded in changing the constitution with the approval of 
the Senegalese Supreme Court in January 2012. 
52 In the original dataset almost half of survey respondents (49%) indicated they were not at all 
interested in politics and an overwhelming majority are not a member of a political party (85%). 
53 Contemporary and previous scholars have described Senegal’s democracy is as one with a 
very strong executive; a weak legislature; a dependent judiciary and a local political structure 
supported by patronage, personalism and clientelist politics. Mbow 2008; Dahou and Foucher 
2004; Thomas and Sissokho 2004; Ottoway 2002; Beck 2001 and 1997; Galvan 2001; Villalon 
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from political engagement or intensify their levels of political activity. Nevertheless, many 
Senegalese citizens choose to vote for an array of reasons, which will be explored below.  
For most of the history of national-level electoral politics in Senegal, participation rates 
among registered voters have been relatively moderate compared to voter turnout rates in sub-
Saharan Africa and across the world. Since 1963, average voter turnout for is about 68% for 
presidential elections and 55% for national assembly elections.54 In the local/municipal elections 
of June 2002 and March 2009 average turnout rates of registered voters are even lower at rates of 
52% and 50%, respectively.55 Yet, what drives political participation in Senegal is an interesting 
question that has not been treated in recent political science literature even though the 
Afrobarometer Round II survey data make such analysis possible for 16 Sub-Saharan African 
countries. Using AfroBaromenter Round II data, I analyzed participation in Senegal against the 
standard indicators of political participation to identify how general understandings about what 
motivated individual level political participation map on to the Senegalese case. 
In sum, analysis of Afrobarometer data indicate that the factors most associated with 
political participation in Senegal include gender, age, education, income, higher levels of civic 
                                                                                                                                                       
1994 and 1995; and Behrman 1977 provide in-depth discussions of these features of Senegalese 
politics. 
54 Data obtained from the African Elections Database at 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/sn.html. Analysis is restricted to the multiparty presidential 
elections of 1963, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 2000 and 2007. It includes two figures for the 2000 
Presidential election because of a necessary run-off election. The average rates turnout rates 
dampen the extremely high turnout rates of 1963, 1968 and 1970, where turnout rates never fell 
below 90%. Since then however, turnout rates for national elections in Senegal have never 
exceeded 70%. See Appendix 2, Table 2.4.1 
55 I calculated turnout rates for these elections using voting data from the National Autonomous 
Electoral Commission of Senegal at http://www.cena.sn/locales/index_locales.php and 
population data from the National Agency of Statistics and Demography of Senegal at 
http://www.ansd.sn/publications/annuelles See Appendix 2, Tables 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. 
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engagement, close affiliation with a political party, and interest in politics.56 In Round II of the 
Afroboarmoeter survey, a variable from the previous round, ‘Voted in Last Election?’ was 
omitted from the survey instrument. Senegal was not included in Round I of the Afrobarometer 
Survey. Therefore, there is no questions about voting history in the survey administered in 
Senegal. Using Round II survey instrument I created an index for national-level political 
participation that included questions about incidents and frequency of respondent contact with 
national political figures such as a parliamentary representative, a government ministry official, 
and a political party official. Two separate forms of political participation regressed against 
participation indicators were: contacting local government representatives and attending a protest 
or demonstration.  
Table 3.1 Political Participation in Senegal 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES PoliticalActionScale ContactLocalRep ProtestMarch 
    
Gender 0.473*** 0.214** 0.178* 
 (0.149) (0.09) (0.10) 
Age 0.00120** 0.000204 0.000191 
 (0.000548) (0.00) (0.00) 
URBRUR 0.191 0.190** -0.0587 
 (0.165) (0.10) (0.11) 
Education 0.114*** 0.0416* 0.0880*** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
Income_GoHungry -0.0418 -0.0000514 0.129*** 
 (0.0649) (0.04) (0.04) 
CommInterest 0.0385 0.00172 -0.033 
 (0.0676) (0.04) (0.04) 
CommViolence 0.0328 0.0357 0.00782 
 (0.0413) (0.02) (0.03) 
PoliticalTrustScale -0.0109 -0.00244 -0.0144 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
QuestionLeaders -0.0251 0.0278 0.026 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
UnderstandPolitics 0.00754 0.0169 -0.0214 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
CountryEconPosition -0.0373 -0.0940** 0.0642 
                                                
56 See Appendix 3, Table 3.1 
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 (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) 
ApproveMP -0.0272 -0.0227 -0.0103 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) 
RadioNews -0.0267 -0.0569 -0.00206 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) 
PoliticalInterst 0.320*** 0.172*** 0.150** 
 (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) 
CivicEngmtScale 0.182*** 0.0925*** 0.0337 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
ClosetoParty 0.565*** 0.185** 0.168* 
 (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) 
    
Constant -0.631 -0.0811 0.385 
 (0.65) (0.38) (0.42) 
    
Observations 567 567 568 
R-squared 0.157 0.118 0.091 
Standard errors in parentheses ()   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
†Data from Afrobarometer Round II surveys were used for this analysis. 
As Table 3.1 indicates, certain variables remain positive and significant across all forms 
of political participation. Men are much more likely than women to reach out to national-level 
politicians (1); local level political officials (2) and to participated in a protest or demonstration 
against the government. This is also true for persons with higher levels of education, greater 
interest in politics and those affiliated with a political party. However, the effect of these 
consistently significant variables on the three different models of participation varies by the type 
of participation in question. For example, gender, education level, political interest and party 
affiliation exhibit their strongest effects on the dependent variable for contacting local political 
officials in Model (2). In the model of participating in a protest, (3) the strength of the 
coefficients of these variables declines. Other variables however, only seem to be important for 
one or two forms of political participation. Levels of civic engagement are important for 
contacting political officials. Unfavorable assessments of the country’s economic position are 
significantly associated with contacting a local government representative. Last is the finding 
62 
  
that those likely to go without food are more likely to attend a protest/demonstration. We should 
expect microfinance as an indicator to behave similarly and matter more for certain forms of 
political participation than others, if it is shown to influence political participation. 
3.3 Demographic Overview of Senegal 
Senegal is a small country, covering a landmass of 196,712 square kilometers (or about 
76,000 square miles).57 In 2002, the third official census reported Senegal to be a country of 
almost ten million inhabitants.58 The projected population levels for 2009, when field research 
for this study was conducted, was close to twelve million.59 Senegal is a country composed 
primarily of young people. 54.7 percent of the population in 2002 was less than twenty years of 
age, 35.5 percent of the population was between twenty and forty-nine years old, and the 
remaining 10 percent were 50 years of age and above.60 The national report attributes the youth 
bias in Senegal to two factors: high fertility levels and a decrease in infant mortality rates due to 
progress made in public health campaigns, especially those targeted towards mothers of children 
under the age of five.61 In addition to a youth bias, there is a gender bias in Senegal. Males are 
predominate among the youth population up to fifteen years old, after that, females dominate the 
                                                
57 Rapport national de présentation des résultats définitifs. ANSD, Décembre 2006, p.14 
58 The official number was 9,858,482. However, Senegal records two separate polulation levels: population de fait 
and populations de droit respectively. The former, population de fait counts the number of persons who live in a 
household, both present and absent at the time of the census. The former population de droit counts the number of 
persons residing in the household at the time of the census as well as any long-term visitors. The populations de fait 
and the population de droit are recorded as 9,555,346 and 9,858,346 respectively. In the official national report, the 
latter count is used, which is the number applied to this study. See the Rapport national de présentation des 
résultats définitifs. ANSD, Décembre 2006, p.12 
59 Ibid. There was a national census conducted in 2008 but no official reports have been published on the results of 
the census. One can assume that the population grew as expected because following the census, many administrative 
departments became regions. Population growth was named as the principal reason but President Abdoulaye Wade 
may have had political incentives for the redistricting of the country the expand the number of government posts 
available for those in the ruling party. 
60 Ibid, pp.15-16 
61 Ibid, p. 16 
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population in every age group, except 75-79.62 Although there are more adult women than men 
living in Senegal, men, not surprisingly, are dominant in terms of political participation. In the 
previous section, Afrobarometer data indicated that gender, education, interest in politics, and 
being affiliated with a political party are consistent indicators of certain forms of political 
participation in Senegal. 
The previous section indicated that there are some forms of political participation in 
Senegal that are more popular than others, namely contacting political officials and participating 
in a protest or demonstration. Being involved in various civic organizations was a significant 
indicator of contacting local and national government officials. Given these predictors of 
political participation, part of the aim of this study is to determine which features of 
microfinance motivate individuals to become more politically engaged and whether microfinance 
has separate and independent effects on political participation than those listed here.  
Policymakers and a few scholars have argued that microfinance engenders political 
participation through social capital by enhancing feelings of trust, mutual cooperation and 
community building among groups of female borrowers. Given that microfinance in Senegal 
offers loans to both individuals and groups, irrespective of gender, this study offers an alternative 
theory of how microfinance may be related to political participation in Senegal. Before outlining 
the argument however, some background information on the case selection is necessary. 
 
3.4 Ethnicity and Language in Senegal 
In 1993, the national report of the 1988 Senegal census stated that intermingling among 
the principal ethnic groups of Senegal decreased the need for traditional ethnicity distinctions 
                                                
62 RGPHIII, p. 17. This is a typical feature among developing countries where young men often emigrate in search of 
better employment opportunities abroad. This would also serve to explain why women dominate the microfinance 
market in Senegal. 
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among Senegalese citizens. The same report identified the principal ethnic groups as Wolof,63 
Serer, Peul, Toucouler,64 Mandique65 and Diola, but also noted that Senegal is home to twenty 
different ethnic groups.66 The waning significance of ethnic identity from the perspective of the 
Senegalese government is perhaps best represented by the decision to omit the analysis of ethnic 
groups from the 2002 National Census.67 Nevertheless, the 1993 census reported the region of 
Dakar to be the most ethnically diverse (in terms of representation among all of the principal 
ethnic groups) with the Wolof accounting for 53.8 percent of the population, followed by the 
Halpoulareen at 18.5 percent, Serer at 11.6 percent, the Diola at 4.7 percent and the Mandigue at 
2.8 percent; unnamed groups comprised the remaining 8.6 percent of the population of Dakar. 
One explanation for the government’s decision to omit demographic data on ethnicity in 
Senegal is that ethnicity is not a particularly salient political identity. In terms of ethnic tensions 
or conflicts, Senegal is unlike some of its West African counterparts such as Cote d’Ivoire and 
Nigeria, which have both experienced several, violent ethnic conflicts in the past few years.68 
                                                
63 Composed of the Wolof and Lebou see RGPHII, p.24 
64 The Toucouler, Peul, Laobe, and Foula ethnic groups are referred to as the Halpoularen. Ibid. 
65 The Malinke, Mandigue and Soce groups form the Malinke. Ibid. 
66 Ibid. Others list an additional group, the Soninke, as one of Senegal’s major ethnic groups 
(Gellar 2005:15) 
67 While the 1993 Rapport National Recensement General de la Population et de l’Habitat de 
1988 includes a list of the relevant ethnic groups in Senegal, and provides an analysis of how 
these groups are represented across Senegal’s regions, the Rapport National of the 2002 Census 
only provides a distribution of ethnic groups among recent and long-term international 
Senegalese immigrants and rates of alphabetization in the dominant language for the 
aforementioned ethnic groups. For the purposes of this study however, a brief overview of the 
ethnic groups in the region of Dakar might be helpful.  
 
68 This is not to negate the ethnic tensions and violence that erupted in April and May of 1989 
between Senegalese and Mauritanian nationals that led to violent uprisings in both countries. In 
addition, the Casamance in the southern region of Zuiguinchor, Senegal is home to Africa’s 
longest running civil conflict which is not an ethnic conflict, but in some instances ethnicity is 
used to gain support for the majority-Diola backed secessionist movement. For more on the 1989 
conflict see Michael Horowitz, “Victims of Development,” IDA Development Anthropology 
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Evidence of the political insignificance of ethnicity can be found in Linda Beck’s Brokering 
Democracy in Africa where she explores variation in support for the incumbent (PS) party across 
four of Senegal’s major electoral districts. Beck explains that if ethnicity were a deciding factor 
for Senegal’s party politics then the Islamo-Wolof dominated PS party could not have 
maintained support from the Toucouler, Pulaar and Jola/Diola ethnic and religions minorities 
outside of the Wolof-dominated regions of Dakar and Diourbel.69 In addition, ethnic and 
religious homogeneity in Wolof-dominated areas did not prevent revolts against, or political 
opposition to the Islamo-Wolof dominated incumbent (PS) party.70  
Theories about the origins of ethnic and religious tolerance in Senegal abound. For the 
most part these theories are steeped in historical, political, social and enviro-anthropoligic 
explanations. For some, the migratory nature of early Senegalese inhabitants who emigrated 
from other kingdoms to the east, including the Nile River Valley, fostered a continual tolerance 
for immigrants and newcomers to a land that was vast and mainly arid.71 For others, what was 
(and in some ways remains) a more politically salient identity is their placement in the caste or 
social hierarchical structure within their particular ethnic group or other social ordering (although 
the political salience of caste and social order varies from group to group).72 In fact, ethno-
                                                                                                                                                       
Network, Vol. 7, No.2 (Fall1989), p. 1-8. For more on the Casamance conflict, see Chapter 5 of 
Linda Beck’s Brokering Democracy in Senegal. Palgrave/MacMillan. 2008 pp.153-196 and 
Gellar, p. 160  
In the spelling of names of ethnic groups, I defer to spelling used in the Rapport National 
Recensement General de la Population et de l’Habitat or National Report of the General 
Population and Housing Census of Government of Senegal. Other others cited here may use 
ethnic language alphabetization for the spelling. 
69 See Beck 2008, pp. 7-9 
70 See Beck 2001, pp. 612-621 The growth in the use of the Wolof language, however, could be 
interpreted as a sign that the Wolof ethnic group is dominating others in Senegalese life. Scholars 
such as Beck and Moumar Coumba Diop and mamadou Diop 
71 See Diop 1960, Brooks 1993, Curtin 1975, and Pelissier 1966. 
72 See Gellar, pp. 19-21. Beck 2008, pp. 19 - 20 
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pluralism and religious tolerance served Senegalese’s leaders well as nation-building political 
tools in the years following Senegal’s independence. For example, Senegal’s first president, 
Leopold Sedar Senghor, publicly espoused his philosophies about the commonalities of people 
through his progressive immigration policies towards residents of neighboring countries. In 
addition, his campaigns on nationalism and négritude were part of a political strategy of reducing 
differences in order to develop a strong sense of national unity.73 Senghor’s successors Abdiou 
Diouf and Abdoulaye Wade have followed in his footsteps, promoting cultural expression and 
celebrating cultural differences as evidence of the quality of Senegal’s democracy. President 
Wade has gone as far as denouncing other African leaders for relying on ethnic division for 
political support.74  
Although there is a high level of inter-ethnic peace and religious toleration among 
Senegalese citizens, this should not cloud the process of language convergence taking place in 
Senegal. Often referred to as ‘Wolofization,’75 this process has not been a deliberate one, 
fashioned by a particular group or council. Nevertheless, at rapidly growing rates, Senegalese 
citizens across various backgrounds and landscapes are beginning to use Wolof as their primary 
language, often to the chagrin of older generations. How Wolof became the dominant language 
in many parts of Senegal remains a linguistic and historical puzzle. Sheldon Gellar points out 
                                                
73 Gellar, pp. 161-162 
74 Ibid. Abdoulaye Wade has openly criticized the policies of the government of Cote d’Ivoire 
for its position towards immigrants from Burkina Faso. Although his familial ties with 
opposition to the government may have had more influence on his statement than his 
philosophies on ethnic pluralism. 
75 Wolofization is a dynamic term that mainly refers to the integration of non-Wolof ethnic 
groups into Wolf by way of language. For more on Wolofization, see Beck 2008, Diop and Diouf 
1990 and Cruise O’Brien 1990). It should also be noted that relative to other African countries 
Senegal is home to an incredibly small number of ethnic groups. It’s neighbor to the south, 




that following independence, access to jobs in the private and government sectors of the 
economy required higher levels of education than primary schooling. According to Gellar, this 
sent many Senegalese to seek out opportunities in the expanding informal sector, where Wolof 
was the lingua franca. (Gellar 2005: 133) Beck also points out that migration to cities and urban 
centers oblige(s/d) the Diola living in rural villages in southern Senegal to learn Wolof. (Beck 
2008: 160) 
While Senegal may enjoy a peaceful degree of ethnic pluralism, with several languages 
being recognized by the government as national languages, Wolof has become the unofficial, 
official language of Senegalese politics, media, news information sources, and culture. Most 
Senegalese newspapers and television and radio stations have exclusively Wolof programming. 
Posters and billboards that line the streets and main roadways of Senegal ranging from campaign 
materials for politicians, to advertisements for businesses from mobile phones to dairy products, 
are almost exclusively directed at Wolof-speaking and reading audiences. The majority of 
popular Senegalese musicians sing and perform in Wolof.76 Formerly, non-Wolof Senegalese 
spoke their maternal language at home, now however, more people are speaking Wolof in both 
their personal and professional lives. (Gellar 2005:136)  
Personal observations during the field research for this project revealed that proficiency 
in Wolof is often linked to intelligence or intellectual capability. In my observations this 
‘intelligence’ was more attached to the possession of common sense than it is to level of 
schooling. However, government studies on language and alphabetization report that Wolof 
enjoys the highest degree of literacy rates after French and Arabic. Approximately 1.5 percent of 
the population (about 150,000 persons) is literate in Wolof. However Pulaar speakers—or 
                                                
76 An exception to this rule is famed singer Baba Maal who sings in Pulaar and Wolof. 
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Halpulaaren are close behind with a literacy rate of 1.2 percent 77 (RGPHIII 2008: 82).  
‘Wolofization’ has been a contested development of Senegalese educational, political and social 
life. In the Lower Casamance regions the Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de la 
Casamance or MFDC often cited Wolofization as one reason for their desire to secede from 
Senegal. (Beck 2008: 160). Pulaar speakers, on the other hand, responded to Wolofization by 
igniting a cultural movement, which included a successful literacy campaign to train students to 
read and write in the Pulaar language (Beck 2008: 161). 
 
3.5 The Importance of Religion 
Religion and politics have a reputation of being intricately linked in Senegal. This is true 
in varying degrees for each of Senegal’s four confréries listed below. But the role of religious 
identity and religions leaders as political mediators has, for the most part, waned over time. The 
overwhelming majority of the population is Muslim and religion is a very public feature of 
Senegalese life. In fact, the nation’s mantra, Un Peuple, Un But, Une Foi (One People, One 
Goal, One Faith) is printed on government documents and emblazoned on the government seal 
and coat of arms. Prayer is often a public act and it is not uncommon to see Senegalese (mainly 
men) completing one or all of their five daily prayers, or Salah on the sidewalks of Dakar or in 
designated public praying areas when shopkeepers and business owners are unable to get to a 
Mosque. Results from the 1988 census indicate that 93.8% of the population is Muslim and the 
                                                
77 Unfortunately, the 2002 government survey does not ask what language people primarily 
speak in their homes. In the previous census, 70.1 percent of the population spoke Wolof. 49.2 
percent of non-ethnic Wolof spoke Wolof as their primary language, which exceeds the rate of 
ethnic Wolof, 42.7 percent of ethnic Wolof listed Wolof as their primary language. Even in 
regions where Wolof constituted an ethnic minority, non-ethnic Wolof spoke Wolof at higher 




remaining 6% include Christians (4.3%) and those who practice other and traditional religions 
(1.6%)78(RGPHII 1993: 27). 
Among Muslims in Senegal, there are four Sufi brotherhoods (confréries) to which the 
majority of Senegalese (88.4%) belong. The Khadirya79 is the oldest tariqa (Sufi order) in 
Senegal, founded in the twelfth century in Bagdad by Abd al-Qadir Jilani and spread across 
North Africa in the nineteenth century. (Beck 2008: 50) Members of this Sufi order lived 
primarily in the southern regions of Ziguinchor, Tambacounda and Kolda at the time of the 1988 
census and accounted for 10.9 percent of Senegalese Muslims. The second largest tariqa is the 
Mouride Brotherhood80 accounting for 30 percent of the country’s Muslims, with an extremely 
dominant presence in certain regions, especially region of Diourbel, where Touba, the Holy 
Capital of Mouridism is located. In Diourbel, 85.3 percent of Muslims belong to the Mouride 
Brotherhood. The Mouride order also has a heavy presence in Thies (44.7%), Louga (45.9%) and 
Fatick (38.6%). The Mouride Brotherhood or tariqa was founded in Senegal by Wolof marabout 
Shaykh Amadou Bamba who was heavily influenced by the Khadiriya.81 The Mouride tariqa is 
perhaps the most politically powerful among Senegal’s Sufi orders because Mouride leaders or 
khalifes are often able to mobilize large blocs of voters for political candidates and political 
officials often need the credence provided by the khalifes of the brotherhood.  
                                                
78 As in the case with ethnicity and spoken languages, it is unclear why the distribution of 
religious affiliation were omitted from the 2002 census. 
79 Here and elsewhere the government spelling for the Sufi orders or tariqa is used. However, 
alternative spellings for the Khadiriya are Qadiri, Qadiriyya or Qadiriya. 
80 Also spelled Muridiya or Muridiyya. 
81 The founder of the Mouride confrerie has been referred often as Cheikh Amadou Bamba. This 
spelling, is widely used, even among members of the brotherhood. Beck (2008:54) has pointed 
out, that this spelling is incorrect. While Beck uses the Anglican form Shaikh, the spelling used 
here is derived from Mouride (Murid) texts including those of the Murid Islamic Community in 
America, or Mica. The term Cheikh is probably widely used because of its etymological 




The largest tariqa in Senegal is the Tidiane82 Sufi order. Founded during the eighteenth 
century in Morocco by Ahmad al-Tijani, the Tidiane Brotherhood has a strong presence in all of 
the regions of the country, expect for the region of Diourbel where Mourides are dominant, but 
the Tidiane still represent close to ten percent of Muslims there. In 1988, about 47.4 percent of 
all Muslims in Senegal belong to the Tidiane brotherhood, their presence strongest in the regions 
of St. Louis and Kaolack, Tambacounda and Kolda (RGPHII 1993: 28.) The fourth and smallest 
(but growing) Sufi order in Senegal is the Layene Brotherhood, which distinguish themselves by 
dressing in all-white attire. The Layene tariqa was founded in the Cap Vert peninsula of Senegal 
in 1884 by Saint Master Seydina Limamou Laye among the Lébou population of pre-colonial 
Senegal. The Lébou people established an independent republic in 1790 in present-day Yoff, a 
central-coastal section of the capital city, Dakar.83 Their strongest presence is in the regions of 
Dakar and Diourbel where respectively 2.1 percent and 3.7 percent of Muslims belong to the 
Layene tariqa (RGPHII 1993: 28). 
The most politically influential confrérie is said to be the Mouride Brotherhood founded 
by Shaykh Amadou Bamba. At one point, especially during the middle and later parts of 
twentieth century, political leaders’ friendly association (in the form of favorable transactions 
with the state and agricultural resources) with the Khalife-General or Surpeme Marabout of the 
Mouride Confréries and even other lesser marabout, meant guaranteed electorate from among the 
thousands, even millions of Mouride disciples, referred to as taalibe.  
                                                
82 Also spelled Tijiani, Tijaniya or Tijaniyya. 
83 Not much scholarship is available on the Layene (also spelled Layenne) tariqa. This 
information was obtained from a brief history of the Layene available on their website 
www.layene.sn. For a deeper study on the Layene see Cevile Laborde, La Confrerie ayenne et 
les Lebou du Senegal: Islam et culture traditionelle en Afrique (Bordeaux: Centre d’Etude 
d’Afrique Noire, 1995) 
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The ability to harness electoral power from the disciples is attributable to several factors. 
One such factor is the structure of the spiritual nature of the relationship between marabout and 
disciple. Part of the belief structure of Mouridism is that disciples or taalibes are dependent upon 
their marabouts (who are almost exclusively descendants of the founder) as intercessors between 
themselves and God. Mouride taalibes believe that they can only enter Paradise (Islamic heaven) 
upon the back of their marabout, who hands them over to Amadou Bamba, who hands them over 
to Allah or God. Another factor that contributed to the political salience of the Mouride 
confréries’s leadership was the ethnic composition of the Mouride brotherhood and the leaders 
of the ruling political parties. The Mouride tariqa is almost exclusively Wolof (though they have 
been gaining members from other ethnic groups), and members of the Wolof ethnic group were 
dominant among the leaders of the PS party, although Senghor himself was a member of the 
Serer ethnic group, and a Catholic.  
The most important political factor however, is the historical political-economic relations 
between the Mouride leadership and the colonial and newly independent state of Senegal. 
Mouride disciples were once organized into villages for the purpose of peanut cultivation. 
Colonial administrators of France, Senegal’s colonial occupiers, developed mutually beneficial 
relationships with the Khalife-General after Mouride resistance to French occupation proved 
futile. This mutually beneficial relationship formed over the issue of groundnut production, 
Senegal’s main export. The production of grounduts provided a source of revenue for Mouride 
disciples, the colonial admistrative apparatus, and subsequently the newly-independet state of 
Senegal. Taalibes are expected to give over part of their personal earnings to their marabout and 
the state gave the marabouts access to state resources in exchange for the marabout legitimating 
the state and issuing informal but effective ndigels (a religious command) to support a particular 
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candidate or in most cases, the ruling party. As droughts, financial crises, unfair producer prices 
and state mismanagement of the agricultural boards began to take form in the 1960s, the nature 
of state-maraboutic relations began to change, as did the use of the ndigel for political purposes. 
In practice in the 1960’s and publicly declared through the 1980s and 1990s ndigels issued by the 
Khalif –General and lesser marabouts were a lifeline for the PS (formely UPS and BDS) party of 
Presidents Senghor and Diouf. Today however, political ndigels are highly contested, as noted 
above in the 1997 Touba tax revolts, and are unable to mobilize voters as once before.84 Some 
marabouts are still involved in politics by issuing ndigels, endorsing various candidates or 
running for office themselves (all features that have increased political competitiveness) but 
ndigels by the Khalife-General that garner a huge vote-share appear to be part of a by-gone era.  
Other Islamic confréries of Senegal have not held the political capital of the Mouride 
brotherhood. This is a factor of size, organization, and composition, For example, the largest of 
the three Sufi orders, the Tidiane brotherhood, is the most geographically dispersed and 
ethnically diverse. Regions where a majority of Muslims belong to the Tidiane confréries 
(Dakar, St. Louis, Tambacounda, Kaoloack, and Kolda) are also regions where Senegalese ethnic 
groups alternate in majority. In Dakar, Kaolack and Thies, Wolof are the ethnic majority. In St. 
Louis, Tambacounda and Kolda, Hal-pulaaren ethnic groups (or ethnic groups who share the 
Pulaar language) comprise the majority. Thus neither the leaders, nor the members of the Tidiane 
brotherhood are able to rally or unite on the basis of ethnicity. More importantly, however there 
is no spiritual tenant held by Tidiane disciples that Tidiane leaders are official intercessors for 
God. Additionally, the entire group Tidiane leaders are not organized based on religion, such that 
                                                
84 For more on the development of ndigels and the relevance of marabouts as political mediators 
over time, see Beck 2008, pp. 69-115. Some seminal works on the Mouride Brotherhood in 
Senegal include Donal Cruise O’Brien ( 
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there is one Supreme Leader or Khalife-General of Tidiane marabouts.85 Lastly, Tidiane 
marabouts, as such, have no history of being political powerbrokers able to organize great blocks 
of voters to support the state or party in power.86 The Tidiane confréries in Senegal is often 
divided into four distinct sub-groups connected to various charismatic religious leaders.87 Two of 
these leaders, Ibrahim Niasse and Malik Sy, are Wolof marabouts from the regions of Kaolack 
and Tivaoune, respectively. The other Tidiane leaders, Umar Tall of the Fuuta Toro in northern 
Senegal and Mamadou Saidou Ba from the southern Casamance region of Senegal both belong 
to ethnic groups that share the Hal-pulaaren language. These four leaders have not been reported 
to link their religious authority to political matters i.e., issue ndigels. On the other hand however, 
to the extent that Hal-pulaaren Tidiane leaders were political power players, it was a function of 
their placement in their respective social orders and not a function of their religious authority. 
3.6 Politics and Society 
Various systems of social orderings including caste, age, and gender have been a feature 
of Seneglaese life for centuries, though ones of diminishing prominence. Often, in instances 
where religious authority had no bearing on individual choices in the political realm, social 
authorities filled the gap in a non-uniform way across Senegal. The region most known for its 
adherence to social orderings in terms of caste was the Fuuta Tooro area, which includes the 
areas around the northeastern border that Senegal shares with Mauritania along the Senegal 
                                                
85 At it Senegalese installation, the Tijiani brotherhood had a Grand-Khalife, Umar Tall, who 
was named Grand Khalife of West Africa on a pilgrammage to Mecca. It is unclear if this title 
resonated upon his return to Senegal. See Gellar 2005, p. 33 and Jamil Abun-Nasr, 1965. 
86 There are exceptions to every rule. Moustapha Sy, a prominent Tidiane leader, galvanized 
support for then challenger, President Abdoulaye Wade in the 1993 elections. (Beck 2008: 104) 
Sy and Kara Mbacke of the Mouride confrérie had large followings among the male youth of 
Senegal. (Gellar 2005: 115) 
87 See Beck 2008, p. 50-51 and Gellar 2005, p.33-34 
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River valley. The Fuuta Tooro encompasses the admisnitrative regions of eastern St. Louis and 
Matam. Among the population that reside in the Fuuta Tooro are the Toucouleur88 a subset of 
two groups living in the region; the Poular (or Pulaar) speakers and the FuuntakoBe people 
which include the Peul, Soninke and Wolok minorities of the region (Beck 2008: 118).  
Precolonial Toucouleur society, like those of other Senegalese ethnic groups, was highly 
stratified and included three basic categories with various sub-groups: free born, artisans and 
captives. This order was maintained through endogamy (intra-caste marriage) and heredity. A 
small section of the Toucouleur constituted the ruling dynastic families that have held fiercely to 
their monopoly on political power as other sources of power have eroded (or become readily 
accessible across castes, authoctonous and immigrant groups) over time.89 Unable to conscript 
access to other forms of authority, members of a small Toucouleur ruling elite, known as the 
toorobe have had to rely only on their monopoly of access to the candidate lists of the local 
political offices in their districts.   
Caste politics remains a feature of local level politics in the Fuuta Tooro, although 
reported to be changing slowly as members of low caste origins have gained access to the party 
list (Beck 2008: 150). Because the enduring basis of Senegalese politics (and social hierarchies) 
is the principle of clientalism, members of the Toucouleur political elite seek to maintain their 
role as the exclusive political patrons in order to perpetuate their social status within Toucouleur 
society. Because of their reliance on political power to buttress their social significance toorobe 
Toucouleur often play musical chairs among the active parties in the region, in a gamble to be 
part of the winning party and/or the party with more pork to spare. 
                                                
88 Again the spelling is taken from the National Report of the Second Official Census of Senegal, 
RGPHII 1993: 24. Other spellings include Tukulor or Tukeleur. 
89 For a detailed overview of the erosion of religious and economic power of Tukolor dynastic 
families see Beck 2008: 117-151. 
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Gender is a persistent social ordering that affects political participation in Senegal. 
Historically, women have voted less than men, and when they did, they often voted along the 
preference(s) of the male leader of their household. And yet, women’s representation at all levels 
of government has increased dramatically in Senegal, especially since the introduction of gender 
quotas to the national legislature and rural and regional councils.90 However, as Linda Beck 
points out, structural barriers to women’s participation in the political arena, either as voters, 
influential party members or political candidates remain in tact.91 If women have political 
aspirations, and are nominated to serve in the executive branch or be submitted to a candidate 
list, they are often either the wives of party leaders or other male political power players or part 
of a class of women known as femmes phares, or educated women.92 Beck identifies three 
channels through which women gain access to political power: mobilization within women’s 
organizations, mobilization within the party, or through connections with the president and 
ranking male officials of the government.93 Even as effective mobilizers, however, women are 
not given the same patronage resources as their male counterparts and are often treated as 
accessory and not key players in the political process. In a clientalist democracy, a politician is 
only as strong as his or her ability to distribute patronage to their clientalist network, or what 
Beck refers to as the hidden public.94 
 
3.7 The Economy in Senegal 
                                                
90 As mentioned above on page ??? 
91 For more on this issue see Beck 2003 
92 Beck 2003: 165 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid, p. 166 
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At the time of the field research for this study, the Senegalese economy was in a 
bifurcated state. Huge development projects, such as a new airport in the Holy City of Touba, 
various highway construction projects and roadway improvements in the capital city, (mainly 
initiated with funding form the Chinese government) and massive housing units were taking 
place credited to the efforts of President Wade. However, inflation of consumer goods prices, 
particularly rice and petrol were causing dissatisfaction among many Senegalese citizens who 
saw no use for the new development projects in relation to their livelihood. In addition, 
worsening problems in the infrastructure and delivery of public utilities, namely water and 
electricity exacerbated the problem. In Spring 2009, sanitation workers, students and teachers all 
went on [uncoordinated] strikes to protest against meager government salaries and benefits.  
The visual development of Senegal and the human welfare condition of its citizens 
presented interesting dichotomies. The 2002 national census reported employment rates for 
Senegalese citizens, to be around 39.1 percent (about 56% male and 23.1% female) with a 6 
percent unemployment rate.95 Unemployment rates are highest among males and females ages 
15-29. This age group also represents the majority of the population. The national employment 
figures however, do not provide details on the various industries in which people work or how 
many people are employed per household.96 Comparatively, other sources put the unemployment 
rate in Senegal at 48 percent and specify that more than 75 percent of the labor force work in 
agriculture while 22.5 percent work in industry and services, namely the informal retail market, 
                                                
95 Senegal considers it workforce to include persons of at least 6 years of age and older, who are 
working or have been unemployed during the year prior to the survey. (RGPHIII 2006: 75) 
Persons not included in the workforce population include students, female homemakers, retired 
persons, physically disabled persons, mentally disabled persons, and older persons. (Ibid) 
96 In the national report, the various employment categories include employer, independent, i.e. 




transportation and tourism.97 Fifty-four percent of the population of Senegal lives below the 
poverty line. As a result, individuals in Senegal rely heavily on social networks to compensate 
for lack of economic resources, especially considering that Senegal imports the majority of its 
food resources, including the daily staple, rice.  
The economic situation for everyday Senegalese citizens aids in the persistence of 
clientalist networks, provides a huge incentive to link to a political party or other patronage 
network and serves as a catalyst for the fierce pursuit of control of the state, which receives very 
large amounts of foreign assistance to aid Senegal in all forms of development. It is in this 
context that the advent and growth of the microfinance industry presents an interesting element 
to democracy in Senegal. The growth of the microfinance industry in Senegal can serve as both 
an interesting element to and contrasting analogy of the characteristics of democracy and politics 
in Senegal. Microfinance in Senegal, as detailed above, is varied and has a history that is not as 
steeped in the personal, clientelist networks as are political parties and other economic 
structures.98 Although some microfinance firms may have risen as a result of a bi-lateral 
partnership between the government of Senegal and that of another country, resulting in firms 
                                                
97 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html The CIA World 
Factbook reports Senegal’s key export industries as phosphate mining, fertilizer production and 
fishing. 
98 This is not a normative indictment of the clientalist system in Senegal. For lack of a better 
word, this system of interdependence and reciprocity operates in social groupings outside of the 
political arena. During field research, I noticed that families with surplus resources were 
expected [and readily willing] to take in the children of family members with fewer resources. 
Neighbors would welcome in each other’s children and distant relatives to prevent any person 
from hunger or homelessness. Often, I myself was admonished for eating at restaurants if the 
household where I was conducting an interview had surplus food for lunch (even when they did 
not). There is, in my assessment, an attitude among Senegalese citizens that individuals have an 
obligation to redistribute surpluses of any kind, this obligation, I believe, is extended to attitudes 
about the role of the state and state figures. 
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such as PAMECAS and CMS, these and all microfinance firms in Senegal thrive by serving 
individuals irrespective of the personal or social networks to which they belong.  
Microfinance provides a space where access to multiplicative resources, namely credit, is 
independent of the dominant, bi-furcated social demography of Senegalese political life. It is a 
space where what Galvan describes as the weakest element of the tri-partite foundation of 
Senegal’s democracy—the ideals of egalitarian citizenship, individualism and civic pluralism—
are practical ethics for the business models of microfinance organizations. It is in this way that 
microfinance adds an interesting element to democracy and society in Senegal. Microfinance is 
an industry in which the ideals of egalitarian citizenship and individualism are linked to the 
distribution of economic goods, resources, and opportunities, namely access to credit and 
financial services. Microfinance firms also present a contrasting analogy to the social bases of 
Senegal’s political party system.  
Unlike the way major political parties in Senegal sometimes operate, microfinance firms 
cannot purport to cater to or seek the endorsement of a particular Sufi brotherhood, ethnic group, 
religious group, political party or popular personality.99 Should MFIs choose to affix themselves 
to any one of these social units it would have the effect of ostracizing another. It is 
counterproductive and self-defeating for microfinance firms to conscript their client base to any 
one group. Unlike political parties that have limited resources and must maintain a pecking order 
by which to manage the distribution of limited resources, microfinance firms garner financial 
backing from the world market, which has been investing heavily and steadily into the 
microfinance industry. MIX Market reports that between 1995 and 2009 the number of 
                                                
99 In the past political candidates in Senegal sought ndigel endorsements or blessings from 
leaders of the Sufi brotherhoods who instructed followers to vote for a particular candidate or 




microfinance firms operating in Senegal increased more than one thousand percent from 37 to 
580 firms by the end of 2009.100  Senegal, like much of the microfinance industry in West Africa, 
is unique in that regulations allow microfinance firms to accept deposits from consumers. These 
deposits cover between fifty and one hundred percent of a firm’s operating costs. The remanding 
funds necessary for financial service provision are readily available from commercial banks, the 
government and development fund institutions (DFIs). In Senegal, about fifty-seven percent of 
financing comes from international financial institutions such as commercial banks, twenty-five 
percent from government-backed loans and the remainder from development fund institutions, 
non-governmental organizations and other sources.101 
 
 
   
 
 





Chapter Four: Finding and Describing Microfinance Borrowers 
This chapter details the survey methodology and describes the data collected for the 
research project. Using random multi-stage cluster design the data collected for the survey is 
close to national census demographic data. The data reveal that microfinance borrowers in 
Senegal overwhelmingly borrow as individuals and not in groups, which affects the ways we 
think about the relationship of microfinance to social capital and microfinance to political 
participation. Microfinance borrowers are more likely to take part in political activities than are 
non-microfinance borrowers. Microfinance borrowers are also more likely to be employed and 
have, on average, higher levels of income than non-microfinance borrowers. The data in this 
chapter reveal that there are grounds for drawing a positive association of microfinance to 





4. Survey Design and Sampling Procedure  
The original survey used in this study includes more than 130 questions. Implemented 
with a multi-stage, stratified random sample from Guediawaye, Senegal, these questions were 
designed to gather sufficient information to empirically test the six hypotheses outlined in 
Chapter Three. The survey includes questions about respondents’ individual characteristics 
including personal traits -- such as gender, age, religion and ethnicity; the extent of a 
respondent’s experience with micro-credit; the structure of a respondent’s microfinance loan(s); 
respondents’ attitudes of political efficacy; various modes of social capital102 [as outlined in the 
previous chapter]; and modes and levels of political participation.  
                                                
102 Questions on the topic of social capital asked respondents about feelings of trust and levels of 
mutual cooperation in relation to three units of social groupings: 1) the level of their quartier 
(neighborhood) of residence, 2) the department of Guediawaye, and 3) the state of Senegal. The 
only reason for the separation was my inclination that feelings of trust among social networks 
and levels of mutual cooperation likely vary from one social unit to another, especially as those 
units increase in size. 
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To determine the sample size necessary to implement the survey, I used information from 
Round II of the AfroBarometer Survey on Senegal as parameters to conduct a power analysis. 103 
In multivariate regression analysis of political participation using AfroBarometer Round II 
Country Data for Senegal, where the full regression model is represented as:  
PoliticalParticipation = b0 + b1(gender) + b2(age) + b3(urban/rural) + b4(education) + b5(income)… 
The inclusion of two continuous predictor variables 1) relying on a community savings bank and 
2) relying on a bank loan to secure a livelihood added between 0.01 and 0.03 to the R-squared 
value of a model of political participation. Other variables in the model included political party 
affiliation, and proxies for political efficacy and social capital.104 The estimates used for power 
analysis were set relatively high in order to yield a sample size that was attainable and more than 
sufficient for regression and logistic analyses. Power analysis using an r2f level of .15 and an r2r 
level of .11 with high bars set for the number of variables in the model (35) and the number of 
variables being tested (16), recommended a sample size of 536 at a power level of 0.8. My 
original intent was to achieve a sample size of 900 respondents--close to twice the amount 
suggested by the power analysis. However, time and resource constraints yielded only 703 
respondents, which is a sample size still substantially greater (31%) than the recommended size 
of the power analysis. 
Age, gender, educational status, economic status, ethnicity, religion, and political party 
affiliation are conventional correlates of political participation that are markedly omitted from 
current survey studies on the political impact of microfinance. These variables may have 
independent effects on political participation or may have interaction effects with microfinance 
                                                
103 Round II of the AfroBarometer survey included two questions (Q7e and Q7g) that closely 
relate to the dissertation topic. The question texts read, “How much do you depend on a 
Community Savings Group to secure a livelihood?” and “How much do you depend on 
Borrowing Money from a Bank to secure a livelihood?”  
104 See Appendix 4, Tables 4.7.9 for regression outputs. 
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that would otherwise be left unaccounted for. The dominant explanation for microfinance’s 
positive impact on individual level political participation posits that social capital--a function of 
group-based borrowing--is the mechanism by which microfinance leads to political 
empowerment. I needed a survey instrument and a survey site that would allow me to capture 
several forms of micro-lending: those that relied on gender and group-based borrowing, and 
those that lend to individual clients regardless of gender. This would allow me to form general 
observations about micro-lending that accounted for variation in the structure of microfinance 
loans before making comparisons to control groups. It was also in my interest to conduct the 
survey in an environment where several forms and layers of social networks [that might have 
political salience] were at work in the everyday lives of individuals. 
The following sections provide an overview of the survey site anddetailed descriptions of 
the sampling procedure used in survey implementation and the survey design. The objectives of 
the sampling and procedure and survey design were 1) to achieve a sample that represented a 
cross section of the population of Senegal as much as possible (given the limited enumeration 




4.1 Sampling Procedure 
In Guediawaye, Dakar people tend to live in neighborhoods based on a common identity 
trait, be it trade or profession, language, and/or religious affiliation.  In interviews it was often 
suggested that this phenomenon was purely coincidental, but at other times it was indicated that 
the naming of the neighborhoods and communes were deliberate. In any case, the natural 
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clustering of individuals and households in Guediawaye provided a nice environment for a multi-
stage, stratified, random sample in a study where measuring social capital at different units of 
social groupings played a large role in the research design. 
 Another advantage of conducting the survey in Guediawaye was the availability of a 
reliable map.105 In 2004, the department of Guediawaye was selected for mapping by l’Agence 
de Developpement Municipal.106 Although the map was quite useful and excellent, I quickly 
learned that it lacked important neighborhood distinctions. I hired an enumerator to work with 
me to walk the 13 miles of Guediwaye, locating each chef du quartier or neighborhood chair to 
assist with properly delineating each quartier (neighborhood). Completed in one week, it was 
discovered that Guediawaye has more than seventy-five quartiers within its six administrative 
units and that Guediawaye is expanding rapidly into its neighboring Department of Pikine, 
mainly along its eastern border.107 When the survey was administered, every attempt was made 
to sample from each quartier. 
At the time of survey implementation, in March 2009, there were six local collectivities of 
Guediawaye: Golf Sud, Medina Gounass, Ndiareme Limamoulaye, Sam Notaire, Ville de 
Guediawaye and Wakhinane Nimzatt. As previously mentioned, the names of these 
administrative units have more than simply nominal functions. For example, on several 
occasions I was informed that the commune Medina Gounass is called such because people who 
settled there come from the original Medina Gounass in the Kolda region of southeastern 
                                                
105 See Appendix 4, Figure 1 
106 Conversation with Mamadou Dieng, Coordiantor of Community Programs, Office of the 
Mayor of Guediawaye. With the support of the World Bank and the Development Agency of 
France, the Government of Senegal established the PAC fund (Programme d’Appui aux 
Communes). The management of the PAC fund was then transferred to an agency created for the 
same purpose, the support of development in the municipalities, l’Agence de Développement 
Municipal. 
107 See Appendix 4, Figure 2 
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Senegal. Ndiareme Limamoulaye, which also houses a large secondary school by the same name, 
derived its name from the fact that many of its residents belong to the Layenne tariqa or Muslim 
brotherhood.  
Once the local administrative units and their various quartiers were plotted onto the map 
provided by Mr. Mamadou Dieng, Project Coordinator for the Department of Guediawaye, each 
commune of Guediawaye was divided into quadrants. Using aerial views provided by Google 
Earth, the houses in each quadrant were counted, numbered and entered into a separate 
dataset.108 A mathematical program then randomly selected the quadrant and households within 
each quadrant to be contacted for the survey. Once arriving at one of the pre-selected 
households, and pending approval of the head of the household, the names of all voting age 
residents of the household were numbered and listed on a sheet of paper by the head of 
household or their representative. The household head [or their representative] was then asked to 
take a flashcard from a stack on the table and the number on the flashcard corresponded to the 
person to be interviewed for the survey. In the end the official survey yielded 703 respondents, 
with 164 of the respondents (23%) having had experience with microfinance borrowing. Later in 
the chapter, the demographics of the sample will be compared to the latest country and regional-
level census data. 
 
4.2 Survey Design 
The survey includes questions similar to those found in the Afrobarometer Survey and 
the American National Election Studies Survey. Survey questions concerning social capital were 
                                                
108 See Figures A4.1 –A4.3, Appendix 4 at the end of this chapter. 
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directly adopted from the World Bank Social Capital Assessment Tool.109 Questions concerning 
political efficacy were taken from the Niemi et al. scale used to measure political efficacy in the 
1988 National Election Study (Niemi et al 1991).110 Below I describe in further detail questions 
surrounding the items most relevant to the hypotheses being tested in this exercise, 
Microfinance, Political Participation, Political Efficacy and Social Capital.111 
Microfinance 
 The survey instrument includes extensive questions about microfinance participation. The 
first, and perhaps most obvious question identifies whether the respondent can be classified as a 
microfinance borrower. Then, follow-up questions are used to get a sense of how successful a 
client has been with microfinance. Thirty-seven questions make up the remainder of the 
MicroFinance section of the survey. These are very specific questions about the details of 
microfinance loans including whether or not the respondent received an individual or group loan, 
whether or not collateral was required to be eligible for the loan, whether the respondent’s 
microfinance group was co-ed or single-gendered and whether or not the group was made of 
individuals who knew each other prior to seeking out microfinance or were grouped together by 
the microfinance agency. Questions about the required frequency of group interaction, loan 
repayment schedules and formats, group size and characteristics (ethnicity, religion, age) were 
also included to get a more qualitative sense of the inner workings of microfinance groups. 
 Other questions were aimed at getting a sense of whether or not the microfinance agency 
had any programmatic agenda in mind. Those who indicated they had experience with 
microfinance or were presently using microfinance were asked about the practices of the lending 
                                                
109 Grooteart, Christian and Thierry Van Bastelaer (2002). Understanding and Measuring Social 
Capital. Washington, DC: World Bank 
110 Niemi et al adopt questions used by Lane (1959) and Milrath (1965). 
111 The full questions and the frequencies of responses are listed in the Appendix to this chapter. 
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institution. Respondents were questioned as to whether or not the lending institutions spoke with 
them about politics, offered literacy courses or business training courses, or used exclusionary 
methods in granting loans. For example, did the lending institutions from which a respondent 
received a loan lend to people of a certain Sufi order or Muslim brotherhood, ethnicity, gender, 
religion or political affiliation. 
 Finally, respondents were asked why they were not using the service of microcredit if the 
respondent indicated that they had never had a microfinance loan. A few responses (I do not 
want/need microfinance, I want it but do not know how to obtain it, or I made a request but was 
refused) were pre-coded. For other responses, interviewers were instructed to record, verbatim, 
the reason given by the respondent. These responses were then each given a separate code.112 
Those with microcredit experience were asked to indicate how they used their microfinance 
loans. Pre-coded responses included personal reasons for everyday needs, an important event 
(such as a wedding or a funeral), collective commercial activity (commercial activity taken with 
others), or individual entrepreneurial activity (commerce activity for one’s own business). As in 
the case with non-microfinance borrowers, other responses were recorded verbatim and were 
subsequently given codes. The next section of the survey asks respondents about their individual 
and group level political activity. 
Political Participation 
I define political participation as any deliberate action taken to shape and or influence a) 
the institutions governing political units (including towns, villages, cities, states, etc), b) the 
decisions of officials who have authority that is public in nature, or c) any deliberate action taken 
                                                
112 Examples of such responses include: “I lack the necessary means; The interest rates are too 
high; I don’t have an idea for a project; I made a request and I am waiting for a response; I will 
make a request; My husband is not comfortable with me having a loan; and I have never asked 
but I will do so in the future.” 
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to determine who, in fact, is a public authority (voting, deposing). There are more than three 
pages of questions concerning the political activity of survey respondents. Some questions ask 
respondents to date the year of a particular activity. This helps in later analysis to determine if, 
for microfinance borrowers these actions were taken before or after the start year of their first 
microfinance loan.  
Questions 60-69 of the survey instrument ask respondents if they voted in specific 
elections.113 Each question names the date and office up for election to help respondents give an 
accurate answer about their past activity. In addition, respondents who answered yes to 
participating in a certain election were asked whether this was the first election of its kind in 
which they cast a vote. In an attempt to gain accuracy, respondents were also asked to name the 
party for which they voted (if they felt comfortable) and to provide the place of the polling 
station if possible. Problems associated with recall were taken into account in designing the 
survey but are admittedly often difficult to avoid.114 The results of voting behavior yielded by the 
survey are compared with voter turnout rates calculated by the National Autonomous Electoral 
Commission later in the chapter.  
The next set of questions in the survey--questions Q70 and Q71--are 9-item questions 
that ask respondents whether or not they participated in a range of activities. In addition, for each 
activity, respondents were asked whether they took part in the activity alone or with another 
person, or group of people. This helps to gain a sense of whether or not political participation is a 
social act for some more than for others or if certain forms of political participation tend to be 
more social than others.  For respondents who indicated they had experience with microfinance, 
                                                
113 See Appendix 4 for questions wording and frequency of responses. 
114 See Pearson et al. (1992) “Personal Recall and the Limits of Retrospective Questions in 
Surveys” in Questions about Questions: Inquiries into the Cognitive Bases of Surveys. 
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Q70 asked about their participation in the following activities before the start year of their 
microfinance loan and if they took part in the activity alone or together with someone(s) else. 
Question 71 inquires about participation in the same 9 activities but refers to the year after 
respondents repaid their [first] loans. The final question in the political participation section of 
the survey instrument asks respondents if they had ever run for a political office in an election 
campaign 
Political Efficacy 
 Political efficacy has been established as an important attitudinal indicator of individual 
political participation. It is said to have two components. External efficacy, which represents 
beliefs about the responsiveness of government authorities to the concerns of citizens and 
internal efficacy, which represents an individual’s beliefs about their own ability to understand 
and effectively participate in the political arena (Niemi, Craig and Mattei 1991: 1407). I argue 
that when microfinance engenders political participation among successful borrowers it is 
because the positive experience with microfinance has increased a person’s level of internal 
efficacy. I employ items found by Niemi et al. (1991) to provide valid and reliable measures of 
internal political efficacy as well as their measures for external efficacy, which are not as reliable 
as the internal efficacy items but remain strong, valid options.  
Social Capital 
 Social capital is a black box, it has many meanings and various parts, some of which have 
been linked to political participation and others not. The dimensions of social capital often linked 
to political participation include civic engagement, feelings of trust in and mutual cooperation in 
society, and the three components of politically relevant social capital, which includes network 
size, the level of political expertise in social networks and frequency of political discussion 
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within a network. The survey instrument includes questions concerning all of the above faces of 
social capital to determine which, if any, aspects of social capital is of importance to the 
relationship between microfinance and political participation. As previously mentioned, the 
questions on social capital are adopted from the World Bank SOCAT survey (2002), and from 
La Due Lake and Huckfeldt’s (1991) study on politically relevant social capital. 
Social Capital as Civic Engagement 
The set of social capital questions used for civic engagement asks respondents about their 
involvement in voluntary organizations and associations. The civic engagement variable is a sum 
of the scores a respondent receives on six questions about membership and level of activities in 
voluntary organizations. 
Social Capital as Trust and Mutual Cooperation 
The second set of questions asks respondents about the level of trust they feel towards 
their members of their quartier and to other residents of Guediawaye as a whole. The responses 
to the each variable are added together and the composite score is the level of social capital as 
trust, labeled SCTotal in the dataset. 
Social Capital as Mutual Cooperation 
Mutual cooperation (MutualCoop) is a composite score of the responses to the questions 
about how often members of the quartier join together to combat problems that affect the 
community such as violence or school closings.  
Politically Relevant Social Capital 
To gain a sense of the political knowledge and expertise available in an individual’s 
network(s), some questions were included as inspired by La Due Lake and Huckfeldt (1998) 




The other independent variables are standard controls for political participation, including 
age, gender and highest level of education. Age and Gender are self-explanatory. These variables 
record respondents’ information about their age and gender classification. Ethnicity and Religion 
asks respondents to self-identify to which ethnic group they belong, which religious affiliation 
they hold, and to which Muslim brotherhood or Christian denomination they ascribe.115 
MaxEduc is the highest level of education for the respondent. 
Income proved to be a murky survey question, related to the question on Employment. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the majority of Senegalese are unemployed in the sense that 
they do not have a regular job to which they report daily and are guaranteed various salaries and 
benefits. Many Senegalese work for themselves but do not consider their self-employment as a 
“job.” In pre-test surveys it was discovered that even people who have jobs with regular fixed 
salaries are not paid on a regular basis. Others who receive regular, fixed salaries were not sure 
how much they made, on average, per month or were unwilling to say. Some respondents readily 
provided this information and were confident in their response. As an alternative to income the 
variable EndsMeet was created based on answers to the question of whether the money made 
from the respondent’s job or self-employment activities was sufficient to cover their daily 
expenses.  
The following section provides detailed descriptions of the sample as it relates to census 
data on the general population of Senegal and the region of Dakar. In addition, I lay out the 
distributions of responses to various measures such as income, education, gender and political 
participation, comparing microfinance borrowers to their non-borrowing counterparts.  
                                                
115 For simplification, the Religion variable is dichotomized into Muslim and non-Muslim. More 
than 90% of survey respondents identified as Muslim. 
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4.3 Overview of the Demographics of Survey Respondents  
For nearly every indicator listed in Table 4.1 below, the data obtained from the original 
survey yielded results that approximate those obtained from the latest national census.116 Of the 
703 respondents survey respondents 369 (53%) are female and 326 (46%) are male.117 The 2002 
national census reported that Dakar on the whole is more male, but the results yielded in 
Guediawaye were close to the national figures which indicate that females are more numerous, 
due mainly to the rate of emigration of young males in search of work. The 2002 census reported 
that population of Senegal was 49.2% male and 50.8% female. There are age differences in the 
mean and median age of the survey sample and the national census data. The survey was 
restricted to Senegalese citizens of voting age (18 and older) while the national census covers 
every age group. The median age for the survey respondents is 33 with ages ranging from 18-
85.118 Other indicators such as ethnicity, religious affiliation, employment rates and annual 
income are in tandem with those reported by the 1988 national census and other country 
information available for Senegal, the survey data approximate the national data more closely 
than the data census data available on Guediawaye’s host region of Dakar. Although the region 
of Kaolack119 is reported to have the highest concentration of Microfinance firms (37), 
accessibility to a cross-section of firms is made difficult by the sheer size of Kaolack, with a 
surface area of more than 15,000 square kilometers, the region of Kaolack is 28 times the size of 
                                                
116 It should be noted that the population of Senegal was classified as essentially rural in the 2002 
national census. 59.3% of the population lived in rural areas and 40.7% lived in areas considered 
urban. The rate of urbanization in Senegal is fast paced however, and Dakar has a 
disproportionate amount of Senegal’s urban dwellers (52.6%).  
117 There were 8 missing responses to the question in Gender. Most likely the interviewers 
accidentally skipped this question. 
118 I had an age cut-off for the survey. The survey was only administered to those ages 18 and 
above. 
119 Kaoloack is one of Senegal’s 14 regions, located southeast of the region of Dakar, in it now 
divided into the two regions of Kaolack and Kaffrine. 
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the region of Dakar.120 The next section will detail who in fact are the microfinance borrowers in 
Guediawaye and extract any significant differences among microfinance borrowers and their 
non-borrowing counterparts. 
 
Microfinance in Guediawaye: Who Borrows? 
As Table 4.2 indicates, Microfinance borrowers are diverse and represent a wide cross-
section of the survey sample and general population. However, some indicators are more 
pronounced among microfinance borrowers than among non-borrowers. Firstly, microfinance 
borrowers are typically female. The predominance of females in the general population and 
survey sample are even more pronounced among microfinance borrowers. This can be attributed 
to the fact that the microfinance and micro-credit are products often associated with women. This 
is not surprising, especially considering that the governing institution for the sector is called the 
Ministry of Microfinance and Female Entrepreneurship. In addition, many firms supply loan to 
women exclusively. Microfinance borrowers are also more Wolof and more Mouride than the 
sample or general population. As in the general population, Microfinance borrowers in the 
sample are overwhelmingly Muslim. Lastly, microfinance borrowers in the sample tend to be 
more employed than other Senegalese citizens and report higher monthly earnings than their 
counterparts. 
                                                
120 An analysis of Microfinance firms by region was once available on the website 














                                                
121 ANSD, July 2009. Situation Economique et Sociale de la region de Dakar de l’annee 2008/SRSD de Dakar p.20  
122 The National Census population numbers are from the ANSD, June 2008. RGPHIII p.12 
123 This represents the total number of survey respondents. There are 8 missing values for gender in the sample. 
124 The Guediawaye survey only interviewed individuals of voting age (18) and older. The age range of the general population in 
the 2002 census was 0-95 years, hence an higher mean.  
125 Ethnicity and Religion were not included in the 2002 National Census, or in the Situation Economique et Social de la region 
de Dakar. These figures are from the previous 1988 census as reported in the ANSD, June 1993. RGPHII pp. 24-25 
126 The 2002 National Census recorded an employment rate of about 39.1% (RGPHIII p.96) and an unemployment rate of 6% 
(RGPHIII p.79). This being extremely low, I consulted other sources. The CIA WorldFactbook lists a 2007 estimate of Senegal’s 
unemployment rate at 48%. See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html 
127 GDP per capita income figures taken from World Bank World Development Indicators, 2009. The monthly income estimates 
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Comparing Microfinance Borrowers to Non-Microfinance Borrowers 
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Median Income (~$156/mo) (~$92/mo) ($76-$95/mo) 
                                                
128 There is 1 missing response for Gender among microfinance borrowers; 6 missing responses for Gender among 
non-microfinance borrowers; and 8 missing responses for Gender in the total sample. The total number of 
microfinance borrowers is 164, and the total number of Non-Microfinance borrowers is 524 with 15 missing 
responses to the question of microfinance borrowing. The total number of survey respondents is 703. 
129 There are 10 missing responses to the employment question. 
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Microfinance Borrowers: Education, Income and Employment 
In terms of income and employment, Microfinance borrowers have higher levels than 
their non-borrowing counterparts. This may be an indication of higher initial endowments prior 
to microfinance, an issue that will be addressed later in this section. In terms of education 
however, microfinance borrowers have similar education levels to their contemporaries. The 
median education level of microfinance borrowers is 4.24 or completed primary education with a 
standard deviation of 2.21 points. For all other survey respondents, the median highest education 
level is 4.61 with a standard deviation of 2.10. In terms of completed formal education, which 
includes primary, secondary and university school, 32% of non-microfinance borrowers have 
completed formal education compared with 29% of non-microfinance borrowers. This difference 
is driven mainly by the fact a higher percentage of microfinance borrowers have Master’s and 
Doctorate degrees compared to the rest of the sample.  





Whether or not microfinance borrowers have, ex ante more financial resources than non-
borrowers cannot be determined from the data available in the survey. At best, we can compare 
the reported financial endowments of those who indicated they intend to seek out a microfinance 
loan with those who have had microfinance experience and those who indicate they are not 
interested in the financial services of micro-credit. Comparison graphs of incomes are presented 
below.130 
The first graph, Graph 4.1 displays the differences in the average income of microfinance 
borrowers (right) to the income of non-microfinance borrowers (left). Of those respondents who 
reported income (only 43% of respondents did so) microfinance borrowers had higher incomes, 
on average, than others in the survey sample. Income levels ranged from 1-11 with 1 
corresponding to an income of less than 10,000 f.CFA (less than $20 per month) to 11, which 
corresponded to a monthly income of more than 400,000 f.CFA per month (more than approx. 
$778 per month).The mean income of microfinance borrowers was about 6.97 (approx. $147 per 
month) with a standard deviation of 2.129. The mean income of non-microfinance borrowers 






Graph 4.1 Comparison Incomes MF and Non-MF 
                                                






The Figure below, Figure 4.3 displays differences in income between those who indicated 
they are interested in microfinance131 and those who reported they did not want nor need micro-
credit loans.132 Taken together, hopeful microfinance borrowers have a mean income level of 
5.113 (approx. $79 per month) and those who indicated they do not want or need microfinance 
                                                
131 The survey question reads, “Tell me the primary reason that you are not participating in 
microfinance. I will read a list of options: I do not want it, I do not have a need for it, I want to 
participate but I do not know how, or I made a request but I was refused. If none of these 
correspond with your primary reason for not participating in microfinance, please give me your 
reason. Try to be specific as possible. Several respondents gave reasons other than the four listed 
here. Enumerators were instructed to record those responses verbatim. Once the analysis of the 
answers was completed and coded, those who are included in the ‘Want Microfinance’ category 
provided reasons such as, (1)‘I made a demand but I was refused;’ (2)‘I want it but I do not know 
how to obtain it;’ (4)‘I lack the necessary means;’ (5)‘The interest rates are too high;’ (9)‘I 
don’t have an idea for a project;’ (10)‘I made a request and I am waiting for a response;’ (12)‘I 
will make a request;’ (14)‘My husband is not comfortable with me having a loan;’ and (18) ‘I 
have never asked but I will do so in the future.’ 
132 Those who fall into the ‘Non-Interested in borrowing’ category gave the specific answer, “I 
do not want or need microfinance,” to the question detailed in the previous footnote. 
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(value 3 on the x axis below) have a mean income level of 5.965 (approx. $96 per month). One 
respondent indicated that they had made a formal application request for a microfinance loan 
(coded as 10 on the x axis below). This respondent reported a high monthly-income level of 
between 100,000f.CFA and 200,000f.CFA per month (approx. $194 - $389 per month) than any 
other respondent. 
 
Figure 4.3 Income Comparisons:  
Hopeful Borrowers and Not-Interested in Borrowing 
 
 
As the Figures above demonstrate, microfinance borrowers appear to be financially better 
off than those 1) who are interested in accessing micro-credit in the future and 2) those that 
specifically indicated that microfinance is something they do not want.  
In terms of employment, microfinance borrowers are more likely to report being 
employed, and are less likely to self-report as being unemployed. It should be noted, however 
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that the ‘unemployment’ status among microfinance borrowers could be higher (or lower 
depending on the definition of employment), due to the fact that many microfinance workers 
indicated they did not have a job per se, but responded that they were a commercant or vendeur 
who was self-employed. Of those respondents who had jobs at the time of the survey, 
microfinance workers were more likely to be regularly paid workers who received their salary at 
the end of the week or month. Respondents who indicated they were interested in microfinance 
borrowing in the future were more likely to have a permanent salaried job, meaning they receive 
a fixed wage plus benefits, than those not interested in micro-credit and those who have 
experience with microfinance. Those who desire microfinance loans are also more likely to have 





Table 4.3134  








                                                
133 This may serve as an indication of public acknowledgment that those eligible for 
microfinance or micro credit must be deemed capable of consuming debt and have 
entrepreneurial aspirations. 
134 Analysis is restricted to respondents ages 21-75, the age range of microfinance borrowers. 
135 The survey question was as follows, “Tell me the primary reason that you are not 
participating in microfinance. I will read a list of options: I do not want it, I do not have a need 
for it, I want to participate but I do not know how, or I made a request but I was refused. If none 
of these correspond with your primary reason for not participating in microfinance, please give 
me your reason. Try to be specific as possible. Several respondents gave reasons other than the 
four listed here, these were recorded verbatim by the numerator. Once the analysis of the 
answers was completed and coded, those who are included in the ‘Want Microfinance’ category 
provided reasons such as, I made a demand but I was refused; I want it but I do not know how to 















Total 160 279 136 
* Column percentages in () 
Table 4.4 
Comparison Employment Benefit Levels 
 
Employed MBs HBs NIBs 
    



































Total Employed  73 99 55 
 *Percentage of Total Employed  
**Percentage of Salaried Workers 
   
The question of whether or not microfinance borrowers’ greater financial resources are a 
result or a cause of their access to micro-credit cannot be determined using the data available. 
Retrospective questions about pre-microfinance income levels were not asked. Only forty-three 
percent of respondents reported their income levels, but microfinance borrowers were more 
likely to report their earnings. Fifty percent of microfinance borrowers reported their incomes 
while forty percent of all others reported their incomes. Of the 83 microfinance borrowers that 
did specify their monthly income levels, 69 respondents (83%) declared that microfinance had 
improved their lives, and their monthly earnings range from less than $20 to more than $837.00. 
The vast majority (73.9%) of these respondents reported a monthly income ranging from $104 to 
                                                                                                                                                       
project; I made a request and I am waiting for a response; I will make a request; My husband is 
not comfortable with me having a loan; and I have never asked but I will do so in the future. 
136 Those who fall into the ‘Non-Interested in borrowing’ category gave the specific answer, “I 
do not want or need microfinance,” to the question detailed in the previous footnote. 
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$628.  Fifty percent of survey respondents who declared they had ‘No Interest in Borrowing’ 
(Column 6) and who also reported their incomes have monthly earnings that fall within the same 
range as those who have experience with microfinance and feel that it has improved their lives. 
Among ‘Hopeful Borrowers’ who reported their incomes (Column 5), fifty percent have incomes 
that are already on par with microfinance clients who reported that microfinance participation 
has produced improvements in their lives. See the highlighted cells in the table below for a 
detailed view.137  
 
 






‘Improved Lives’  
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Borrowers with NO 



















$20 - $39 1 
 




$40 - 59 5 
 




$60 - $79 2 
 




$80 - $99 6 
 












































$600 - 1 3 4 0 2 
                                                
137 This is weak evidence for the case that there is little initial differentiation between microfinance 
borrowers and non-microfinance borrowers, especially considering that those with higher monthly 
earnings are: 1) more likely to keep track of their earnings and 2) be more willing to report them. 
Nevertheless the table demonstrates that there exists some parity among experienced borrowers and those 
with no desire to borrow. It is safe to assume that ‘Hopeful Borrowers’ have reason to desire microfinance 
as a way of improving their economic well-being, at the very least. These figures account for 43% of 
survey respondents. (The figures in this dataset are restricted to respondents between the ages of 21 and 
75, the minimum and maximum ages of respondents with microfinance experience.) 
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Total  69 10 83 114 52 
Total MBs, 
HBs & NIBs 
  164* 284** 134*** 
 
An alternative to the question on monthly earnings was a question that asked respondents, 
“Are you able to support your living (or make ends meet) with the earnings from your work?”138 
Among the respondents to this question 77 percent (461) affirmed this statement and 23 percent 
(139) said that they were not able to make ends meet with the money they earned from the work 
that they perform. The table below compares the responses to this EndsMeet questions among 
Experienced Borrowers, Hopeful Borrowers and those with No Interest in Borrowing or (NIB’s).  
 













  (33%)** 
165 
(69%)* 
  (43%)** 
91 
(73%)* 









  (58%)** 
42 
(27%)* 
  (33%)** 
126 
(24.85%) 
Total  135 239 133 507 
*Indicates % of Column Total  
**Indicates % of Row Total 
  
The above table shows that the majority of survey respondents (75%) reported they are 
able to make ends meet with the money they earn from their work. Hopeful Borrowers (HBs) 
were more likely than Experienced Borrowers (EBs) and those with No Interest in Borrowing 
                                                
138 For whatever reason, this is a question that enumerators often missed during survey 




(NIBs) to report that the wages they earned were not able to cover their living expenses. Again, it 
is not possible to determine from this table if EBs are simply wealthier than their counterparts 
irrespective of microfinance; or if experience with microfinance made the difference for them in 
terms of income and economic welfare. Retrospective questions on income and employment 
levels prior to microfinance would have helped to mitigate this problem.139 Nevertheless, the 
evidence from the survey data indicate that 1) EBs have incomes that are higher than HBs and 
NIBs and that 2) EBS are able to cover their living expenses with the money that they earn from 
working. Microfinance has improved the lives of the overwhelming majority of participants by 
their own affirmations, but it remains unclear whether or not EBs had pre-microfinance profiles 
that more closely resembled those of HBs or NIBs.  
4.4 The Structure of Microfinance Loans 
We can find out more information about microfinance borrowers by reviewing some 
details of the conditions under which they were able to obtain a loan. The table below contains a 
list of questions about the requirements for securing the loans with which survey respondents 
have experience, requirements for conduct once awarded the loan and the type of loan they 
received, i.e. group or individual. Of the 164 survey respondents who have experience with 
microfinance, eighty percent of them were required to be a member of the lending institution 
(credit union) to obtain a loan, seventy-seven percent were required to provide some form of 
collateral in order to qualify for a loan.  Less than two percent of Experienced Borrowers said 
that it was necessary to have a particular religious, political, ethnic, or professional association in 
order to receive a loan.  
                                                
139 Time and resource constraints prevented a revisit to the enumeration area in time for the 
completion of this writing. 
104 
  
 Close to seventy-five percent (122) of all EBs borrow as individuals. Only nineteen 
percent of EBs (31) reported that they received a group-structured loan from a microfinance 
institution. Lastly, six respondents reported having experience with both individual and group-
based loans. This highlights the unique nature of microfinance in Senegal, given that the 
common lending format among microfinance institutions is the group-based, gender-biased 
formant. Among Experienced Borrowers, only 9 percent reported that in order to receive 
financing they had to be the member of a pre-formed group. Among EBs with group-based loans 
twenty six percent indicated that their group was composed of men and women. Fifty-two 
percent of group borrowers said that their lending institution granted loans only to women. 
Seventy-five percent of respondents with group borrowing experience said that the members of 
the group were required to make repayment as a unit. Fifty-two percent of group borrowers were 
required by their lending institution to meet regularly with members of the group. 
Table 4.6 Survey Questions on Microloan Structures 
 Yes No 








Must be a member of a particular religious 











Must be the member of a certain ethnic group, trade union, or some other 









Total Microfinance Borrowers 164 
 





















Questions for Group Borrowers140 Yes No 
Is your group composed of men and women? 11 29 
Does your lender lend only to women? 22 14 
Is the group required to make payments together? 31 8 
Are you and your group required to meet regularly? 26 12 
 
 
As previously mentioned, the lending organizations servicing the survey respondents 
include banks, credit unions, non-governmental organizations, charities and private, self-formed 
groups or associations. Credit unions dominate the supply of loans however, and close to sixty 
percent of borrowers, (95 respondents) identified either CMS (Credit Mutual of Senegal) or 
PAMECAS (Partnership for the Mobilization of Savings and Credit in Senegal) as their lending 
institutions.141 Collectively, there is nothing especially distinct about microfinance borrowers in 
terms of religion, political affiliation, associational life or profession. It may be the case that 
because of the widely enforced standard that potential borrowers have some sort of collateral and 
general stability (a proper address and phone) to obtain a loan, they have higher initial 
endowments than their non-borrowing counterparts. But proximity in the geographic location 
and the socioeconomic position of survey respondents may serve as some indication that 
microfinance borrowers are not special or richer than non-interested borrowers or hopeful 
borrowers.  
4.5 Political Participation Among Survey Respondents 
                                                
140 Many questions for which only group borrowers could respond have more responses recorded 
than the number of persons that indicated they were group borrowers. This is mainly due to the 
fact that some (6) respondents have experience with both group and individual loans.  
 
141 Ninety-five percent of Experienced Borrowers (155) reported the source of their microfinance 
loans. The number of CMS or PAMECAS borrowers is probably larger however as many 
respondents indicated that their loans came from a special bi-institutional fund between CMS 
and another organization or PAMECAS and another organization. 
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The previous sections in this chapter have addressed the processes involved in question 
formulation for the original survey used in field research, detailed the procedures involved in the 
multi-stage random sampling methods and provided overviews of the demographics of survey 
respondents in relation to Senegalese national-level survey data. This section includes summary 
data on responses to questions related to political participation, and compares the rates of 
participation among microfinance borrowers and all others in the sample.   
Figure 4.4 






The majority of survey respondents (88.19%) indicated that they are registered voters.142 
94% of Microfinance Borrowers are registered to vote and 86% of Non-Microfinance Borrowers 
are registered to vote.143  
Party Affiliation 
A very small minority of respondents (15%) however, indicated that they were members 
of a political party.144  21% of Microfinance Borrowers are affiliated with a political party while 
13% of those with no micro-credit experience are members of a political party. 
Voting 
More than 80% of survey respondents reported voting in one of the five elections 
inquired about in the survey. The table below provides greater detail of how many elections 
people participated in. 20% of respondents had not voted in any of the elections in question.  
Table 4.6 
Voter Participation of Survey Respondents 
 
Vote: All_Elections145 Frequency Percent 
0 145 20.63 
1 106 15.08 
2 131 18.63 
3 118 16.79 
4 99 14.08 
5 104 14.79 
Total 703 100.00 
 
                                                
142 97% of respondents (686) answered the question about being registered to vote. 
143 Comparison rates are in Figure 4.5 below. 
144 99% of respondents (699) answered the question about party membership. 
145 Elections include the 2002 Local Elections, the 2002 Regional Elections, the 2007 
Presidential Election, the 2007 Legislative Elections and the 2009 Local Elections. 
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In chapter 2, Tables 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 displayed the voter turnout rates Dakar and Senegal’s 
other regions for the 2002 and 2009 Local and Regional Election. The respective turnout rates 
for the 2002 and 2009 elections in the region of Dakar were 45% and 34%. According to the 
original data collected for this survey, Guediawaye saw lower rates for the 2002 elections and 
higher rates in the 2009 election. The data show that the respective voter turnout rates in 
Guediawaye for the 2002 and 2009 local elections were 34% and 50%. In the 2007 Presidential 
elections, 79% of survey respondents voted. In the 2007 Legislative elections 55% of survey 
respondents indicated that they voted in the election. 
When compared with others in the survey, a higher proportion of those with micro-credit 
experience are registered to vote. Microfinance borrowers also voted at higher rated in the 
relevant elections than those with no microfinance experience. Comparison rates for voter 




Comparing Voter Registration and Electoral Participation:  





Other Forms of Participation  
The other various methods of political participation included in the survey questionnaire 
were: 1) contacting a local government official, 2) contacting a national government official, 3) 
working/volunteering for a local political campaign, 4) working/volunteering for a national 
political campaign, 5) working for a political party, 6) participating in a protest, march or 
demonstration, or 7) contributing a monetary or in-kind gift to a political campaign. The majority 
of survey respondents (69%) reported that they had not participated in any of the activities. The 
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mean level of participation among all survey respondents is 1.30 activities. The table below 




Rates of Other Forms of Participation146 
 
ALL_ Participation Frequency Percentage 
0 490 69.6 
1 46 6.53 
2 43 6.11 
3 23 3.27 
4 31 4.4 
5 11 1.56 
6 16 2.27 
7 4 0.57 
8 12 1.70 
9 3 0.43 
10 7 0.99 
11 2 0.28 
12 10 1.42 
13 1 0.14 
14 5 0.71 
Total 703 100.00 
 
Comparing Participation: Microfinance and Non-Microfinance 
The following figures present various political activities and compares experienced 
microfinance borrowers to other survey respondents.  Rates of participation are consistently 
higher among those with micro-credit experience. In figure 4.6 the mean participation levels in 
all activities are compared. 
Figure 4.6 
                                                
146 Respondents were asked whether they participated in the same activity twice. Respondents 
were given a reference data and asked if they participated in the activity before or after the 
provided reference date. For microfinance borrowers, the reference was point was before and 
after the year they began microfinance activities. For all others the reference year was 2005. 
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The overwhelming majority of respondents (78.41%) indicated that they had not 
participated in any of the seven activities in the Pre-Participation Scale. The mean level of 
participation in pre-microfinance/pre-2005 activities is 0.615. That level is higher for those with 
microfinance experience: .805. The difference in means of non-microfinance borrowers and non-
microfinance borrowers is 0.19.  
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In figure 4.7 below, the pre-microfinance political participation rates of microfinance 
borrowers are compared to the pre-2005 participation rates of non-microfinance borrowers.  
 
Figure 4.7 




Of those that did take part in the seven political activities inquired about in the survey, 
the mean level of participation is 2.85 with a standard deviation of 1.84.  Even before beginning 
microfinance activities, Figure 4.7 shows that those persons who had microfinance experience 
were more politically active than others in the sample.147 Those who would become microfinance 
borrowers had a pre-microfinance participation mean of 3.07, others had a pre-2005 participation 
mean of 2.74, a difference of 0.33. 
                                                
147 Figure 4.8 in the appendix displays the differences in means between microfinance borrowers 




The mean level of post-microfinance/ post-2005 participation is 0.695. The majority of 
respondents did not participate in any of the seven activities, although the mean level is higher 
than the pre-2005/pre-microfinance levels. The mean level of microfinance borrowers post-
microfinance is 0.878. The post-2005 mean level of non-microfinance respondents is 0.647. The 
difference in means of the two groups, 0.231 is greater than the pre-microfinance (or pre-2005) 
difference in means, 0.19. Figure 4.8 below displays the differences in means of those who 
actually participated in one of the seven activities after beginning microfinance (and after 2005 
for non-microfinance borrowers).  
Among respondents who did take part in one of the seven activities, the post-
microfinance participation mean of microfinance borrowers is 3.2 while the post-2005 mean of 
participation is 2.7561 for all others. The post-participation difference in means for those who 
took part in the activities, 0.4439 is greater than the pre-participation difference in means for 
those who did participate, 0.33145. In addition, the difference in the mean levels of microfinance 
borrowers pre-microfinance and post-microfinance, 0.13023 is greater than the difference 























Pre and Post Microfinance Voting 
 Respondents were also asked whether or not they voted in an election before and after 
2005 (for non-microfinance borrowers) and before an after their exposure to a microfinance loan 
(for microfinance borrowers). In Figure 4.9 below, the proportion of microfinance borrowers 
(right) who voted before and after microfinance loans is larger than the proportion of non-
microfinance borrowers that voted before and after 2005.  Whether or not these differences are 
statistically significant will be explored in the following chapter. 
 
 
                                                
148 Figure 4.10 in the Appendix displays the post-microfinance/post-2005 differences in means 




Comparing Proportions: Pre and Post Voter Participation 
 
This chapter has addressed the processes involved in question formulation for the original 
survey used in field research, detailed the procedures involved in the multi-stage random 
sampling methods and provided overviews of the demographics of survey respondents in relation 
to Senegalese national-level survey data. The data indicate that there is nothing especially 
distinct about microfinance borrowers in terms of religion, political affiliation, associational life 
or profession. In terms of income and employment however, microfinance clients have 
endowments than their non-borrowing counterparts. This may be as a result of microfinance or 
an ex ante condition that led to approval for a microfinance loan. In addition, those who ended 
up with microfinance experience were ex ante more politically active [before receiving 
microfinance] than non-microfinance borrowers. The data indicate that microfinance borrowers 
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may indeed be special when compared to non-interested borrowers or hopeful borrowers, such 
that any differences between them could very well be the result of selection bias on the part of 
micro-lending institutions. The following chapter uses the data summarized in this chapter to test 
the hypotheses concerning the political impact of microfinance using linear and logistic 
regression analyses. It addresses whether or not microfinance is a strong indicator of political 
participation and then tests various mechanisms by which microfinance may have a positive 
impact on the political engagement of micro-credit clients.
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Chapter Five: The Nature of the Relationship – Microfinance and Political 
Participation 
  
The sections in this chapter test and compare the current hypotheses about the nature of 
the relationship of microfinance to political participation using the dataset compiled for this 
research project. Recall from previous chapters that the current literature on microfinance and 
political participation emphasizes social capital as the exclusive mechanism by which 
microfinance and political participation are linked. As a result, higher participation rates seen 
among microfinance borrowers are attributed to improved attitudes of trust and mutual 
cooperation among microfinance borrowers. The data reveal that only certain forms of social 
capital are linked to microfinance and political participation. The data also show that the extent 
to which microfinance and certain dimensions of social capital increase the likelihood of 
participation depends on the activity in question. Microfinance matters more for some activities 
than others, and certain forms of social capital matter more for some political activities and less 
for others. This chapter also tests other explanations of political participation from the political 
science literature including the role of individual characteristics such as age, gender, income, 
education and employment status as well as the effect of political party affiliation. The data show 
that the importance of these individual characteristics also varies across different modes of 
participation. Microfinance remains an important determinant of participating in politics at the 
local level but loses its significance as a predictor of participation activities that have more 
national-level consequences. Questions in the survey asked all 703 respondents about pre-and 
post-microfinance political participation activities. The data reveal that microfinance borrowers 
were not more likely to participate in various activities after exposure to microfinance than 
before exposure to microfinance. Although statistically significant relationships between 




Microfinance and Political Participation 
That microfinance has the positive externality of increasing the political participation of 
micro-credit borrowers is often assumed in international development circles. The claim has 
been partially verified with small case studies and anecdotal evidence. (Hashemi et.al. 1996; 
Mayoux 1999; Sebstad and Cohen 2000; Cheston and Kuhn 2001; Simnowitz 2002; Pitt et. al 
2003; Mosley et. al 2004; Johnson 2005, Bayulgen 2006) In this chapter, the hypotheses spelled 
out in Chapter 1 are tested using the data collected from the original survey designed for this 
study, outlined in Chapter 4. The first and most basic hypothesis relevant to the research topic 
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(H1) is the claim that microfinance has a positive impact on political participation. That 
relationship can be diagramed in the following way: 
H1: MF  +   Political Participation  
This hypothesis represents two separate claims. First, that persons who participate in 
microfinance programs have higher levels of political participation than those who do not 
participate in microfinance. The second claim is that a person without microfinance will exhibit 
an increase in his/her level of political engagement after experience with a microfinance loan, 
such that microfinance causes an increase in political participation149.  
Using the survey data, I first test the claim that persons exposed to microfinance have 
higher levels of political participation than those with no microfinance experience by comparing 
the two population proportions. The null hypothesis H0, states that there is no difference between 
the levels of political participation of microfinance borrowers and non-microfinance borrowers 
or H0: p1 – p2 = 0, where p1 is the proportion of microfinance borrowers who participate in one of 
the political activities in the survey, p2 is the proportion of non-microfinance borrowers who 




 represents the overall sample proportion, the total 
number of individuals from both samples who participate in the activity in question. The formula 























                                                
149 This hypothesis often assumes that those who need, and access microfinance were also 
politically marginalized in the same way that they were once financially marginalized before the 
advent of microfinance. This is not my assumption. My argument acknowledges the very real 
possibility that there are microfinance borrowers who were politically active before becoming 
microfinance borrowers, regardless of the lack of formal financial services available to them.  
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This formula was applied to all the various modes of participation included in the survey. 
The survey instrument asked respondents whether or not they participated in five different 
elections, whether or not they contacted national-level and local-level government officials about 
a problem, whether or not they volunteered for a national or local level political campaign, 
whether or not they worked for a political party, whether or not they participated in a 
protest/march/demonstration, whether or not they made monetary or in-kind contributions to a 
political campaign, and whether or not they ever ran for a political office. These thirteen 
different activities are considered as examples of political participation in Senegal, but are in no 
way an exhaustive list of all forms of political engagement available to Senegalese citizens.  
In chapter four, the differences in participation rates between microfinance borrowers and 
non-microfinance borrowers’ participation in the above-listed political activities were quite 
noticeable (See Figures 4.4, 4.9 and 4.10). For example, 88% of non-microfinance borrowers are 
registered voters, while 94% of microfinance borrowers are registered voters. Thirteen percent of 
non-microfinance borrowers are members of a political party compared to 21% of microfinance 
borrowers. These differences however, only suggest that microfinance causes political 
participation. The tables below present the results of testing the statistical significance of the 
differences in rates of participation for each of the thirteen participation items listed above. The 
p-values derived from the hypothesis tests for two proportions are listed in Column (5) of each 
table. Analysis begins with rates of electoral participation for microfinance borrowers and non-






5.1 Microfinance and Electoral Participation 
Table 5.1 Microfinance and Electoral Participation150 













       
PresVote2007 .85 .79 .06 0.043 -.006% -.13 622 
Regional/LocalElection2009 .67 .45 .22 0.000*** .13 - .31 637 
Legislative2007Vote .66 .52 .14 0.001*** .063 - .22 618 
GuedMayorVote2002 .57 .34 .23 0.000*** .14 - .32 550 
RegionalCouncil2002Vote .51 .33 .18 0.000*** .09 - .27 551 
 
As Table 5.1 shows, the positive association between microfinance participation and 
electoral participation is statistically significant in four of the five elections. In all but one of the 
elections, the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the political participation [as 
voting] of microfinance borrowers and non-microfinance borrowers should be rejected. Being a 
micro-credit borrower has a positive and significant relationship with voting in the 2002 
Mayoral, 2002 Regional, 2007 Legislative and 2009 Regional and Local elections. In the 2007 
Presidential election however, the confidence interval for difference between microfinance 
borrowers’ participation and non-microfinance borrowers’ participation includes 0, such that I 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the participation between the 
two groups.  The lower and upper ends of the 95% confidence intervals for each election are 




                                                
150 Analysis was restricted to include only those who would have been eligible to vote in the 
elections. In the 2002 elections, only those 25 and older were included. In the 2007 elections, 
only those 20 and over were included in the proportions tests (prtests). Full outputs of the prtests 
are included in the Appendix to this chapter. 
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5.1.2 Microfinance and Other Modes of Participation 













       
Visit/ContactNat’lOfficial .18 .09 .08 0.004*** .02 - .15 680 
Visit/ContactLocalOfficial .17 .10 .07 0.015** .006 - .13 680 
Work/VolunteerLocalCampaign .17 .13 .04 0.193  -.02 - .10 676 
Work/VolunteerNat’lCampaign .15 .12 .03 0.355  -.03 - .09 677 
WorkforPoliticalParty .12 .10 .02 0.423  -.03 - .08 676 
CampaignContribute .06 .05 .01 0.566 -.03 - .05 676 
RanforOfficeEver .05 .03 .02 0.165 -.01 - .06 677 
ProtestorDemonstrate .04 .07 .03 0.250 -.01 - .06 679 
 
As is evident from Table 5.1.2 above, there are statistically significant differences 
between microfinance borrowers and non-microfinance borrowers in the acts of contacting a 
local or national government official. Being a microfinance borrower has a positive and 
significant relationship with the activity of contacting local and/or national level elected officials.  
Microfinance however, is not linked in any statistically significant way to the six other forms of 
political participation listed in the table.  Based on the information included above, I cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that there exists no difference between the political participation of 
microfinance borrowers and the political participation of non-microfinance borrowers in the 
areas of working or volunteering for a political campaign, working for a political party, 
participating in a protest or demonstration, making a contribution to a political campaign, or 
running for a political office. For those activities, the difference between microfinance borrowers 
and non-microfinance borrowers is negligible at best. 
 The information in Tables 5.1 and 5.1.2 demonstrate that microfinance matters more for 
some forms and levels of political participation than it does for others. In Table 5.1 the 
differences in the rates of electoral participation are greatest in local level elections. In column 
(3) of Table 5.1 the difference in proportions is greatest for the GuedMayorVote2002 and the 
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Regional/LocalElection2009 elections, being 0.23 and 0.22 respectively. Both of these elections 
involved voting for the mayor of the municipality of Guediawaye and for the local 
representatives who would represent Guediawaye at regional council.151 Although significant, 
the differences in proportions of electoral participation for offices that do not have locally 
specific ramifications for the department of Guediawaye are smaller at .18 and .14, respectively 
(RegionalCouncil2002 and Legislative2007Vote).   
 In Table 5.1.2 differences in the participation rates of microfinance and non-microfinance 
borrowers were greatest and most significant in the areas of contacting elected officials. 
Microfinance borrowers are more likely to confront an elected official about a problem in 
Guediawaye than are non-microfinance borrowers. Microfinance borrowers are also more likely 
to have contacted a member of the national government.152 The data in Tables 5.1 and 5.1.2 
confirm, with certain qualifications, the first hypothesis being tested in this study. This 
hypothesis states that, Individuals with micro-credit experience are more politically active than 
their non-borrowing counterparts. The tables above reveal that individuals with micro-credit 
experience are more likely to take part in some activities than their non-borrowing counterparts. 
Microfinance borrowers are more likely to vote in local and regional level elections and are more 
likely to contact political officials. In sum, the positive impact of microfinance is conditional to 
the form of political participation in question. 
 
                                                
151 Guediawaye is a department in the region of Dakar. 
152 In the survey, these are two separate questions. The first asks a respondent if they have ever 
contacted a local elected official about a problem in Guediawaye. The second question asks 
respondents if they had ever visited or contacted a member of the national government. It is 
noted that the second question allows for a wide range of types of contact. Respondents may 
have contacted members of the national government because the government official is a close 
family friend. The sequencing of questions however, implies that the respondent is being asked 
about their political activities, albeit respondents have much room to misinterpret. 
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5. 2 Microfinance, Social Capital and Political Participation  
The results in Tables 5.1 and 5.1.2 above, confirm a strong association between 
microfinance and electoral participation.153 To a certain extent, the assumptions about the 
positive effect of microfinance are verified in this initial analysis. However, it is premature to 
infer a causal relationship here, and conclude that microfinance causes people to vote who would 
have refrained from voting [were it not for participating in a microfinance program]. As a result, 
it would also be premature to pin the effect of microfinance on electoral participation on the 
mechanism of social capital -- a mechanism commonly found in the microfinance literature and 
one that also dominates in development arenas. This mechanism relies on a particular 
conceptualization of microfinance, which involves gender-biased and group-structured 
microfinance loans. In this case, the relationship between microfinance and social capital would 
be drawn as: 
H2:  Microfinance     Social Capital    Political Participation 
In Chapter Three, I explained that social capital is an amorphous term with several meanings. 
In the literatures on social capital, political participation and microfinance, social capital has 
been defined in the following four ways: 
1) Social Capital as Civic Engagement  
(Putnam, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c) 
 
2) Social Capital as Trust  
(Fukuyama, 1995) 
 
3) Social Capital as Mutual Cooperation  
(Ostrom, 1994; Coleman, 1987, 1988, Greely, 1997) 
 
4) Social Capital as Politically Relevant Network Interactions  
                                                
153 Only those respondents ages 23 and older would have been eligible to vote in the 2002 
elections and only survey respondents ages 20 and older would have been eligible to vote in the 
2007 elections. All survey respondents were presumed eligible to vote in the 2009 elections. 
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(La Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998) 
 
In this section of Chapter Five, I will test the relationship between these four forms of social 
capital and microfinance as well as political participation. 
 When applied as an explanatory mechanism linking microfinance and political participation, 
social capital is often treated as an all-inclusive package of trust and goodwill that is 
automatically produced as a result of repeated interactions among group-based microfinance 
clients who share a large loan. But, as was pointed out in the opening chapters of this text, micro-
credit loans do not have uniform structures. Microfinance firms in Senegal grant individual and 
group loans and vary in the rules and regulations that govern the structures of those loans. There 
is both inter- and intra-level variance for various aspects of micro-lending including the 
collateral requirements to receive a loan, the frequency of loan repayments, the frequency with 
which group borrowers must meet, and the obligations group borrowers have to one another. 
Below, I compare the average levels of the various forms of social capital among 
microfinance borrowers and non-microfinance borrowers. I also test the significance of the 
difference between group borrowing and individual borrowing for the various measures of social 
capital using the same method. 
Unfortunately, the data do not include pre-microfinance measures of social capital, which 
would provide a measurement of changes in an individual’s perception of their stock of social 
capital across time. The survey data is observational with some retrospective questions on voting 
and other forms of political participation. The survey instrument did not ask respondents whether 
or not they were more civically engaged after microfinance than they had been before 




Microfinance  Social Capital 
What the data do allow is a test of the hypothesis that microfinance borrowers have, on 
average, higher levels of social capital than non-microfinance borrowers. The table below 
displays the results of testing that hypothesis. 
 
Table 5.2 Social Capital and Microfinance 













       
MutualCoop 5.13 5.01 .12 0.319 -.38 - .62 688 
SCTrust 2.73 2.62 .10 0.027*** .002 - .21 688 
CvcEngmt 2.58 1.84 .74 0.0005*** .33 – 1.16 688 
DiscussPolitics 2.57 2.39 .19 0.0089 .03 - .34 684 
PolDiscnNtwk 1.77 1.49 .28 0.003 .08 - .47 688 
PoliticalFriend .60 .49 .12 0.0048 .03 - .20 676 
 
Table 5.2 above displays the statistically significant differences between microfinance 
borrowers and non-microfinance borrowers for certain forms of social capital. Microfinance 
borrowers generally have higher levels of civic engagement154, and higher feelings of trust155 
about others than do non-microfinance borrowers. In addition, microfinance borrowers have 
more politically relevant social capital than non-microfinance borrowers, meaning that 
microfinance borrowers have, on average larger political discussion networks than do non-
microfinance borrowers, and a larger share of microfinance borrowers have friends who are 
                                                
154 Recall from Chapter Four that the variable CvcEngmt is a composite score on a five-item 
index that asks respondents whether or not they are a member of a group or association and how 
many organizations to which they belong, if they are active participants in the group or 
association’s meetings, if they assist with group meetings, volunteer for group/associations 
activities, and have served as a group president.  
155 SCTrust is also a composite score on a nine-item index asking respondents how much trust 
they have for others individuals with respect to their neighborhood, municipality, region and 
throughout all of Senegal.  
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political experts. Lastly, microfinance borrowers tend to discuss politics more often than do non-
microfinance borrowers.  
Table 5.2 also shows, however, that microfinance borrowers do not exhibit higher levels 
of mutual cooperation than non-microfinance borrowers. This particular finding is problematic 
for theories that claim that group-based microfinance loans automatically produce mutual 
cooperation—and thus social capital-- as a function of the terms of the loan. These statistically 
significant results however, cannot determine whether or not a cause-and-effect relationship 
exists between microfinance and social capital. It is highly plausible that those individuals with 
strong social networks seek out microfinance, or that those individuals who live in environments 
with higher levels of social capital will seek out microfinance. Alternatively, microfinance firms 
may establish themselves in areas where there are sufficient amounts of social, and other types of 
capital to make for trustworthy micro-credit clients.  
Part of the claim that microfinance borrowers have more social capital than non-
microfinance borrowers rests on the assumption that group-based loan programs inherently 
produce trust and mutual cooperation among members. However, not all group-based loan have 
the same structures. Some lending institutions require group members to meet more frequently 
than do others, some micro-lending groups have no requirements other than that group members 
make credit payments on the same day. Below, I tested the differences in the levels of each 
dimension of social capital among group borrowers and individual borrowers using the two-






Table 5.3 Social Capital among Group and Individual Borrowers* 
 Mean of Group 
Borrowers 









       
^MutualCoop 5.31 5.01 .25 0.299 -.68 – 1.17 154 
^CvcEngmt 3.41 2.34 1.07 0.0169*** .08 – 2.06 154 
^SCTrust 2.80 2.70 .10 0.147 -.09 - .29 154 
~DiscussPolitics 2.48 2.62 .14 0.777 -.49 - .22 152 
^PolDiscnNtwk 1.5 1.88 .38 0.0723** .13 - .88 154 
~PoliticalFriend .71 .61 .10 0.158 -.09 - .29 152 
^In Rows 1-3 and 5 there are 32 Group Borrowers and 122 Individual Borrowers. ~In Rows 4 and 6 there are 31 Group Borrowers and 121 
Individual Borrowers 
 
As the table above indicates, group borrowers exceed individual borrowers in a statistically 
significant way only in the area of civic engagement. Group borrowers tend to belong to more 
civic organizations than individual borrowers and group borrowers tend to be more active in 
those organizations than microfinance borrowers receiving individual loans. Individual-loan 
borrowers however, have on average larger political discussion networks than do group 
borrowers. Other than the size of the political discussion network and the level of civic 
engagement, the differences between the levels of social capital of group microfinance borrowers 
and the social capital levels of individual microfinance borrowers are not statistically significant. 
However, the statistically insignificant p-values may not necessarily indicate that the null 
hypothesis-- that the two means are the same--should be accepted. The differences in the means 
between group and individual borrowers are fairly large (the smallest being .10) but the effects of 
the differences in means for each social capital indicator are masked by the large p-values. 
Table 5.2 demonstrated that the differences in levels of social capital among microfinance 
borrowers and non-microfinance borrowers are statistically significant, except in the form of 
mutual cooperation. Microfinance borrowers have higher levels of civic engagement, higher 
levels of trust in their social networks, and more politically relevant social capital than non-
microfinance borrowers. However, the results presented in Table 5.2 are not an indication that 
128 
  
microfinance builds or produces social capital. Contrary to what is often believed about 
microfinance, the results in Table 5.3 demonstrate that group-based microfinance programs are 
not associated with higher levels of social capital, except in the area of civic engagement: active 
associational membership. In this case, microfinance borrowers with group loans have higher 
levels of civic engagement than non-microfinance borrowers. In the literature however, trust in 
social networks and mutual cooperation are the forms of social capital believed to be the most 
politically salient for microfinance. The tables above lead to the following summary statements: 
Microfinance borrowers have, on average higher levels of social capital than non-microfinance 
borrowers, except in the form of mutual cooperation. Persons with group microfinance loans 
have higher levels of civic engagement than persons with individual loans, but do not have 
higher levels of any form of social capital. Persons with individual micro-loans have more 
politically relevant social capital than those with group loans. With these findings in mind, I 
tested which modes of social capital are associated with higher levels of political participation 
using logistic regression analysis. 
Taking into account the different forms of social capital listed above, I formulate four models 
of political participation. Each model is based on one of the four definitions of social capital used 
in this study, and applied to the four elections in which microfinance was found to have a 
positive and significant relationship with electoral participation (See Tables 5.1 and 5.1.2). All 
four models use the same basic logistic regression equation outlined below in Equation (2): 
! 
logit(p) = ln[ p1" p] = # + $1MF + $2SC + u  
Where p is the probability of voting in the election in question, ! is the constant term, MF is a 
variable that denotes whether or not a person has microfinance experience, SC is a variable that 
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is a measure of the respondent’s level of one of the four forms of social capital and u is the error 
term. The regression results of the various models are listed in the tables below. 
 
Tables 5.4.1-5.4.5 Social Capital and Electoral Participation156 
Table 5.4.1 Civic Engagement 
Equation   Variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% C.I.] X 
GuedMayorVote2002  MFever* 0.220 0.048 4.670 0.000 0.127 - 0.312 0.280 
   CvcEngmt 0.018 0.009 2.020 0.043 0.001 – 0.036 2.087 
Marginal effects after logit        
y  = Pr(GuedMayorVote2002) (predict)        
=  .40211713157         
N=550          
RegionalCouncil2002Vote  MFever* 0.173 0.047 3.680 0.000 0.081 - 0.266 0.278 
   CvcEngmt 0.011 0.009 1.320 0.187 0.006 - 0.028 2.093 
Marginal effects after logit        
y  = Pr(RegionalCouncil2002Vote) (predict)       
 =  0.37638125         
N=551          
Legislate2007Vote  MFever* 0.164 0.044 3.710 0.000 0.077 - 0.251 0.252 
   CvcEngmt 0.008 0.009 0.960 0.336 -0.008 - 0.025 2.083 
Marginal effects after logit        
y  = Pr(Legislate2007Vote) (predict)        
 =  .56202466         
N=618          
RegionalElection2009  MFever* 0.206 0.045 4.560 0.000 0.117 - 0.294 0.246 
   CvcEngmt 0.038 0.009 4.320 0.000 0.021 - 0.055 2.064 
Marginal effects after logit        
y  = Pr(RegionalElection2009) (predict)        
 =  .50469223         
N=637          
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1      
 
Table 5.4.1 shows that social capital as civic engagement is not an important determinant 
of participation in the Regional Election of 2002 and the Legislative Election of in 2007. In the 
                                                
156 Marginal results for microfinance and the different measures of social capital are presented in 
the Appendix to this chapter. The marginal effects in the Appendix display changes in 
probability at different levels of the five different dimensions of social capital. 
157 Predicted probabilities in the far-left column of Tables 5.4.1-5.4.5 represent the marginal 
effects at the means of the independent variables. Appendix Tables 5.4.1-5.4.5 in the appendix 
provide the predicted probabilities for each value of the independent variables. 
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2002 Mayoral election and the 2009 Regional/Local Elections however, CvcEngmt joined 
microfinance as a significant predictor of political participation. In the marginal effects table 
above, the average microfinance borrower had a probability of voting in the 2002 Mayoral 
election that was 22 points higher than the average non-microfinance borrower when holding the 
variable CvcEngmt at its mean. A marginal 1 point/unit change from the average CvcEngmt 
score of 2.09 is associated with a 1.8% increase in the probability voting in the 2002 mayoral 
election for the average voter.158 A non-microfinance borrower with an average CvcEngmt score 
of 2.09 has a predicted probability of voting of .34 in the 2002 Mayoral election. A microfinance 
borrower with the average CvcEngmt score has a predicted probability score of .56 of voting in 
the 2002 Mayoral election. In the 2002 regional election and the 2007 legislative elections only 
experience with microfinance had a significant impact on the probability of voting. The marginal 
effects above imply that microfinance borrowers had a 17.3% higher probability of voting in the 
2002 regional election. A non-microfinance borrower with an average CvcEngmnt score of 2.09 
has a .33 predicted probability score of voting in the 2002 regional election.159 Given the same 
average level of CvcEngmt, a microfinance borrower has a predicted probability score of .50 for 
the 2002 regional election. In the 2007 legislative elections, microfinance borrowers have a 
16.4% higher probability of voting in the 2007 legislative election. A non-microfinance borrower 
with an average CvcEngmnt score of 2.08 has a predicted probability score of .52 of voting in 
the 2007 legislative election, compared to the .68 predicted probability score of a microfinance 
borrower with the same level of CvcEngmt. In the 2009 regional elections microfinance 
                                                
158 To see the changes in the probabilities at various levels of Civic Engagement see Appendix 
Table 5.4.1. 
159 These findings are consistent with the initial finding presented in Table 5.1 where 
microfinance was found to have a larger impact on voting in local-level elections than in regional 




borrowers had a 21% higher probability of voting than non-microfinance borrowers and a 
marginal change in civic engagement from the average level of 2.06 is associated with a 3.8% 
increase in the probability of voting. The predicted probability score of a microfinance borrower 
is .66, at the mean score of CvcEngmt. The predicted probability score of a non-microfinance 
borrower, holding the mean score of CvcEngmt constant, is .45.  
Table 5.4.2 displays the effects of microfinance and social capital as trust in networks on 
electoral participation. 
Table 5.4.2 Trust in Networks 
Equation  Variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% C.I.] X 
GuedMayorVote2002 MFever* 0.225497 0.04737 4.76 0.000 .132644 - .3185 0.280000 
  SCTrust 0.182815 0.04234 4.32 0.000 .099833 - .265797 2.667810 
Marginal effects after logit       
y  = Pr(GuedMayorVote2002) (predict)       
 =  .39818155160        
N=550         
RegionalCouncil2002Vote MFever* 0.174753 0.04785 3.65 0.000 .080965 - .268542 0.277677 
  SCTrust 0.212929 0.04224 5.04 0.000 .130131 - .295727 2.666390 
Marginal effects after logit       
y  = Pr(RegionalCouncil2002Vote) (predict)      
 =  .36926173        
N=551         
Legislate2007Vote MFever* 0.169213 0.04391 3.85 0.000 .08315 - .255277 0.252427 
  SCTrust -0.007800 0.03590 -0.22 0.828 -0.078161 - 0.062562 2.655410 
Marginal effects after logit       
y  = Pr(Legislate2007Vote) (predict)       
 =   .5619217        
N=618         
RegionalElection2009 MFever* 0.217837 0.04411 4.94 0.000 .131383 - .30429 0.246468 
  SCTrust 0.036690 0.03566 1.03 0.304 -0.139776 2.648620 
Marginal effects after logit       
y  = Pr(RegionalElection2009) (predict)       
 =  .50388476        
N=637         
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1     
 
                                                
160 Predicted probabilities in the far-left column of Tables 5.4.1-5.4.5 represent the marginal 
effects at the means of the independent variables. Appendix Tables 5.4.1-5.4.5 in the appendix 




From the information presented in Table 5.4.2, trust in social networks appears to have 
significant positive effects on the probability of voting in the 2002 elections but not in the 2007 
Legislative election or the 2009 Regional/Local election where microfinance participation was 
also found to be an important indicator of electoral participation. In the marginal effects table, 
having experience with microfinance is associated with a 23% higher probability of voting in the 
2002 Mayoral election. As trust in networks increases from its mean score of 2.67, so does the 
probability of voting in the 2002 elections, by approximately 18%. Because SCTrust is a 
continuous variable with scores ranging from 0 to 4 having a higher than average level of trust in 
social networks is a stronger predictor of participation in the 2002 mayoral election than is 
microfinance, but only slightly. In logistic regression analysis, SCTrust has a larger coefficient 
than microfinance though both are significant at the p < 0.001 level. For example, the predicted 
probability of voting in the 2002 mayoral election for a person with a score of 1 in trust in social 
networks is .1331, the predicted probability of voting in the 2002 mayoral election for a 
microfinance borrower with a SCTrust score of 0 is .1302.  This explains the findings for the 
2002 regional elections where the average level of trust in social networks, 2.67 had a larger 
impact on the probability of voting than did experience with microfinance. Marginal changes in 
SCTrust are associated with a 21.2% increase in the probability of voting whereas having 
microfinance experience is associated with a 17% higher probability of voting in the 2002 
regional election. In the more recent 2007 and 2009 elections trust in social networks was not a 
significant predictor of the likelihood of voting.161  
                                                
161 Appendix Table 5.4.2 displays predicted probabilities of voting in the elections at the 
different levels of social capital. For example, in the 2002 mayoral election, non-microfinance 
borrowers with no trust in social networks (SCTrust = 0) have a predicted probability voting of 
.06. Changing from the lowest to the highest score on the SCTrust Scale (SCTrust = 6) without 
microfinance (MFever = 0) meant an increase in the predicted probability of voting in the 2002 
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Tables 5.4.3-5.4.5 provide the coefficients of three dimensions of politically relevant 
social capital on the probability of voting in the elections where microfinance was shown to be 
an important correlate (See Table 5.1). The three dimensions of politically relevant social capital 
are: 1) the size or extent of an individual’s political discussion network; 2) the level of political 
expertise within those networks; 3) and the frequency of political discussions.  Table 5.4.3 
presents the results on the effect of the size of an individual’s political discussion network. 
  Table 5.4.3 Political Discussion Network 
Equation  Variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% C.I.] X 
GuedMayorVote2002 MFever* 0.220326 0.04794 4.60 0.000 .12636 - .314292 0.280000 
  PolDscnNtwk 0.098708 0.01953 5.05 0.000 .06042 - .136995 1.641820 
Marginal effects after logit       
y  = Pr(GuedMayorVote2002) (predict)       
 =  .40017058        
N=550         
RegionalCouncil2002Vote MFever* 0.1693782 0.04842 3.50 0.000 .074474 - .264283 0.277677 
  PolDscnNtwk 0.1075171 0.01938 5.55 0.000 .069534 - .1455 1.64428 
         
Marginal effects after logit       
y  = Pr(RegionalCouncil2002Vote) (predict)      
 =  .37212798        
N=551         
Legislate2007Vote MFever* 0.1564049 0.04479 3.49 0.000 0.068624 - .244186 0.252427 
  PolDscnNtwk 0.0760784 0.01907 3.99 0.000 .038706 - .113451 1.60032 
Marginal effects after logit       
y  = Pr(Legislate2007Vote) (predict)       
 =  .56480413        
N=618         
RegionalElection2009 MFever* 0.2109024 0.04459 4.73 0.000 .123517 - .298288 0.246468 
  PolDscnNtwk 0.048919 0.01807 2.71 0.007 .013503 - .084335 1.58556 
Marginal effects after logit       
y  = Pr(RegionalElection2009) (predict)       
 =  .50432793        
N=637         
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1     
 
                                                                                                                                                       
election from .06 to .62. Adding microfinance to a maximum SCTrust score increased the 




In the marginal effects table above, both microfinance experience and having an 
extensive political discussion network increase the probability of voting in the four elections in 
question in a significant way. In the 2002 mayoral election, microfinance borrowers had a 22% 
higher probability of voting and marginal increases in the size of a political discussion network 
from the average level of 1.6 is associated with a 9.8% increase in the probability of voting.162 In 
the 2002 regional and local elections microfinance borrowers had 17% higher probability of 
voting and marginal increases from the average size of a political discussion networks are 
associated with an 11% increase in the probability of voting. However, this results masks the fact 
that for the 2002 regional elections marginal increases in the size of a political discussion 
network was a stronger and more significant predictor of voting than microfinance.  In the 2007 
legislative elections microfinance borrowers have a 16% higher probability in of voting in the 
election and marginal increases from the average size of a political discussion network is 
associated with an 8% increase in the probability of voting. Lastly, in the 2009 regional/local 
elections the average microfinance borrower had a 22% higher probability of voting than the 
average non-microfinance borrower and a marginal change in the average size of a political 
discussion network is associated with a 4.8% increase in the probability of voting.  
Table 5.4.4 presents the results of the effect of having friends who are political experts on 
the probability of voting in the four elections where microfinance experience was found to be a 
                                                
162 See Table 5.4.3 in the appendix for the various predicted probabilities of voting in the 
elections based on the different sizes of a political discussion network and experience with 
microfinance. For example, the table in the appendix shows that not discussing politics with 
anyone and not having microfinance experience is associated with a 22% probability of voting in 
the 2002 Mayoral elections. Non-microfinance borrowers who discussed politics with at least 
two categories of people, for example with family and friends had a probability of voting of .41. 
Non-microfinance borrowers who discussed politics with everyone from family, friends, 
neighbors and religious leaders had a .81 probability of voting in the 2002 Mayoral. 
Microfinance borrowers who did the same had a probability of voting of .89. Results are similar 
in the regression analyses of the other three elections.  
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statistically significant factor for political participation. Having a political expert as a friend 
represents the second component of politically relevant social capital. 
Table 5.4.4 Political Friends 
Equation  Variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% C.I.] X 
GuedMayorVote2002 MFever* 0.2198073 0.04719 4.66 0.000 .127325 - .312289 0.282569 
  PoliticalFriend* 0.136488 0.04249 3.21 0.001 .053217 - .219759 0.53578 
Marginal effects after logit       
y  = Pr(GuedMayorVote2002) (predict)       
 =  .40278233        
N=545         
RegionalCouncil2002Vote MFever* 0.1677475 0.04761 3.52 0.000 .074432 - .261063 0.28022 
  PoliticalFriend* 0.1662932 0.04127 4.03 0.000 .085411 - .247176 0.534799 
Marginal effects after logit       
y  = Pr(RegionalCouncil2002Vote) (predict)      
 =  .37466919        
N=546         
Legislate2007Vote MFever* 0.1661299 0.04402 3.77 0.000 .079852 - .252408 0.254902 
  PoliticalFriend* -0.0392819 0.04064 -0.97 0.334 -0.159319 0.51634 
Marginal effects after logit       
y  = Pr(Legislate2007Vote) (predict)       
 =  .56744619        
N=612         
RegionalElection2009 MFever* 0.2026262 0.04496 4.51 0.000 .114508 - .290744 0.248811 
  PoliticalFriend* 0.1530087 0.04007 3.82 0.000 .074465 - .231553 0.508716 
Marginal effects after logit       
y  = Pr(RegionalElection2009) (predict)       
 =  .50887311        
N=631         
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1     
 
In three of the four elections included in the table above, having a friend who is 
considered a political expert increases the probability of voting in an election. Microfinance 
experience is associated with a higher probability of voting in all four of the elections. In the 
2002 mayoral elections microfinance borrowers had a 22% higher probability of voting and 
having a friend who is a political expert is associated with a 14% higher probability of voting. 
For the 2002 regional elections the marginal effects of microfinance experience and having a 
political expert as a friend appear relatively equal in this table but in the logistic regression the 
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coefficient on PoliticalFriend is twice the size of the coefficient of microfinance and more 
significant. In the 2002 regional elections non-microfinance borrowers with a political expert as 
a friend have a predicted probability of voting of .45. Microfinance borrowers without a political 
expert as a friend have a predicted probability of voting of .38. In the 2007 legislative elections 
those with micro-credit experience had a 17% higher probability of voting in the election. 
Having a political expert as a friend was not a significant predictor of voting in the 2007 
legislative election. In the 2009 regional/local election having experience with microfinance 
means a 20% higher probability of voting in the election having a political leader/expert as a 
friend increases the probability of voting by 15%. 
Table 5.4.5 below includes the marginal effects of the frequency of political discussions 
and microfinance experience on the 2002 mayoral and regional elections, the 2007 legislative 
election and the 2009 regional and local elections. The frequency of political discussions 
represents the last component of politically relevant social capital.  
Table 5.4.5 Discuss Politics 
Equation  Variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% C.I.] X 
GuedMayorVote2002 MFever* 0.218839 0.04747 4.61 0.000 .125791 - .311887 0.279197 
  DiscussPolitics 0.0934052 0.02468 3.79 0.000 .045039 - .141771 2.45803 
Marginal effects after logit       
y  = Pr(GuedMayorVote2002) (predict)       
 =  .39786122        
N=548         
RegionalCouncil2002Vote MFever* 0.1682347 0.04766 3.53 0.000 .074819 - .261651 0.276867 
  DiscussPolitics 0.0954762 0.02433 3.92 0.000 .047791 - .143162 2.46266 
Marginal effects after logit       
y  = Pr(RegionalCouncil2002Vote) (predict)      
 =  .37092079        
N=549         
Legislate2007Vote MFever* 0.171349 0.04409 3.89 0.000 .084937 - .257761 0.251623 
  DiscussPolitics 0.0169084 0.02296 0.74 0.461  -0.028084 - 0.061901 2.44156 
Marginal effects after logit       
y  = Pr(Legislate2007Vote) (predict)       
 =  .56233838        
N=616         
137 
  
RegionalElection2009 MFever* 0.2067373 0.04551 4.54 0.000 .117534 - .29594 0.245669 
  DiscussPolitics 0.1258996 0.02426 5.19 0.000 .078353 - .173446 2.4315 
Marginal effects after logit       
y  = Pr(RegionalElection2009) (predict)      
 =  .50253506        
N=635         
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1     
 
Similar to the effects of the Political Discussion Network and having Political Friends 
dimensions of politically relevant social capital, the frequency with which an individual 
discusses politics in a strong predictor of the probability of voting, particularly in the 2002 
mayoral and regional elections as well as the 2009 mayoral and regional elections. In the table 
above microfinance experience is a significant predictor of voting in all four of the elections. In 
the 2002 mayoral election, microfinance increases the probability of voting by 22% for a person 
who discuss politics somewhere between rarely and often. A marginal increase in the average 
level of frequency of political discussions is associated with a 9% increase in the probability of 
voting in the 2002 mayoral election. In the 2002 regional election, experience with micro-credit 
is associated with a 17% higher probability of voting and a marginal increase in the frequency of 
political discussions is associated with a 9% increase in the probability of voting. In the 2007 
legislative election, only microfinance experience is a significant predictor of voting in the 
election. Microfinance borrowers have a 17% higher probability of voting in the 2007 legislative 
election. In the 2009 regional election microfinance borrowers had a 21% higher probability of 
voting and a marginal change in the average frequency of political discussion from 2.4 is 
associated with a 12% increase in the probability of voting in the 2009 regional/local election. 163 
 In the tables above, the various dimensions of social capital were tested in separate 
models for their impact on voter participation in four separate elections. As the tables above 
                                                
163 Table 5.4.5 in the Appendix shows the changes in marginal effects of voting according to the 
various levels of the frequency of political discussions from never (0) to often (4).  
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indicate, the components of social capital vary in their significance for electoral participation. 
Recall that this is also true for the impact of microfinance on electoral participation (in Table 
5.1). For example, in Table 5.4.1 social capital as Civic Engagement has a positive, significant 
impact on the probability of voting in the Mayoral 2002 and Regional/Local 2009 elections, but 
not on the 2002 regional and 2007 legislative elections. In Table 5.4.2 social capital as levels of 
trust in social networks had a positive and significant impact on the probability of voting in the 
2002 mayoral and regional elections but not in the 2007 and 2009 elections. In addition, trust in 
social networks was a stronger predictor of participation in the 2002 regional elections than 
microfinance. The same findings applied to a dimension of politically relevant social capital: 
having a political expert as a friend (Table 5.4.4). Having an extensive political discussion 
network has a statistically significant and positive impact on the probability of voting in the 
mayoral and regional 2002 elections and the 2007 legislative election (Table 5.4.3) and was also 
a stronger predictor of participation than microfinance experience. Lastly, both microfinance 
experience and increases in the frequency of political discussions were found to increase the 
probability of voting in the local and regional elections of 2002 and the local and regional 
election of 2009 (Table 5.4.5) such that microfinance and social capital both matter for political 
participation in recent election in Senegal.  
  
5.3 Additional Explanations of Political Participation 
The results in Tables 5.4.1-5.4.5 merely demonstrate how microfinance and various 
measures of social capital perform as indicators of political participation without considering 
well-established indicators of political participation from the political science literature. As 
previously stated, the claim that microfinance is an automatic catalyst for the production of 
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social capital plays a large role in the literature connecting microfinance to political participation. 
So far, this literature has overlooked alternative explanations of political participation verified in 
the field of political science, mainly because researchers and development practitioners have 
relied on a particular conceptualization of microfinance—the Grameen Bank model. 
Microfinance has become synonymous with the Grameen Bank model although the global 
microfinance industry is diverse and provides financial services such as savings, insurance and 
micro-credit to both men and women who can participate in microfinance programs as 
individuals or as members of a savings or borrowing group. This is especially true in Senegal.   
To see how microfinance and the various dimensions of social capital included above 
compare with some conventional explanations of political participation, I include additional 
variables in the logit model that was outlined above in Equation (2). The adjusted logit 
regression model is written below in Equation (3). 
! 
log it(p) = ln[ p1" p ] =# + $1MF + $2SC + ...+ $7Income+ $8Educ + $9Gender + $10AGE + $11Party + u  
In the expanded Equation (3) above, standard predictors of political participation such as 
income, education level, gender, age and political party affiliation are included in the logit model 
and used to analyze the data. Tables 5.5.1 – 5.5.4 below display the marginal effects results of 
the logistic equations. A separate logistic equation is run for each of the four elections in which 
experience with microfinance was shown to be a significant factor for electoral participation 
(Table 5.1). 
Table 5.5 Extended Models of Electoral Participation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES GuedMayorVote2002 RegionalCouncil2002Vote Legislate2007Vote RegionalElection2009 
     
MFever 0.529** 0.377 0.118 0.434* 
 (0.235) (0.244) (0.232) (0.225) 
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CvcEngmt -0.009 -0.0676 0.00706 0.111*** 
 (0.0456) (0.048) (0.0410) (0.040) 
SCTrust 0.728*** 0.937*** -0.119 -0.0735 
 (0.207) (0.219) (0.172) (0.167) 
PolDiscnNtwk 0.460*** 0.544*** 0.408*** -0.0566 
 (0.110) (0.115) (0.102) (0.095) 
PoliticalFriend 0.207 0.369 -0.283 0.0278 
 (0.232) (0.239) (0.207) (0.198) 
DiscussPolitics -0.0462 -0.168 -0.152 0.290** 
 (0.156) (0.162) (0.139) (0.137) 
EndsMeetYES -0.0274 -0.485** -0.0801 0.673*** 
 (0.232) (0.237) (0.200) (0.195) 
MaxEduc 0.0920* 0.123** 0.0327 -0.000929 
 (0.053) (0.055) (0.046) (0.045) 
Gender -0.16 0.0671 -0.328 -0.0661 
 (0.230) (0.235) (0.200) (0.196) 
AGE 0.0635*** 0.0629*** 0.0686*** 0.0285*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
PartiMember 0.381 0.827*** -0.027 0.985*** 
 (0.305) (0.313) (0.292) (0.297) 
Constant -6.094*** -6.548*** -1.963*** -2.298*** 
 (0.811) (0.859) (0.625) (0.608) 
     
Observations 514 515 579 595 




Table 5.5 above shows that the only variable that consistently increases the likelihood of 
voting in a significant way is AGE. When all other indicators are held at their means, as years of 
AGE increases so does the probability of voting in any election. For example, in the 2009 
regional and municipal election, when Age alone increases from 18 years to 75 years the 
predicted probability of voting increased from .40 to .75. No other predictor variables have a 
consistent impact on the probability of voting across all elections.  
The size of a respondent’s political discussion network (PolDscnNtwk) comes in close 
second to AGE in terms of its consistency in predicting the likelihood of voting. A one-unit 
increase in the size of an individual’s PolDscnNtwk increases the chances of voting across three 
elections. In the 2007 Legislative elections, increasing the size of the political discussion 
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network from 0 to 6 (meaning from discussing politics with no one to discussing politics with 
family, friends, neighbors, co-workers, religious leaders, etc) increased the predicted probability 
of voting from .42 to .87. Following PolDscnNtwk, the variables SCTrust and Party Affilitation 
(PartiMember) have the most significant impact on the likelihood of voting, especially in the 
local and regional 2002 elections. In the 2002 and 2009 regional elections, political party 
affiliation (PartiMember) is a strong predictor for the probability of voting. In the table above, 
the variable EndsMeet is used as a proxy for Income. Only 40% of respondents actually provided 
their (monthly) incomes. The EndsMeet question asked respondents whether or not they were 
able to make ends meet with the money they earned from working. In the table above, EndsMeet 
has a negative effect on the probability of voting in the 2002 regional election, but a positive 
impact on the likelihood of voting in the 2009 regional election.  
The variable in question, however, MFever (an indication of microfinance participation) 
has a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of voting in only two elections: the 2002 
mayoral election and the 2009 regional elections, and only at the p < .05 and p < .10 levels. In 
the 2002 mayoral race, the difference between having no microfinance experience and having 
microfinance experience translates into an increase in predicted probability of voting from .37 
(no microfinance experience) to .47 (experience with a microfinance loan). 
 For a more refined analysis of the data, Tables 5.5.1-5.5.4 below display the marginal 












Table 5.5.1 Marginal Effects of Extended Logit Model: 2002 Mayoral Election 
Marginal effects after logit 
y = Pr(GuedMayorVote2002) (predict) 









According to the figures in Table 5.5.1 above, in 2002, a 23 year-old female microfinance 
borrower with a minimum level of trust in social networks and one group of people with which 
she discussed politics has a 0.06 predicted probability of voting in the Guediawaye mayoral 
elections with a 90% confidence level. In that same election, a 56 year-old female microfinance 
borrower with a maximum level of trust in her surrounding social networks, an extensive 
political discussion network, who has earned her Master’s degree has a predicted probability of 
voting in the 2002 mayoral election of .99 with a p-value 0.000.  
Table 5.5.2 Marginal Effects of Extended Logit Model: 2002 Regional Election 
Marginal effects after logit 
y = Pr(RegionalCouncil2002Vote) (predict) 
   = .34610579 
 
VARIABLES dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% C.I.] X 
MFever* 0.0871091 0.05751 1.51 0.130 -0.025605 0.199823 0.279612 
CvcEngmt -0.0152928 0.01074 -1.42 0.154 -0.03634 0.005755 2.13592 
SCTrust 0.2121074 0.04902 4.33 0.000 0.11603 0.308184 2.66956 
PolDis~k 0.1230593 0.02613 4.71 0.000 0.071843 0.174276 1.6466 
Politi~d* 0.0829299 0.05331 1.56 0.120 -0.021551 0.187411 0.537864 
Discus~s -0.0379766 0.03675 -1.03 0.301 -0.109996 0.034043 2.46408 
VARIABLES dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% C.I.] X 
 
MFever* 0.1271824 0.05718 2.22 0.026 0.015116 0.239249 0.28210 
CvcEngmt -0.0021262 0.01076 -0.20 0.843 -0.023206 0.018954 2.13035 
SCTrust 0.1719115 0.04877 3.53 0.000 0.07633 0.267494 0.26749 
PolDis~k 0.1085129 0.02605 4.17 0.000 0.057454 0.159572 1.64397 
Politi~d* 0.0488104 0.05452 0.90 0.371 -0.058044 0.155665 0.53891 
Discus~s -0.0109191 0.03692 -0.30 0.767 -0.083272 0.061434 2.45914 
EndsMe~S* -0.0064664 0.0549 -0.12 0.906 -0.114062 0.101129 0.69261 
MaxEduc 0.0217132 0.01257 1.73 0.084 -0.002929 0.046356 4.42607 
Gender* -0.0378564 0.05411 -0.70 0.484 -0.143917 0.068204 0.48444 
AGE 0.0149961 0.00237 6.32 0.000 0.010346 0.019646 37.97280 
PartiM~r* 0.0921185 0.07494 1.23 0.219 -0.054758 0.238995 0.16732 
(*)dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1    
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EndsMe~S* -0.1122514 0.05581 -2.01 0.044 -0.221644 -0.002858 0.693204 
MaxEduc 0.027797 0.01246 2.23 0.026 0.003384 0.052209 4.4233 
Gender* 0.027797 0.05311 0.29 0.775 -0.088903 0.119296 0.485437 
AGE 0.0142264 0.00233 6.10 0.000 0.009656 0.018797 38.0233 
PartiM~r* 0.197732 0.07664 2.58 0.010 0.047516 0.347948 0.16699 
(*)dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1    
 
Table 5.5.2 above demonstrates that in the 2002 Regional elections, the predicted 
probabilities of voting are not significant until SCTrust or PolDscnNtwk variables exceed the 
value of 1. A 23 year old, non-microfinance borrower with Quranic education and an SCTrust 
and a PolDscnNtwk level of 2, who is not a member of a political party has a .12 probability of 
voting in the 2002 regional election. If the same individual becomes a member of a political 
party and has an increased sense of trust in their social environs and an expansive political 
discussion network, the predicted probability of voting increases to .95 at the p < .01 level. 
Table 5.5.3 Marginal Effects of Extended Logit Model: 2007 Legislative Election 
Marginal effects after logit 
y = Pr(Legislative2007Vote) (predict) 
   = .57823002 
VARIABLES dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [    95% C.I.   ] X 
MFExperience* 0.0286989 0.05605 0.51 0.609 -0.081157 0.138555 0.253886 
CivicEngmt 0.0017221 0.01001 0.17 0.863 -0.017896 0.02134 2.11054 
Trust -0.0289747 0.04198 -0.69 0.490 -0.111259 0.053309 2.66245 
PoliticalDiscussionNetwork 0.0995246 0.02485 4.01 0.000 0.050822 0.148227 1.60276 
PoliticalFriends* -0.068862 0.05027 -1.37 0.171 -0.167383 0.029659 0.519862 
DiscussPolitics -0.0370877 0.03401 -1.09 0.275 -0.103746 0.029571 2.44387 
EndsMeetYES* -0.0194796 0.04854 -0.40 0.688 -0.11462 0.075661 0.670121 
MaximumEducation 0.0079796 0.01119 0.71 0.476 -0.013961 0.02992 4.50777 
Gender* -0.0800018 0.04852 -1.65 0.099 -0.175107 0.015103 0.478411 
AGE 0.0167183 0.00233 7.17 0.000 0.012149 0.021288 36.209 
PartiMember* -0.006585 0.07139 -0.09 0.927 -0.146506 0.133336 0.151986 
(*)dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1    
 
In the 2007 legislative election the predicted probability of voting increases as the 
respondent’s age and size of political discussion network increases. A 20-year old respondent 
with no political discussion network had a .36 probability of voting in the 2007 legislative 
elections. If the respondent’s network size were increased by 2, the probability of voting 
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increases to .56 at the p < .01 level. Similarly, a 50-year old respondent with a fairly strong 
political discussion network (4) had a predicted probability of .96 at the p < .01 level. A ten-year 
increase in age, increases the predicted probability of voting to .98. 
Table 5.5.4 Marginal Effects of Extended Logit Model: 2009 Local and Regional Election 
Marginal effects after logit 
y = Pr(RegionalElection2009) (predict) 
   = .51526499 
VARIABLES dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [    95% C.I.   ] X 
MFExperience* 0.107406 0.05463 1.97 0.049 0.000332 0.21448 0.248739 
CivicEngagement  0.0278109 0.00989 2.81 0.005 0.008433 0.047189 2.10084 
Trust -0.0183564 0.04182 -0.44 0.661 -0.100323 0.06361 2.65554 
PolDisscussionNetwork  -0.014135 0.02374 -0.60 0.552 -0.060664 0.032393 1.58992 
PoliticalFriend* 0.0069407 0.04957 0.14 0.889 -0.090219 0.1041 0.512605 
DiscussPolitics 0.0725511 0.03415 2.12 0.034 0.005621 0.139481 2.43361 
EndsMeetYES* 0.1664892 0.04716 3.53 0.000 0.074056 0.258922 0.660504 
MaximumEducation -0.0002321 0.01126 -0.02 0.984 -0.022309 0.021845 4.53277 
Gender* -0.0165144 0.04898 -0.34 0.736 -0.112513 0.079484 0.477311 
AGE 0.0071149 0.00207 3.43 0.001 0.003052 0.011177 35.8118 
PartiMember* 0.232545 0.06294 3.70 0.000 0.109195 0.355895 0.154622 
(*)dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1    
 
In the 2009 regional election, which took place just before the survey was implemented, 
microfinance, civic engagement, frequent political discussions, age, political party affiliation and 
economic well-being are significant indicators of the probability of voting. In that election, the 
predicted probability of voting for an 18-year old with a minimum level of civic engagement 
(belonging to one voluntary organization), at least one group of people with which he discussed 
politics, who had no political party affiliation and was not able to make ends meet with the 
money he or she earned is .20 at the p < .05 level. The predicted probability of voting in the same 
election increases to .94 at the p < .01 level for a 30-year old microfinance borrower with a civic 
engagement level of 8 (the maximum is 11), who discusses politics with at least 4 groups of 
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people (family, friends, co-workers, members of an organization), who is able to make a living 
with the money he or she earns and is a member of a political party.164 
It must be emphasized that the results presented here are not conclusive of a causal 
relationship between microfinance and social capital; social capital and political participation; or 
microfinance and political participation. Although statistically significant differences exist 
between the proportion of microfinance borrowers who vote and the proportion of non-
microfinance borrowers who vote, the differences do not serve as proof of a causal relationship 
between microfinance and political participation. In the same vein the statistically significant 
differences between the average level of social capital among microfinance borrowers and the 
average levels of social capital reported by non-microfinance borrowers is promising, but 
inconclusive about microfinance’s role as a catalyst for social capital. It is necessary to 
acknowledge the endogeneity problems inherent in the relationship of microfinance to social 
capital. Those with a priori higher levels of social capital may be more likely to seek out a 
micro-credit loan. In addition, the results presented above only relate to one form of political 
participation--voting.  
In the expanded logit model of electoral participation, microfinance only maintains 
significance as an indicator in the 2002 and 2009 local elections. The measures of social capital 
presumed in the literature to be most associated with microfinance and political participation—
trust and mutual cooperation--are also inconsistent indicators of electoral participation, if at all. 
Social capital as mutual cooperation is not found to be a significant predictor of voting in any of 
the elections. Like microfinance, social capital defined as trust in social networks is a significant 
indicator in only two of the four elections where microfinance experience was previously shown 
                                                
164 See the Appendix for the marginal results and the predicted probabilities included I the 95% 
confidence intervals.  
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to be a relevant factor for voter turnout. In terms of the theories most relevant to the political 
science literature including, education, economic status and party affiliation, education was 
found to play a weak role in turnout for the 2002 mayoral and 2009 regional elections. Economic 
well-being played a slightly more significant role in the 2002 and 2009 regional elections. Last, 
but not least, political party affiliation was a strong predictor of voting in the 2002 and 2009 
regional elections. In terms of voting in the 2002 mayoral, 2002 regional/municipal, 2007 
legislative and 2009 regional and local elections, Age is the most important factor. But political 
participation in Senegal - and in many other democracies - is not limited to voting. Other forms 
of political participation, such as supporting a political candidate, contacting a government 
official about an issue, or participating in a protest or demonstration are important forms of 
political engagement that are considered here.  
 
5.4  Microfinance and Other Forms of Political Participation 
The next set of tables display the significance of the differences in participation rates 
among microfinance borrowers and non-microfinance borrowers across eight various modes of 
political participation. These activities include 1) voting in an election 2) contacting a national-
level official about a problem, 3) contacting a local-level government official about a problem, 4) 
volunteering for a national political campaign, 5) volunteering for a local-level political 
campaign, 6) working for a political party, 7) participating in a protest/march/demonstration, and 
8) making a monetary or in-kind contribution to a political campaign. In these instances, 
respondents who had micro-credit experience were asked whether or not they took part in such 
activities before and after the start date of their [first] microfinance loan. Non-microfinance 
borrowers were also asked whether or not they participated in those same activities with respect 
147 
  
to a reference year, 2005. In the distribution of responses to these pre-microfinance/pre-2005 and 
post-microfinance/post-2005 participation measures presented in Chapter Four, it appeared that 
there was a relationship between microfinance and political participation.  
In the case of the pre-microfinance participation rates, Figure 4.10 in Chapter Four 
indicated that the rates of participation were higher among would-be microfinance borrowers, 
before the start date of their [first] loan. If the differences in the pre-microfinance/pre-2005 rates 
of participation are significant, this would signal that many individuals who seek out 
microfinance are those who are already more politically active. The hypothesis tests for two 
proportions for each of the seven political participation items are displayed below in Table 5.6. 














       
PreVote .85 .70 .15 0.001*** 8% - 22% 566 
PreGuedVisit/Contact .16 .09 .07 0.013*** 0.8% - 13% 679 
PreGovtVisit/Contact .16 .07 .09 0.001*** 2% - 15% 680 
PreLocalWork/Volutnteer .14 .11 .03 0.218 0% - 13% 678 
PreNatlWork/Volutnteer .12 .10 .02 0.457 -4% - 8% 678 
PreWorkforPoliticalParty .09 .09 .00 0.992 -5% - 5% 677 
PreCampaignContribute .08 .05 .03 0.100 -1.2% - 8% 677 
PreProtestorDemonstrate .06 .06 .00 0.953 -4% - 4% 679 
 
The results of the hypotheses tests in Table 5.6 show that although the differences in 
means between future microfinance borrowers and future non-microfinance borrowers appeared 
meaningful across all seven activities in Chapter 4, the differences in the proportions of 
microfinance borrowers and non-microfinance borrowers who participate in the activities listed 
above are only significant in three of the eight modes of political participation: voting in an 
election, visiting or contacting a local government official and visiting or contacting a national 
government official.  
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Before beginning their microfinance loans, individuals who would later receive micro-
credit were already more likely than non-microfinance borrowers to 1) vote in an election 2) visit 
or contact a local official about a problem in Guediawaye and 3) visit or contact a national 
government official about a problem. The chances of an individual voting in an election prior to 
2005 or prior to receiving a micro-credit loan increases anywhere from 8% - 22% if they later 
became a microfinance borrower. The chances of visiting or contacting a local or government 
official increases anywhere from 1% to 13% if the individual was someone who would begin 
microfinance loans in the future. The chances of an individual visiting or contacting a national 
government official increases anywhere from 3% to 15% if the individual was someone who 
would begin microfinance borrowing activities later in life. 
These findings suggest that the claim that microfinance leads to increased political 
participation suffers from an endogeneity problem such that those who are already politically 
active may be more likely to apply and receive micro-credit loans. That relationship would be 
diagramed in the following way: 
Political Participation   Microfinance 
However, as I noted in Chapter Three, it is not a far-fetched idea that people have reasons 
to be politically active before having a microfinance loan. To assume that microfinance is an 
exclusive motivator of political participation among the poor is a mistake. Nevertheless, 
experience with microfinance may still serve to increase the participation levels of politically 
active, would-be microfinance borrowers, just not a large scale. Even if individuals were active 
before obtaining their loan, they may have taken part in only three of the eight activities 
reviewed above. It is possible that they took part in more of these activities after having exposure 
to a microfinance loan. Comparing the participation rates in the same activities after clients 
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received their microfinance loan can help to determine whether or not microfinance-borrowers’ 
level of participation in fact increased after receiving their [first] microfinance loan.  














       
PostVote .88 .85 .03 0.188 0.3% - 6% 557 
PostGovtVisit/Contact .18 .09 .09 0.004*** 2% - 15% 680 
PostGuedVisit/Contact .17 .10 .07 0.015*** 0.6% - 13% 679 
PostLocalWork/Volutnteer .17 .13 .04 0.193 2% - 10% 678 
PostNatlWork/Volutnteer .15 .12 .03 0.355 -3% - 9% 678 
PostWorkforPoliticalParty .12 .10 .02 0.423 -3% - 8% 677 
PostCampaignContribute .06 .05 .01 0.566 -3% - 5% 677 
PostProtestorDemonstrate .04 .07 .02 0.250 -1% - 6% 679 
 
The results in Table 5.7 on post-microfinance and post-2005 rates of participation are 
very similar to those presented in Table 5.6 on pre-microfinance and pre-2005 rates of political 
participation. The difference in population proportions is only significant for those who 
contacted or visited a local government officials or a national government official. However, the 
difference in proportions is no greater in the post-microfinance and post-2005 period than it was 
pre-microfinance and pre-2005 period. Besides voting, non-microfinance borrowers were no 
more likely to participate in the above-listed activities after 2005 than they had been prior to 
2005. Except for voting in elections, the difference in the rate of participation among 
microfinance borrowers did not increase after microfinance borrowers received a microfinance 
loan. Eighty-five percent of microfinance borrowers voted before receiving microfinance, while 
eighty-eight percent of microfinance borrower voted after receiving their loan. However, the 
difference in voting rates among non-microfinance borrowers is even greater. Seventy percent of 
non-microfinance borrowers reported voting before 2005, while eighty-five percent of non-
microfinance borrowers reported voting since 2005. For the other activities, these results in 
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Table 5.7 indicate that microfinance does not lead to increases in certain forms of political 
participation. The results also imply that those who took part in visiting or contacting 
government officials were likely to be future microfinance borrowers, and likely to remain 
politically active.  
The results in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 suggest that microfinance has no causal effect on 
political participation. Those who were exposed to microfinance were no more likely to contact 
an elected official, work or volunteer for a political campaign, work for a political party, 
participate in a protest or demonstration against the government, or make a contribution to a 
political campaign after receiving microfinance than they had been before receiving 
microfinance. Although microfinance borrowers were more likely than non-microfinance 
borrowers to contact a local or national government official, this was true about microfinance 
borrowers before they received their loan and the differences between the two groups did not 
increase after microfinance clients received their loan.165 
In Table 5.6 and Table 5.7, microfinance did not prove to be an important determinant of 
certain forms of political participation, namely participating in a protest or demonstration, 
working for a political party or volunteering or contributing to a political campaign. However, 
microfinance proved to be related to electoral participation in a positive and significant way in 
Table 5.1 and Table 5.6. Whether or not the information from those tables is evidence that 
microfinance causes an increase in electoral participation however, is premature. In order to 
make a more definitive statement about the causal effect of microfinance on political 
                                                
165 It is possible that the responses to these questions suffer from the issues that plague surveys with retrospective 
questions. Respondents who have at some point ever participated in any of the activities may remember themselves 
as having always taken part in that activity. I made every effort to illicit truthful responses by having interviewers 
move through these questions slowly and carefully, repeating the reference year (2005 or the start year of 
microfinance) as they asked the respondent about each activity separately. For each activity, I also asked if they 
remember taking part in the activity alone or with another person or with a group of people. 
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participation, we need to be able to detect tangible changes in the behavior of respondents after 
exposure to microfinance borrowing.  
 
5.5 Determining Cause-and-Effect: Microfinance and Electoral
 Participation 
One method of comparing the voting behavior of microfinance borrowers in relation to 
the start year of their micro-credit loan is the use of panel data.166 To do this, I transformed the 
survey data into longitudinal data in order to observe the electoral participation of survey 
respondents, in relation to the start year of microfinance. 167 After transforming the data in this 
way I used the Fixed Effects (FE) technique with a logistic regression to perform the analysis.168 
The FE technique assumes that a respondent’s individual characteristics, such as gender, 
education level, and socioeconomic status may impact or bias their experience with microfinance 
(IV) or their voting behavior (DV). The logistic equation for the fixed effects model is: 
! 








) = *1Xit ++ i + uit  
In this equation 
! 
ai  (i = 1...n) is the unknown intercept for each respondent, 
! 
Yit  is the probability 
of the dependent variable (voting in the election) occurring, i = respondent and t = time. 
! 
Xit  
represents the independent variable MF (start year of microfinance), 
! 
"1 is the coefficient for 
! 
Xit  
                                                
166 Much of data collected in the survey is observational and relies on retrospective self-reporting of respondents’ 
behavior. This is recognized as a methodological difficulty, because of the significant chance of reporting error.  
167 As indicated in the previous chapter, the panel dataset is constructed from responses to the same survey and thus 
reflect retrospective responses. The data have not been collected across various years in a strict sense. Instead, the 
voting behavior of respondents in each election is considered as a unique event and analyzed in relation to the start 
year of microfinance.  
168 Fixed Effects was chosen because I am interested in analyzing the impact of microfinance exposure to 
microfinance. Exposure to microfinance changes from one year to the next: from the years before exposure to the 
years after exposure. Random effects assume that any changes in [voting] behavior are random and uncorrelated 
with exposure to microfinance. The hypothesis tests in Table 5.1 demonstrated that the predictor variable, 
microfinance experience, is related to voting. 
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(start year of microfinance or MF) and 
! 
uit  is the error term. This equation determines the 
likelihood of voting in one of the five elections, if the respondent began microfinance in the 
same year, or a year prior to the year in which the election took place. The outputs of the logistic 
regressions are included in Table 5.8 (below). 
 
Table 5.8 Voting, Post-Microfinance Exposure 
. xtlogit VOTE_ MF if AGE >= 23, i(person) fe   
Note: multiple positive outcomes within groups encountered.      
Note: 164 groups (801 obs) dropped because of all positive or      
all negative outcomes.      
  VOTE_ Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
   MFExperience .9408278 .2796913 3.36 0.001 .3926428 1.489013 
             
 
. xtlogit, OR       
VOTE_ OR Std. Err. z P|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
MFExperience 2.562101 .7165976 3.33 0.001 1.480889 4.432717 
       
       
 
Table 5.8 above indicates that becoming a microfinance borrower prior to an election has 
positive and significant effects on voting in a subsequent election. The likelihood of voting in 
any one of the elections mentioned in the survey increases substantially if an individual begins 
microfinance in the year prior to the election or in the same year of the election. The odds ratio 
(OR) for the dependent variable MF is 2.56. This means that if an individual switches from being 
a non-microfinance borrower to a microfinance borrower in the year(s) prior to, or the same year 
of an election, their log odds of voting in the upcoming election are multiplied by 2.56. For a 
non-voting, non-microfinance borrower in 2002, who became a microfinance borrower in 2006 
the odds of voting in the 2007 election are more than twice as high as those who had not become 
a microfinance borrower before the 2007 elections. In the analysis above, only 409 respondents 
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were included. This is because 164 respondents had either never voted, or they voted in all five 
elections so that there was no variation in their voting behavior. In addition, the analysis was 
restricted to include only those individuals who would have been eligible to participate in all of 
the elections: only survey respondents ages 23 and older were included in the analysis.169 
The findings that the odds of electoral participation of non-microfinance borrowers 
would multiply by 2.56 if they become microfinance borrowers in the year prior to an election 
are promising; and yet they are at best, suggestive. It remains unclear if becoming a microfinance 
borrower was what changed the behavior of actual microfinance borrowers in the sample.  
In other words, the two questions that arise are, “How likely were microfinance 
borrowers to vote before beginning microfinance?” and “How does prior voting experience 
impact the chances of voting in the future?” Recall that in Table 5.6, 85% of respondents with 
microfinance experience indicated that they had voted in an election prior to the year they 
received a microfinance loan and in Table 5.7 88% of microfinance borrowers indicated they 
voted after receiving their microfinance loan.  
Considering that a large share of microfinance borrowers voted before receiving their 
micro-credit loans, I added pre-microfinance voting behavior, or past voting experience as an 
indicator of electoral participation to the Fixed Effects logit model used above. The FE technique 
assumes that a respondent’s individual characteristics, such as gender, education level, and 
socioeconomic status may impact or bias their experience with microfinance (IV) or their voting 
behavior (DV). When the lag variable L.VOTE_ -- a measure of pre-microfinance voting 
experience – was added to the model, receiving a microfinance loan prior to an election (the 
                                                
169 126 respondents were under the age of 23 at the time of the survey. When the analysis does not limit age, the n 
increases to 449, with 207 respodents dropped because of all positive or negative outcomes, but the results are 
similar. When all respondents are included, the OR (odds ratio) remains at 2.56.  
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variable MF) is no longer a significant indicator of political participation. The results of the 
logistic regression are included below in Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9 Prior Voting and Microfinance 
EQUATION VARIABLES VOTE_ 
VOTE_ MF 0.108 
  (0.365) 
 L.VOTE_ 1.110*** 
  (0.151) 
 Observations 892 
 Number of persons 300 
 
When prior voting experience in taken into account, the impact of pre-voting 
microfinance exposure on voting behavior becomes insignificant. However, the results of the 
logit regression analysis in the tables above overlook the fact that there are some microfinance 
borrowers who did not take part in any of the other forms of political activity before beginning 
microfinance .The next section presents information about those microfinance borrowers who 
were in no way politically active prior to receiving a micro-credit loan but became more 
politically engaged after exposure to microfinance.  
5.6  Exploring Cause-and-Effect: Microfinance and Political
 Participation 
A small number of non-microfinance borrowers and microfinance borrowers who did not 
engage in certain political activities engaged in those activities only after receiving a 
microfinance loan. This section presents information on those survey respondents across the 
eight different forms of political participation inquired about in the survey.  













      
Vote 14 .08 110 .20 124 
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Guediawaye_Visit/Contact 9 .05 18 .03 27 
Government_Visit/Contact 8 .05 20 .04 28 
LocalCampainWork/Volutnteer 11 .07 24 .04 35 
NatlCampaign_Work/Volutnteer 10 .06 22 .04 32 
WorkforPoliticalParty 7 .04 18 .03 25 
ProtestorDemonstrate 2 .01 15 .03 17 
CampaignContribute 10 .06 9 .02 19 
 
Table 5.10 includes the number of respondents whose political participation profiles changed 
over time. Some respondents participated in various activities only after microfinance or only 
after 2005. For most activities, the differences between the proportion of microfinance borrowers 
who changed their political behavior over time and the proportion of non-microfinance 
borrowers who changed their political behavior over time is negligible. To determine if 
experience with microfinance is an important predictor of changes in political participation over 
time, I test experience with microfinance as well as other indicators of political participation 
using logistic regression analysis. The results of the regression analysis are included in Table 
5.11 below. 
Table 5.11 Indicators of Changes in Political Participation170 


















         
MFever -0.365 0.512 -0.211 0.748 1.109 -1.074 (omitted) (omitted) 
 (0.576) (1.095) (1.407) (1.125) (1.161) (1.749)   
Gender -0.303 1.384* 1.317 1.092* 0.982 0.61 0.463 -1.975 
 (0.327) (0.751) (0.825) (0.664) (0.672) (0.772) (0.889) (1.845) 
AGE 0.0358* -0.0169 0.0224 -0.114** -0.116* -0.0693 -0.0224 -0.0618 
 (0.019) (0.047) (0.057) (0.055) (0.060) (0.063) (0.071) (0.111) 
MaxEduc -0.0023 -0.00516 0.246 -0.0415 0.0576 0.0773 0.464** 0.0148 
 (0.081) (0.163) (0.188) (0.161) (0.170) (0.190) (0.223) (0.380) 
EndsMeetYES -0.188 -0.744 -1.541* -0.103 -0.275 -0.132 1.938 -0.538 
 (0.324) (0.700) (0.815) (0.647) (0.665) (0.799) (1.179) (1.369) 
PartiMember 0.85 2.099** 2.638*** 1.690** 1.550** 2.057** 1.268 0.817 
 (0.596) (0.882) (0.995) (0.762) (0.790) (0.866) (1.106) (1.460) 
PolDiscnNtwk -0.556** 0.134 -0.252 -0.0296 -0.0179 0.431 -0.518 1.188 
 (0.231) (0.439) (0.496) (0.374) (0.378) (0.435) (0.715) (0.751) 
PoliticalFriend 0.572* 0.771 1.284 1.125 1.011 0.765 0.964 (omitted) 
                                                
170 Marginal effects of the independent variables are listed in Appendix Table 5.11. 
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 (0.338) (0.846) (1.012) (0.760) (0.778) (0.960) (1.002)  
DiscussPolitics 0.535** -0.32 -0.0679 1.089** 1.088** 1.428** 0.571 0.246 
 (0.247) (0.534) (0.562) (0.462) (0.472) (0.617) (0.631) (0.955) 
CvcEngmt 0.124* 0.374** 0.549*** -0.0799 -0.109 -0.0618 0.245 -0.0379 
 (0.075) (0.157) (0.202) (0.135) (0.143) (0.162) (0.178) (0.284) 
SCTrust -0.0261 0.722 0.917 0.801 0.514 0.701 -0.461 1.269 
 (0.251) (0.695) (0.795) (0.577) (0.586) (0.679) (0.729) (1.389) 
Constant -1.707* -5.911** -9.610*** -5.857*** -5.392** -8.903*** -7.661** -7.041 
 (1.027) (2.439) (3.182) (2.111) (2.100) (2.890) (3.443) (5.203) 
Observations 194 196 196 193 193 193 176 78 
 
The Table above indicates that microfinance is not a significant indicator of an increase in 
political participation.171 Microfinance is not one of the reasons individuals who were previously 
politically inactive, became active at a later time. Gender, Age, Maximum Education Level, the 
ability to make Ends Meet with money earned, being a political PartiMember, the size of an 
individual’s Political Discussion Network, the frequency at which an individual Discusses 
Politics, and a respondent’s level of Civic Engagement affect whether or not a person engages in 
one of the eight activities tested in the regression analysis. But the nature of the effect of these 
variables varies depending on the activity in question. For example, Gender plays a significant 
role in the probability of an individual contacting a local government official or working for a 
political party. Education is only significant in the probability of participating in a protest or 
demonstration. For some activities, microfinance was omitted from the analysis because it 
perfectly predicted failure to participate in the activity. This is true for taking part in a protest or 
demonstration against the government and making a monetary or in-kind donation to a political 
campaign. 
                                                
171 In the regression analysis above, I restricted analysis to persons who had not previously taken 
part in any of the eight activities. Recall that in the fixed effects analysis of the panel level data 
on voting, prior voting experience was a stronger indicator of voting after microfinance 
exposure, than was receiving a microfinance loan before an election. I created a variable, 
Pre_Score, which is a count of the number of activities a respondent took part in prior to 
receiving a microfinance loan or prior to 2005. The logit regression models for each activity 
were applied to those with a Pre_Score of zero. 
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5.4 Summary of Results 
 This chapter has tested the various hypotheses that surround the question of the 
relationship between microfinance and political participation. In section 5.1 of this chapter I 
tested the hypothesis that microfinance is associated with higher levels of electoral participation. 
A two population proportions test found that to be the case not only for electoral participation in 
four elections, but also for other forms of political participation (Section 5.2). Microfinance 
clients voted in the 2002 mayoral and regional elections, the 2007 legislative election and the 
2009 regional/municipal election at higher rates than non-microfinance clients and microfinance 
borrowers were more likely to visit or contact local and national government officials than non-
microfinance borrowers.  In Section 5.2, I tested the hypotheses that microfinance produced 
social capital and that microfinance and social capital explained political participation. In Table 
5.3 logit regression analysis, which controlled for microfinance participation and five dimensions 
of social capital: civic engagement, trust in social networks, the size of a respondents political 
discussion network, the presence of political experts in a respondent’s network, and the 
frequency of a respondent’s political discussion; microfinance was found to be a consistent 
predictor of the likelihood of voting across all elections, where various forms of social capital 
varied in their significance from election to election (See Tables 5.4.1-5.4.5).  
I indicated in Section 5.2 that I could not establish, with my current data, whether or not 
microfinance led to higher forms of social capital. This is one of the main causal chains claimed 
in the literature on microfinance and political participation. The hypothesis states that 
microfinance leads to an increase of political participation by way of increasing social capital: 




In Table 5.2 I establish, using two-group averages, that microfinance clients had higher levels of 
social capital along four dimensions: civic engagement, trust in social networks, and the three 
dimensions of politically relevant social capital: the size of a political discussion network, the 
presence of political experts within that network, and the frequency of political discussions. The 
results of testing the significance of the difference between the two-group averages do not 
determine whether or not microfinance caused an increase in social capital, or if social capital 
caused microfinance participation. This increase would be difficult to prove even in panel-level 
data.  
 In Section 5.3 I tested additional indicators of political participation with microfinance 
and found that when additional indicators are added to the logit model, microfinance only 
maintains its significance for voting in local-level elections. In Section 5.4 I find that 
microfinance clients are also more likely to participate in other political activities at higher rates 
than non-microfinance borrowers. After transforming the data into panel data and analyzing 
voting behavior with respect to the start year of microfinance using Fixed Effects models in 
Section 5.5, I initially found that beginning microfinance prior to an election greatly increased 
the odds of voting in a subsequent election by an order of 2.56. However, when previous voting 
experience (prior to microfinance) was included as an independent variable, microfinance lost its 
predictive power. In the end, the data could not prove that microfinance was a predictor of voting 
in any of the elections. 
 I test for a cause-and-effect relationship between microfinance and other forms of 
participation in Section 5.6 and find that microfinance is not a significant cause of participation 
in any of the political activities in question. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusions and Next Steps 
 
 
 The aim of this dissertation was to explore the political affect of microfinance using data 
for non-microfinance clients and microfinance clients in Senegal. Microfinance is part of an 
enormous development trend in international economic development whereby large investments 
are being made by individuals and institutions to provide direct-assistance to individual 
entrepreneurs living in the world’s poorest regions. There is another, equally large trend in 
international development and international relations: the quest for programs that can 
simultaneously promote democracy and democratic development. Microfinance is thought to be 
one such program. Indeed when Muhammed Yunus and the Grammen Bank Foundation won the 
2006 Nobel Peace Award for their efforts in supplying micro-loans and other financial services 
to the poor in rural Bangladesh, the adjoining press release statement included the following 
statement, “Development from below serves to advance democracy and human rights.172” 
This dissertation explored whether or not the assertions about the ability of microfinance 
to advance democracy and democratic processes bore some truth. Using data from an original 
survey administered in the microfinance-saturated environment of urban Senegal, this study has 
shown that, although microfinance has a strong association with political participation, care 
should be taken so as not to falsely infer a causal relationship between microfinance and political 
participation where one cannot be proven and may not exist. This brief concluding chapter 
reviews the theories of microfinance, social capital and political participation previously 
introduced in this study, summarizes my findings, and raises some important implications for 
further inquiry. The goals of this work are to shed light on the diversity within the microfinance 
                                                
172 See fn. 4 
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industry, bring attention to the large microfinance industry in Senegal, unpack the complex 
relationship of microfinance to political participation, and to offer some ways of thinking about 
how individual-focused economic development programs relate to political empowerment.  
By offering credit for entrepreneurship and not aid for sustenance, microfinance has 
changed the way the world thinks about development and ways of eradicating poverty. At the 
same time, economic development has become more and more concerned with societal 
improvements such as good governance and gender equality. The popularity of microfinance as a 
socially transforming development tool presents an interesting area of research. Much of this 
momentum rests on a particular notion of microfinance as a program that specifically targets 
groups of women and helps them achieve their entrepreneurial goals. However this study 
highlights the fact that the microfinance industry is very diverse and many institutions grant both 
individual and group loans to men and women, for consumption and commercial needs. I find 
that microfinance experience and political participation share a connection. However, the nature 
of the relationship between them does not follow a clear, causal path.  
 
1. Common Ideas About Microfinance 
Some common assumptions about microfinance are that microfinance consists mainly of 
loans made available to groups of women, following the Grameen Bank model, and that 
Bangladesh is the capital of microfinance. The Grameen Bank model requires that clients learn 
and recite key principles that center of business practices, group cohesion and community-
mindedness. This is thought to engender trust, group solidarity, and mutual cooperation and 
foster a sense of community among borrowers. In short, microfinance is thought to be good for 
social capital, which is good for political participation and democratization. But microfinance 
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refers to an industry of financial services which rage from insurance products, to savings 
products to small loans. Microfinance firms across the world vary in their clientele, products and 
services.  
The microfinance industry across the continent of Africa is large and is sufficiently 
established that is has been incorporated into the financial industry and regulated by several 
governments.  As the data have shown in Senegal, more than 20% of the adult population has 
experience with a micro-credit loan from a microfinance institution. The overwhelming majority 
of microfinance borrowers are individual borrowers, whose loans are awarded by credit unions, 
owned by the depositors. In most cases group borrowers are not required to meet regularly, take 
training courses or memorize principles meant to foster trust and solidarity among group 
members.   
As explained in Chapter Two, microfinance and political participation have been 
theorized to be connected by the processes involving social capital. Social capital can be defined 
in many ways, as trust in social networks, mutual cooperation, civic engagement, and as 
networks with political salience. But this overlooks important research in political science on 
what motivates individuals to become politically active and engage in various political activities. 
If microfinance can affect social capital and feelings of trust and network solidarity, it can also 
affect certain individual characteristics and attitudes that are traditionally related to political 
participation. The rationale behind social capital as the linking mechanism is based on a 
particular conception of microfinance involving gender and group based lending techniques. In 
this study I aimed to explore the relationship between microfinance and political participation 




To my knowledge, only two studies have rigorously tested the relationship of 
microfinance to limited measures of political participation and the relationship of microfinance 
to social capital. One study is an extensive panel study on the Grameen model in Bangladesh 
(Hashemi et al.), and the other is a small-scale study of microfinance borrowers across different 
firms in Eastern Europe (Mosley et al.). In the first study, microfinance participants were found 
to be more politically aware than non-microfinance borrowers and more likely to have taken part 
in a protest or demonstration since beginning their microfinance loan; in the second study, 
microfinance was shown to strengthen pre-existing social ties, generate increased trust towards 
government officials on the part of microfinance borrowers and this increased trust was linked to 
informal modes of political participation.  
 
2. Current Understandings of Political Participation 
An enduring research question in the field of political science is capturing and identifying 
the factors that can predict, or are most closely associated with various forms of political 
participation. One of the most reliable indicators of voting and other forms of political 
participation in the United States is an individual’s socioeconomic status, which includes a 
person’s education, wealth, and income levels. Increases in education levels support the skills, 
and networks necessary to reduce the information costs associated with participation and bolster 
the additional resources, such as wealth and income that promote political engagement (Downs 
1957; Lane 1959; Wolfinger and Rosentstone 1980; Verba, Schlozmna & Brady 1995). Apart 
from socioeconomic status, additional individual-level characteristics have been shown to have a 
substantial impact on political engagement including age and gender. 
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Intangible endowments such as institutional trust, political trust, and general trust in 
others are attitudinal dimensions that have been shown to have some bearing on an individual’s 
propensity towards political activity. Political efficacy often called “subjective political 
competence” (Campbell et al. 1954; Almond & Verba 1963), “powerfulness” (Seeman, 1966), or 
“political effectiveness” (Lane, 1959). is historically defined as the feeling that one’s political 
action does, or can have a meaningful impact on the political process (Campbell, Gurin & Miller 
1954).Those with higher levels of political efficacy are found to be more politically active than 
others. Their feelings of efficaciousness are associated with education, gender, employment 
status and income levels. Cox (2003) found that trust in government institutions such as the 
legislature, the executive branch, local government, and the judiciary, had a positive, significant 
relationship with voter turnout in European Parliamentary elections. On the other hand, 
dissatisfaction with government can also motivate people to become politically active not only 
through voting, but also in social and political movements, or by emigrating to another polity 
(Hirschman 1970; Radcliff 1992; Kostadinova 2003). 
More recently, social capital has gained traction as an explanation for an individual’s 
level of political participation. Much of this is due to the amount of attention garnered by Robert 
Putnam’s famous book, Bowling Alone (1993). Mobilization plays an extremely important role in 
actually getting people to the protest, the campaign, or the voting booth. To this end, political 
participation rates can often be traced to whether or not someone directly asks for your 
participation or deliberately inhibits your participation. Those who desire to be politically active 
may be institutionally marginalized and effectively prevented from doing so, and individuals 
who may have no interest in engaging with the political sphere find themselves politically 
activated because of the efforts of a political party, other organization or a local authority.  
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One consequence of studying the political affect of microfinance in Senegal is learning 
how these common explanations of political participation translate to the Senegalese citizen. 
Using AfroBarometer Round II Survey data, I found that individual characteristics of Age, 
Gender, Education Level and Interest in Politics as well as mobilization into a political party 
were the most reliable predictors of political participation in Senegal. The AfroBarometer data 
were limited in the scope of political activities included in the survey. Only the actions: 
contacting a government official and attending a protest, march, or demonstration were included. 
Even in this limited scope, in some ways, our understanding of what motivates people to be 
come politically active is universally applicable. My own data reveal that individual 
characteristics, attitudinal measures and social capital are all significant predictors of political 
participation in Senegal, but that the extent to which any of those indicators have an affect on an 
individual’s propensity towards a given activity changes with the activity in question. This helps 
inform us about the factors associated with political participation in the Sub-Saharan African 
context and provides insights into how individual, social and attitudinal characteristics matter 
more for some modes of political participation and less for others. 
 
3. Learning about Microfinance in Senegal 
Microfinance in Senegal is exceptional for many reasons, one of them being the variation 
among lending structures. Most firms offer several different types of micro-loans including 
individual and group loans to women and men; the diversity of the type of lending firms, which 
range from mutual organizations, to private not-for-profit firms to government funded entities; 
and the extent to which firms have financial autonomy from the government and other outside 
funding sources. Thus, microfinance in Senegal provides a fruitful place to study the political 
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impact of micro-credit. Given the variation in the types of credit made available, the variation in 
the structure of group and individual loans, and the diversity of the supply of creditors, any 
theory about the political effects of micro lending on individual clients that proves applicable in 
the Senegalese context should extend to other contexts as well. 
The growth of the microfinance industry in Senegal can serve as both an interesting 
element to and contrasting analogy of the characteristics of democracy and politics in Senegal. 
Microfinance provides a space where access to multiplicative resources, namely credit, is 
independent of the dominant, bi-furcated social demography of Senegalese political life. It is a 
space where what Galvan describes as the weakest element of the tri-partite foundation of 
Senegal’s democracy—the ideals of egalitarian citizenship, individualism and civic pluralism—
are practical ethics for the business models of microfinance organizations. 
Microfinance borrowers in Senegal are diverse and represent a wide cross-section of the 
survey sample and general population. However, some indicators are more pronounced among 
microfinance borrowers than among non-borrowers. Firstly, microfinance borrowers are 
typically female. The predominance of females in the general population and survey sample are 
even more pronounced among microfinance borrowers. This can be attributed to the fact that the 
microfinance and micro-credit are products often associated with women. This is not surprising, 
especially considering that the governing institution for the sector is called the Ministry of 
Microfinance and Female Entrepreneurship. In addition, many firms supply loans to women 
exclusively. Microfinance borrowers are also more Wolof and more Mouride than the sample or 
general population. As in the general population, Microfinance borrowers in the sample are 
overwhelmingly Muslim. Lastly, microfinance borrowers in the sample tend to be more 
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employed than other Senegalese citizens and report higher monthly earnings than their 
counterparts. 
In Senegal, where strong networks are necessary for daily survival, microfinance proved 
to be positively related to five dimensions of social capital: 1) civic engagement, 2)trust in social 
networks, and the three components of politically relevant social capital: 1) the size of an 
individual’s political discussion network, 2) the presence of a political ‘expert’ in an individual’s 
social network, and 3) the frequency an individual had political discussion within their networks. 
Microfinance clients had on average higher levels of these forms of social capital than non-
microfinance borrowers. The difference between the levels of mutual cooperation between 
microfinance borrowers and non-microfinance borrowers was insignificant. Although that data 
reveal that microfinance is related to social capital in a significant way, the association between 
microfinance and social capital cannot be attributed to the group borrowing experience given that 
the majority of microfinance borrowers in the survey sample have individual loans. In addition, it 
is unclear if experience with microfinance leads to higher levels of social capital. In short, there 
may be a selection effect in place whereby individuals with higher levels of civic engagement; 
strong social networks and higher levels of politically relevant social capital seek out 
microfinance borrowers loans. As indicators of political participation, both the significance of 
microfinance and social capital was determined by the political activity in question. 
Microfinance and social capital are not consistent indicators of all forms of political 
participation. In fact, microfinance was more relevant for regional and local elections where as 
the different dimensions of social capital were important in some election and not in others. 
Microfinance was also positively related to additional indicators of political participation. 
But the problem of selection effects persists throughout the comparisons of microfinance 
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borrowers to non-microfinance borrowers. Microfinance borrowers are slightly more education 
than non-microfinance borrowers and are much more likely to report being employed and being 
able to make their ends meet their needs. Unfortunately, the survey did not ask microfinance 
borrowers about their quality of life before and after receiving a micro-credit loan. Microfinance 
borrowers reported higher monthly incomes than non-microfinance borrowers. This may be due 
to successes in the enterprises in which microfinance borrowers invested their micro-loans or due 
to the endogeneity problems of more financially secure individuals seeking out, and being 
eligible for microfinance loans. 
 
4. Microfinance and Political Participation: The Nature of the Relationship 
 Chapter Five revealed that although there is a strong, statistical relationship between 
microfinance and several indicators of political participation including social capital and 
individual characteristics such as socio-economic status, and between microfinance and several 
measures of political participation microfinance cannot be said the cause an individual to become 
politically active who had been previously inactive. Respondents with microfinance experience 
were as likely to vote in an election, contact a government official, volunteer for a political 
campaign and participate in a protest or demonstration before experience with a microfinance 
loan, as they were after their experience with a microfinance program. Individuals who were 
previously politically inactive became active for a variety of reasons, none among them being 
microfinance.  
The finding that microfinance is significantly associated with higher rates of various 
forms of political participation should drive researchers to find out how the act of seeking out a 
loan is related to the act of political participation and how a broader range of clients can be 
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reached. If microfinance borrowers are already those who are more politically active in their 
community, making an attempt to use microfinance alone as a catalyst for further political 
engagement is futile. On the other hand, if the client base is purposefully broadened to target 
politically inactive clients then perhaps we could gain a better understanding of how experience 
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Appendix: Chapter Two 






   
1963 86% 90% 
1968* 94.7% 93% 
1973* n/a n/a 
1978 n/a n/a 
1983 56.7% 56.2% 
1988 58.8% 57.9% 
1993 51.5% 41% 
1998**  39.3% 
2000 62.2%  
2001**  67.4% 
2007 70.6% 34.7% 
   
Avg. Participation Rates 68.6% 59.9% 
 
*Single party elections 




Table 2.4.2 2002 Local Election Turnout Figures by Region 
Region Registered Voters Votes Cast Invalid Votes Turnout Rate 
     
Dakar 721,743 328,134 4,670 0.45 
Diourbel 192,320 77,233 1,276 0.40 
Fatick 161,781 85,877 1,649 0.53 
Kaolack 223,499 146,261 2,590 0.65 
Kolda 219,655 110,948 2,343 0.51 
Louga 186,906 101,731 1,244 0.54 
Matam 91,059 49,262 1,414 0.54 
Saint Louis 196,615 112,221 1,497 0.57 
Tambacounda 151,953 73,009 1,436 0.48 
Thies 376,186 204,540 2,647 0.54 
Ziguinchor 140,647 66,230 648 0.47 
     
Total Registered 1,940,621  Total Turnout 0.52 
V.A.P.* 5,323,580  V.A.P.* Turnout 0.36 
*V.A.P. refers to voting age population 
 
Table 2.4.3 2009 Local Election Turnout Figures by Region 
Region Registered Voters Votes Cast Invalid Votes Turnout Rate 
     
Dakar 1,487,592 498,978 16,631 0.34 
Diourbel 408,981 125,643 2,263 0.31 
Fatick 219,802 125,312 1,980 0.57 
Kaffrine 166,763 101,001 2,895 0.61 
Kaolack 325,127 154,780 2,374 0.48 
Kedougou 39,098 20,460 752 0.52 
Kolda 177,909 97,405 2,116 0.55 
Matam 167,801 93,166 3,580 0.56 
Saint Louis 348,931 187,196 4,370 0.54 
Sedhiou 145,453 84,326 2,606 0.58 
Tambacounda 188,078 96,803 1,712 0.51 
Thies 632,001 318,238 5,598 0.50 
Ziguinchor 214,803 102,690 1,744 0.48 
     
Total Registered 3,034,747  Total Turnout 0.52 
V.A.P 6,301,663  V.A. P. Registration 0.48 









(1) Political Action Scale 
Q29A1: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for 
help to solve a problem or to give them your views: A Regional Government Representative?  
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to 
Answer, -1=Missing 
 
Q29B: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help 
to solve a problem or to give them your views: A Parliamentary Representative? Value Labels: 
0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -
1=Missing 
 
Q29C: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help 
to solve a problem or to give them your views: An official of a government ministry?  
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Only once, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to 
Answer, -1=Missing 
 
Q29D: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help 
to solve a problem or to give them your views: A political party official?  




Q29A: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons for help 
to solve a problem or to give them your views: A Local Government Representative?  





                                                
173 Questions taken from Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) 




Q111: Interviewer’s highest level of education Variable label: Interviewer’s education Values: 0-9 
Value Labels: 0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling (including Koranic) only, 2=Some 
primary schooling, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Some high school, 5=High school completed, 
6=Post secondary qualifications (not university), 7=Some university, college, 8=University, 
college completed, 9=Post graduate 
 
Income_GoHungry 
Q9A: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: Enough food 
to eat? Variable label: How often gone without food  
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 
9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
CommInterest 
Q62: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or 
Statement B. A: Each person should put the well-being of the community ahead of their own 
interests. B: Everybody should be free to pursue what is best for themselves as individuals. 
Variable label: Community well-being vs. individual interests  
Value Labels: 1=Agree Very Strongly with A, 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree Very 




Q71B: In your experience, how often do violent conflicts arise between people: Within the 
community where you live? Variable label: Violent conflicts within community  
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Rarely, 2=Sometimes, 3=Often, 4=Always, 9=Don’t Know, 
98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
PoliticalTrustScale 
Q43A: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to 
say: The President? Variable label: Trust the President  
 
Q43B: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to 
say: The Parliament?  
 
Q43C: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to 
say: [your country’s National Electoral Commission]?  
 
Q43D: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to 
say: The Regional Government Body?  
 
Q43E: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to 
say: Your Local Government Body? 
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Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=A little bit, 2=A lot, 3=A very great deal, 9=Don’t Know/Haven’t 
Heard Enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
QuestionLeaders 
Q65: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or 
Statement B. A: As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders. 
B: In our country these days, there is not enough respect for authority.  
Value Labels: 1=Agree Very Strongly with A, 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree Very 




Q28A: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Politics and government 
sometimes seem so complicated that you can’t really understand what’s going on.  
Value Labels: 1=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly 
Disagree, 9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
CountryEconPosition 
Q1A: Let’s begin by talking about economic conditions. In general, how would you describe: The 
present economic conditions of this country? 
Value Labels: 1=Very bad, 2=Fairly bad, 3=Neither good nor bad, 4=Fairly good, 5=Very good, 
9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
ApproveMP 
Q48B: Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs 
over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Your Member of 
Parliament?  
Value Labels: 1=Strongly Disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly Approve, 
9=Don’t Know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
RadioNews 
Q26A: How often do you get news from the following sources: Radio? Variable label: Radio 
news  
Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Less than once a month, 2=A few times a month, 3=A few times a 
week, 4=Every day, 9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
PoliticalInterst 
Q27: How interested are you in public affairs?  
Value Labels: 0=Not interested, 1=Somewhat interested, 2=Very interested, 9=Don’t Know, 





Q24B: Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could 
you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a 
member: A trade union or farmers association/club/cooperative?  
 
Q24C: Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could 
you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a 
member: A professional or business association? 
 
Q24D: Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could 
you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a 
member: A community development or self-help association? 
 
Value Labels: 0=Not a Member, 1=Inactive Member, 2=Active Member, 3=Official Leader, 
9=Don’t Know, 98=Refused to Answer, -1=Missing Data 
 
ClosetoParty 
Q87A: Do you feel close to any particular political party or political organization? If so, which 
party or organization is that?  



















Q8a. Have you ever received a microfinance loan? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 524 76.16 76.16 
YES 164 23.84 100.00 
Total 688 100.00  
 
Success with Microfinance 
Q8c. If you have had more than one microfinance loan, how many have you had? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
1-3 94 76.06 76.16 
4-6 19 15.2 91.26 
7 or more 4 3.22 94.48 
Don’t Know 7 5.64 100.00 
Total 124 100.00  
 
Q8d. Have you fully repaid your loan(s)? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 1 0.64 0.64 
YES 152 98.06 98.7 
Don’t Know 1 0.64 99.34 
Refused  1 0.64 99.98 
Total 155 100.00  
 
Q8e. Has having microfinance improved your life? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 34 20.73 20.73 
YES 130 79.27 100.00 






Structure of Microfinance Loan 
Q11.  Did you have an individual or group loan, or perhaps you have had experience 
with both? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
Individual 122 76.25 76.25 
Group 32 20.00 96.25 
Both 6 3.75 100.00 
Total 160 100.00  
 
Q12. Please tell me the type of organization from which you received your microfinance 
loan? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
Credit Union 85 58.62 58.62 
Non-Govt. Org. 7 4.83 63.45 
Bank 50 30.49 93.94 
Government 2 1.38 95.32 
Group/Association 6 4.13 99.45 
Total 145 99.45  
 
Q17. Did you have to be the member of a credit union to receive the loan? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 25 15.82 15.82 
YES 129 81.65 97.46 
Don’t Know 4 2.53 100.00 
Total 158 100.00  
 
Q18.  Did you have to give a guarantee (collateral) to receive the loan? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 30 18.75 18.75 
YES 126 78.75 97.50 
Don’t Know 4 2.50 100.00 




Q19.  Were you required to ascribe to any religion or any religious group to receive your 
loan? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 155 94.51 94.51 
YES 3 1.82 96.34 
Don’t Know 6 3.66 100.00 
Total 164 100.00  
 
Q20.  Were you required to be a member of, support or declare support for a political 
party to receive the loan? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 155 94.51 94.51 
YES 2 1.22 95.73 
Don’t Know 7 4.54 100.00 
Total 164 100.00  
 
Q21.  Did the organization that granted you a microfinance loan speak to you about 
political issues or affairs? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 153 93.29 93.29 
YES 5 3.05 96.34 
Don’t Know 6 3.66 100.00 
Total 164 100.00  
 
Q22.  Does a person have to be a member of a particular ethnic group, professional 
organization, trade union, or some other association or group to receive a 
microfinance loan from your lending institution? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 157 95.73 95.73 
YES 1 0.61 96.34 
Don’t Know 6 3.66 100.00 




Q23.  Were you required to take any training courses before you were granted the 
microfinance loan? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
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NO 145 91.19 80.65 
YES 14 8.81 100.00 
Total 159 100.00  
 
Q24. How many times does your lending organization require you to attend the course? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
Never 13 28.26 28.26 
Less than Once per 
Month 
3 3.46 31.72 
 







Once a week 6 13.04 83.89 
Don’t Know 6 13.04 100.00 
Total 46 100.00  
 
Q25. How many times do you actually attend the course? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
Never 24 52.17 52.17 
Less than Once per 
Month 
2 4.35 56.52 
 







Once a week 5 10.87 93.48 
Don’t Know 3 6.52 100.00 
Total 46 100.00  
    
Q26. The loan was granted to you for what amount of time? In other words, after how 
long do you need to repay the loan?  
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
More than 6 Mos. 118 76.13 76.13 
Six Months 23 14.84 90.97 
 







Don’t Know 3 1.93 100.00 
Total 20 100.00  
 
Q27. How often are you required to make payments on the loan? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
183 
  
Never 1 0.64 0.64 
Less than once per 
month 
8 5.09 5.73 
 







Once a week 7 4.46 98.97 
Don’t Know 3 1.91 100.00 
Total 157 100.00  
 
Q28. How often do you actually make payments? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
Never 1 0.64 0.64 
Less than once per 
month 
16 10.19 10.83 
 







Once a week 7 4.46 96.82 
Don’t Know 6 3.18 100.00 
Total 157 100.00  
 
 
Group Microfinance Loans 
 
Q31.  Is your microfinance group composed of women and men? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 24 70.59 70.59 
YES 10 29.41 100.00 
Total 34 100.00  
 
Q32.  Does your lending organization only grant loan to women? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 12 35.29 35.29 
YES 19 55.88 91.17 
Don’t Know 3 8.83 100.00 
Total 34 100.00  
 
 
Q33.  Is your group required to make loan repayments together as a group? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
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NO 6 17.65 17.65 
YES 27 79.41 97.06 
Don’t Know 1 2.94 100.00 
Total 34 100.00  
 
 
Q33.  Does/Did your lender require that your group meet frequently? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 13 31.71 31.71 
YES 27 65.85 97.56 
Don’t Know 1 2.44 100.00 
Total 41 100.00  
 
 
Q34b. How often does your lender require that your group meet? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
Never 3 7.32 7.14 
Once per month 29 70.73 78.05 
 
















Refuse 1 2.44 100.00 
Total 41 100.00  
 
  
Q34c. How often does your group actually meet? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
Never 3 7.69 7.69 
Once per month 27 69.23 76.92 
 
















Refuse 1 2.57 100.00 
Total 39 100.00  
 
Q35.  Are there members of your group who are related? 
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 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 41 97.62 97.62 
YES 1 2.38 100.00 
Total 42 100.00  
Q36.  Are all of the members in your group of the same ethnicity? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 40 95.24 95.24 
YES 1 2.38 97.56 
Don’t Know 1 2.44 100.00 
Total 41 100.00  
 
 
Q38.  Are the members of your group from the same quartier? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 14 36.84 36.84 
YES 26 65.00 100.00 
Total 40 100.00  
 
 
Q39.  Are the members of your group required to come from the same quartier? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 20 50.00 50.00 
YES 16 40.00 90.00 
Don’t Know 4 10.00 100.00 
Total 40 100.00  
 
Q40.  Are you and your group members also members of the same political party? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 26 63.41 63.41 
YES 4 9.76 73.17 
Don’t Know 11 26.83 100.00 
Total 41 100.00  
 
 
Q41. Were you members of the same political party before becoming a microfinance 
group? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 22 55.00 55.00 
YES 1 2.50 57.50 
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Don’t Know 17 42.50 100.00 
Total 40 100.00  
 
Q43.  Is one of the members of your group a political leader? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 14 35.00 35.00 
YES 13 32.50 67.50 
Don’t Know 13 32.50 100.00 
Total 40 100.00  
 
 
Q44.  Has a member of your group run for political office? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 13 33.33 33.33 
YES 9 23.08 56.41 
Don’t Know 17 43.59 100.00 
Total 39 100.00  
 
 
Q45.  Are members of your microfinance group related to a local elected official? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 9 22.50 22.50 
YES 20 50.00 77.50 
Don’t Know 11 27.50 100.00 
Total 40 100.00  
 
 
Q46.  Are there members of your microfinance group who have a close relationship or 
friendship with a national elected official? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 10 25.00 25.00 
YES 18 45.00 70.00 
Don’t Know 12 30.00 100.00 
Total 40 100.00  
 
 
Reasons for Obtaining a Loan 
 
Q47. Please tell me the item(s) that best correspond to why/how you have used the loan? 
You have used your microfinance loan for… 
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 Freq. Percent Cum. 
Personal Reasons/Everyday Needs  38 23.90 23.90 
 























Don’t Know 2 1.25 100.00 
Total 159 100.00  
 
 
Reasons for not Obtaining a Loan 
 
Q47. Please tell me the item(s) that best correspond to why/how you have used the loan? 
You have used your microfinance loan for… 
CODES Freq. Percent Cum.  
1 18 3.71 3.71  
2 231 47.63 51.34  
3 156 32.16 83.50  
4 11 2.27 85.77  
5 1 0.21 85.98  
6 2 0.41 86.39  
7 1 0.21 86.60  
8 2 0.41 87.01  
9 2 0.41 87.42  
10 1 0.21 87.63  
11 30 6.18 93.81  
12 19 3.92 97.73  
13 3 0.61 98.34  
14 1 0.21 98.55  
15 2 0.41 98.96  
16 2 0.41 99.37  
17 1 0.21 99.58  
18 1 0.21 99.79  
19 1 0.21 100.00  
Total 485 100.00   
 
Value Labels:  
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1=I made a request but was refused,  
2=I’d like one but don’t know how/cannot get one   
3=I do not want/need it,  
4=I lack the necessary means,  
5=The interest rate is too high, 
6=I am not interested,  
7=Microfinance, t’s not reassuring,  
8= Microfinance, it’s not certain,  
9=I lack an idea or concept of what to do with the loan, I lack a business idea  
10=I made a demand and am waiting for a response,  
11=I’ve never made a request,  
12=I am going to make a request,  
13=I never thought about it,  
14=My husband does not want me to get one,  
15=I don’t want it for the moment,  
16=I have fear of loans,  
17=I never tried,  
18=I’ve never requested it but will in the future,  
19=I am in the army,  








Q49.  How interested are you in politics and political affairs? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NOT INTERESTED 342 48.93 48.93 
A LITTLE INTERESTED 196 28.04 76.97 
INTERESTED 101 14.45 91.42 
VERY INTERESTED 60 8.58 100.00 
Total 699 100.00  
 
 
Q50.  Are you the member of a political party? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 594 84.98 84.98 
YES 105 15.02 100.00 
Total 699 100.00  
 
Q55.  Are you registered to vote? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
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NO 81 11.81 11.81 
YES 605 88.19 100.00 
Total 686 100.00  
 
Q60.  In February 2007, there was a presidential election here in Senegal. Did you vote in 
the February 2007 presidential election? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 135 20.77 20.77 
YES 515 79.23 100.00 
Total 650 100.00  
 
Q63.  In June 2007, there was an election here in Senegal for the national assembly. Did 
you vote in the June 2007 national assembly/legislative election? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 291 45.05 45.05 
YES 355 54.95 100.00 
Total 646 100.00  
 
 
Q66.  In 2002, there was a regional election for the regional council and mayor of the 
region of Dakar. Did you vote in the 2002 Dakar regional election? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 431 66.82 66.82 
YES 214 33.18 100.00 
Total 645 100.00  
 
Q67.  In 2002, there was a local election for the mayor of Guediawaye. Did you vote in the 
2002 Guediawaye mayoral election? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 418 64.81 64.81 
YES 227 35.19 100.00 
Total 645 100.00  
 
Q69.  The most recent regional and municipal elections took place not too long ago on 
March 22, 2009. Did you vote in that election? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 325 49.85 49.85 
YES 327 50.15 100.00 





Before and After Questions 
The following questions ask microfinance respondents whether they took part in a particular 
activity any time before the year they began using microfinance and anytime after they stop 
taking out microfinance loans. If individuals were presently in a microfinance loan at the time of 
the interview, they were asked if they took part in any of the activities since the year they began 
their first microfinance loan. 
 
All other respondents were asked if the took part in the same activities before and after 2005. 
 
Q70a. Pre_Voter: Before ______ had you ever voted in an election? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 243 35.06 35.06 
YES 450 64.94 100.00 
Total 693 100.00  
 
Q70c.  PreGuedVisitorContact: Before ______ had you ever visited or contacted a local 
elected official about a problem here in Guediawaye? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 621 89.48 89.48 
YES 73 10.52 100.00 
Total 694 100.00  
 
Q70d.  PreGovtVisitorContact: Before ______ had you ever visited or contacted a national 
elected official or a member of government for any reason? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 631 90.70 90.79 
YES 64 9.21 100.00 
Total 695 100.00  
 
Q70f.  PreLocalVolunteerorWork: Before ______ had you worked or volunteered in a local 
political election campaign? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 613 88.46 88.46 
YES 80 11.54 100.00 
Total 693 100.00  
 
Q70g.  PreNationalVolunteerorWork: Before ______ had you worked or volunteered in a 
national political election campaign? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 618 89.18 89.18 
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YES 75 10.82 100.00 







Q70h.  PreWorkforPoliticalParty: Before ______ had you ever worked for a political party? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 631 91.18 91.18 
YES 61 8.82 100.00 
Total 693 100.00  
 
Q70i.  PreProtestorDemonstrate: Before ______ did you take part in a protest or 
demonstration against the government? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 653 94.09 94.09 
YES 41 5.91 100.00 
Total 694 100.00  
 
Q70f.  PreCampaignContribute: Before ______ had you made a contribution in space or 
other kind for an election campaign? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 653 94.36 94.36 
YES 39 5.64 100.00 
Total 693 100.00  
 
 
After 2005/Microfinance Questions 
 
Q71a. Post_Voter: After ______ did you vote in an election? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 142 20.46 20.46 
YES 552 79.54 100.00 
Total 694 100.00  
 
Q71c.  PostGuedVisitorContact: Before ______ had you ever visited or contacted a local 
elected official about a problem here in Guediawaye? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 618 88.92 88.92 
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YES 77 11.08 100.00 
Total 694 100.00  
 
Q71d.  PostGovtVisitorContact: Before ______ had you ever visited or contacted a national 
elected official or a member of government for any reason? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 617 88.78 88.78 
YES 78 11.22 100.00 
Total 695 100.00  
 
Q71f.  PostLocalVolunteerorWork: Before ______ had you worked or volunteered in a local 
political election campaign? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 598 86.54 86.54 
YES 93 13.46 100.00 
Total 691 100.00  
 
Q71g.  PostNationalVolunteerorWork: Before ______ had you worked or volunteered in a 
national political election campaign? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 604 87.28 87.28 
YES 88 12.72 100.00 
Total 692 100.00  
 
 
Q71h.  PostWorkforPoliticalParty: Before ______ had you ever worked for a political party? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 618 89.44 89.44 
YES 73 10.56 100.00 
Total 693 100.00  
 
 
Q71i.  PostProtestorDemonstrate: Before ______ did you take part in a protest or 
demonstration against the government? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 651 93.80 93.80 
YES 43 6.20 100.00 




Q71f.  PostCampaignContribute: Before ______ had you made a contribution in space or 
other kind for an election campaign? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 654 94.65 94.65 
YES 37 5.35 100.00 
Total 693 100.00  
 
Ran For Political Office 
 
Q72.  RanforOffice: Have you ever run for a political office in an election? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 670 96.82 96.82 
YES 22 3.18 100.00 
Total 692 100.00  
 
Q73.  HeldanOffice: Have you ever held a political office as an elected official? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 674 97.26 97.26 
YES 19 2.74 100.00 







Q76a.  Do you think you could do a good a job as any political official or leader (for 
example a mayor or government minister)? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
STRONGLY AGREE 261 38.72 38.72 
AGREE 202 29.97 68.69 
DISAGREE 140 20.77 89.46 
DISAGREE STRONGLY 71 10.53 100.00 
Total 674 100.00  
 
Q76b.  You know politics better than most people? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
STRONGLY AGREE 80 11.87 38.72 
AGREE 233 34.57 68.69 
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DISAGREE 263 239.02 89.46 
DISAGREE STRONGLY 98 14.54 100.00 
Total 674 100.00  
 
Q76d.  People like you do not have a say in what the government does. 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
STRONGLY AGREE 49 7.13 7.13 
AGREE 67 9.75 16.89 
DISAGREE 225 32.75 49.64 
DISAGREE STRONGLY 346 50.36 100.00 
Total 687 100.00  
 
Q7f.  The political authorities do not take seriously what people like you say. 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
STRONGLY AGREE 220 35.26 35.26 
AGREE 283 45.35 80.61 
DISAGREE 46 7.37 87.98 
DISAGREE STRONGLY 75 12.02 100.00 
Total 624 100.00  
 
Q76g.  If you talk about politics your friends and neighbors don’t listen to you. 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
STRONGLY AGREE 27 4.54 4.54 
AGREE 288 48.40 52.94 
DISAGREE 210 35.29 88.24 
DISAGREE STRONGLY 70 11.76 100.00 




Civic Engagement (CvcEngmt) 
Q80a. Are you the member of a group, association or organization? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 386 55.14 55.14 
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YES 314 44.86 100.00 
Total 700 100.00  
 
GroupMembership = Number of Organization to which a respondent belongs 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
1 237 85.87 52.94 
2 28 10.14 98.44 
3 3 1.09 98.86 
4 5 1.81 99.57 
5 1 0.36 99.72 
7 2 0.72 100.00 
Total 276 100.00  
 
Q83.  ActiviGrpMembr: How active are you in the groups you belong to? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
VERY ACTIVE 207 4.54 4.54 
A LITTLE ACTIVE 86 48.40 52.94 
NON ACTIVE 27 35.29 88.24 
Total 320 100.00  
 
Q84. AsstwithGroup: Do you regularly assist with group meetings for your organization? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 47 14.55 14.55 
YES 276 85.45 100.00 
Total 323 100.00  
 
Q85. GrpVolunteer: Do you regularly volunteer in your group? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 57 17.65 17.65 
YES 266 82.3 100.00 
Total 323 100.00  
 
Q86. GroupPres: Are you the president of one of these groups or organizations? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 81 82.65 82.65 
YES 17 17.35 100.00 
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Trust and Mutual Cooperation 
 
Trust 
Q98a. The majority of people in this quartier are honest and can be trusted. 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
STRONGLY AGREE 117 20.53 20.53 
AGREE 318 55.79 76.32 
DISAGREE 103 18.07 94.31 
DISAGREE STRONGLY 32 5.61 100.00 
Total 570 100.00  
 
Q98b. People here in Guediawaye are interested only in their own well-being. 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
STRONGLY AGREE 138 22.59 22.59 
AGREE 258 42.23 64.81 
DISAGREE 165 27.00 91.82 
DISAGREE STRONGLY 50 8.18 100.00 
Total 611 100.00  
 
Q98c. People who live here in Guediawaye are trustworthier than others in Senegal. 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
STRONGLY AGREE 22 9.32 9.32 
AGREE 109 46.19 55.53 
DISAGREE 82 34.75 90.28 
DISAGREE STRONGLY 23 9.75 100.00 
Total 236 100.00  
 
Q98d. In Guediawaye, one must pay attention or someone will take advantage of you. 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
STRONGLY AGREE 101 17.88 17.88 
AGREE 284 50.27 68.14 
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DISAGREE 152 26.09 95.04 
DISAGREE STRONGLY 28 4.96 100.00 
Total 565 100.00  
 
Q98e. If you have a problem there is always someone there to help you. 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
STRONGLY AGREE 137 21.17 21.17 
AGREE 336 51.93 73.10 
DISAGREE 135 20.87 93.97 
DISAGREE STRONGLY 39 6.03 100.00 
Total 647 100.00  
 
Q98g. The majority of people in this quartier help those who are in need. 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
STRONGLY AGREE 148 26.43 26.43 
AGREE 258 46.07 72.50 
DISAGREE 125 22.32 94.82 
DISAGREE STRONGLY 29 5.18 100.00 
Total 560 100.00  
 
Q98i. You feel like you are a member of this quartier. 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
STRONGLY AGREE 318 46.49 46.49 
AGREE 302 44.15 90.64 
DISAGREE 47 6.87 97.51 
DISAGREE STRONGLY 17 2.49 100.00 
Total 684 100.00  
 
Q98j. Here in Guediawaye, if you lose your chicken or goat, someone in the quartier will 
help you to find it. 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
STRONGLY AGREE 42 8.14 8.14 
AGREE 282 54.65 62.79 
DISAGREE 90 17.44 80.23 
DISAGREE STRONGLY 102 19.77 100.00 
Total 516 100.00  
 
Q98k. Here in Guediawaye, if you lose your wallet in the quartier, when someone finds it, 
they will try to return it to you. 
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 Freq. Percent Cum. 
STRONGLY AGREE 30 6.96 6.96 
AGREE 115 26.45 33.41 
DISAGREE 135 31.32 64.73 
DISAGREE STRONGLY 152 35.27 100.00 




Q094A. If the headmaster of the primary school in this quartier were absent for a long 
period of six months or more, who would take action? Do you think that NO ONE 
would join together to take action? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 35 6.14 6.14 
YES 522 91.58 100.00 
Total 570 100.00  
 
Q094B. If the headmaster of the primary school in this quartier were absent for a long 
period of six months or more, who would take action? Do you think that THE 
PEOPLE IN THE QUARTIER would join together to take action? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 218 47.39 47.39 
YES 242 52.61 100.00 
Total 570 100.00  
 
Q094C. If the headmaster of the primary school in this quartier were absent for a long 
period of six months or more, who would take action? Do you think that THE 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS would join together to take action? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 299 65.57 65.57 
YES 157 34.43 100.00 
Total 456 100.00  
 
Q094D. If the headmaster of the primary school in this quartier were absent for a long 
period of six months or more, who would take action? Do you think that THE 
QUARTIER ASSOCIATION would join together to take action? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 193 42.98 42.98 
YES 256 57.02 100.00 




Q094E. If the headmaster of the primary school in this quartier were absent for a long 
period of six months or more, who would take action? Do you think that PARENTS 
OF THE STUDENTS would join together to take action? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 38 6.54 6.14 
YES 543 93.46 100.00 
Total 581 100.00  
 
Q094F. If the headmaster of the primary school in this quartier were absent for a long 
period of six months or more, who would take action? Do you think that THE 
ENTIRE QUARTIER would join together to take action? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 236 52.44 52.44 
YES 214 47.56 100.00 
Total 570 100.00  
 
Q096A. If a problem affected all of Guediawaye, like widespread violence, how do you 
think the situation would be resolved? Who would take action? Do you think that  
EACH PERSON/HOUSEHOLD WILL RESOLVE IT FOR THEMSELVES? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 312 50.24 50.24 
YES 309 49.76 100.00 
Total 621 100.00  
 
Q096B. If a problem affected all of Guediawaye, like widespread violence, how do you 
think the situation would be resolved? Who would take action? Do you think that 
THE NEIGHBORS TOGETHER would join together to take action? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 88 13.97 13.97 
YES 542 86.03 100.00 
Total 630 100.00  
 
Q096C. If a problem affected all of Guediawaye, like widespread violence, how do you 
think the situation would be resolved? Who would take action? Do you think that 
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEADERS would join together to take action? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 419 79.06 79.06 
YES 11 20.94 100.00 




Q096D. If a problem affected all of Guediawaye, like widespread violence how do you think 
the situation would be resolved? Who would take action? Do you think that ALL 
THE COMMUNITY LEADERS would join together to take action? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 232 46.31 46.31 
YES 269 53.69 100.00 
Total 501 100.00  
 
Q096E. If a problem affected all of Guediawaye, like widespread violence how do you think 
the situation would be resolved? Who would take action? Do you think that  THE 
NEIGHBORS TOGETHER would join together to take action? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 196 36.98 36.98 
YES 334 63.02 100.00 
Total 530 100.00  
 
Politically Relevant Social Capital 
Q77.  DiscussPolitics: Do you often discuss politics with others? How often do you discuss 
politics with others? 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
VERY OFTEN 79 11.32 11.32 
OFTEN 244 34.96 46.28 
RARELY 273 39.11 85.39 
NEVER 102 14.61 100.00 
Total 698 100.00  
 
Q78A. PolDscnNtwk: With whom do you discuss politics? 
NO ONE 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 595 99.17 36.98 
YES 5 0.83 100.00 
Total 600 100.00  
 
Q78B. PolDscnNtwk: With whom do you discuss politics? 
YOUR PARENTS 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 274 45.44 36.98 
YES 329 54.56 100.00 




Q78C. PolDscnNtwk: With whom do you discuss politics? 
OTHER RELATIVES 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 508 84.11 36.98 
YES 95 15.73 100.00 
Total 603 100.00  
 
Q78D. PolDscnNtwk: With whom do you discuss politics? 
FRIENDS 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 94 15.59 36.98 
YES 509 84.41 100.00 
Total 603 100.00  
 
Q78E. PolDscnNtwk: With whom do you discuss politics? 
MEMBERS OF A GROUP OR ASSOCIATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 508 84.39 84.39 
YES 94 15.61 100.00 
Total 602 100.00  
 
 
Q78F. PolDscnNtwk: With whom do you discuss politics? 
CO WORKERS 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 552 91.69 91.69 
YES 50 8.31 100.00 
Total 602 100.00  
 
 
Q78G. PolDscnNtwk: With whom do you discuss politics? 
RELIGIOUS LEADERS 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 589 97.68 36.98 
YES 14 2.32 100.00 




Q75.  Political Friend: Do you have a friend and/or relative that is a leader in a political 
party or who is a political official? 
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 Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO 337 48.77 48.77 
YES 354 51.23 100.00 
Total 691 100.00  
 
Other Independent Variables 
 
Age 
Q002. What is your age? 
AGE |  Freq. Per. Cum.     
18 | 6 0.87 0.87 
19 | 14 2.03 2.90 
20 | 34 4.93 7.84 
21 | 26 3.77 11.61 
22 | 21 3.05 14.66 
23 | 25 3.63 18.29 
24 | 21 3.05 21.34 
25 | 28 4.06 25.40 
26 | 20 2.90 28.30 
27 | 22 3.19 31.49 
28 | 16 2.32 33.82 
29 | 14 2.03 35.85 
30 | 38 5.52 41.36 
31 | 19 2.76 44.12 
32 | 25 3.63 47.75 
33 | 25 3.63 51.38 
34 | 20 2.90 54.28 
35 | 23 3.34 57.62 
36 | 16 2.32 59.94 
37 | 20 2.90 62.84 
38 | 14 2.03 64.88 
39 | 12 1.74 66.62 
40 | 21 3.05 69.67 
41 | 12 1.74 71.41 
42 | 12 1.74 73.15 
43 | 16 2.32 75.47 
44 | 13 1.89 77.36 
45 | 12 1.74 79.10 
46 | 8 1.16 80.26 
47 | 16 2.32 82.58 
48 | 15 2.18 84.76 
49 | 6 0.87 85.63 
50 | 8 1.16 86.79 
51 | 11 1.60 88.39 
52 | 4 0.58 88.97 
53 | 6 0.87 89.84 
54 | 5 0.73 90.57 
55 | 8 1.16 91.73 
56 | 7 1.02 92.74 
57 | 6 0.87 93.61 
58 | 6 0.87 94.48 
59 | 3 0.44 94.92 
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60 | 9 1.31 96.23 
61 | 4 0.58 96.81 
62 | 4 0.58 97.39 
63 | 5 0.73 98.11 
64 | 2 0.29 98.40 
65 | 1 0.15 98.55 
66 | 2 0.29 98.84 
68 | 1 0.15 98.98 
69 | 1 0.15 99.13 
74 | 1 0.15 99.27 
75 | 2 0.29 99.56 
76 | 1 0.15 99.71 
79 | 1 0.15 99.85 
85 | 1 0.15 100.00     




Gender |Freq. Percent Cum. 
     
Female |369 53.09 53.09 
Male |326 46.91 100.00 
     




MaxEduc: What is your highest level of education? 
MaxEduc | Freq. Percent Cum.     
1 | 49 7.15 7.15 
2 | 82 11.97 19.12 
3 | 129 18.83 37.96 
4 | 68 9.93 47.88 
5 | 162 23.65 71.53 
6 | 44 6.42 77.96 
7 | 73 10.66 88.61 
8 | 64 9.34 97.96 
9 | 10 1.46 99.42 
10 | 4 0.58 100.00  





3=Incomplete Primary  
4=Complete Primary  
5=Incomplete Secondary  
6=Completed Secondary School  
7=Professional/Vocational Training  









Q114: Emploi: Do you have a job? 
  Freq. Percent Cum. 
NO | 427 61.09 61.66 
YES | 266 38.05 99.71      





Q121 Income: According to your estimations, how much money do you earn from the 
work that you do, per month? 
Income |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
----------------------------------------------- 
          1 |         17        5.61        5.61 
          2 |         19        6.27       11.88 
          3 |         27        8.91       20.79 
          4 |         34       11.22       32.01 
          5 |         20        6.60       38.61 
          6 |         37       12.21       50.83 
          7 |         48       15.84       66.67 
          8 |         65       21.45       88.12 
          9 |         24        7.92       96.04 
         10 |          6        1.98       98.02 
         11 |          6        1.98      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 




1=Less than 5,000 f.CfA 
2=5,001 a 10,000 f.CfA  
3=10,001 a 20,000 f.CFA 
4=20,001 a 30,000 f.CFA 
5=30,001 a 40,000 
6=40,001-50,000 
7=50,001 a 75,000 f.CFA 
8=75,001 a 100,000 f.CFA 
9=100,001 a 200,000 f.CFA 
10=200,001 a 300,000 f.CFA 
11=300,001 a 400,000 
12=Plus de 400,000 f.CFA, 
 
Q120 EndsMeet: Are you able to live off of the money you earn from your daily work? 
EndsMeet | Freq. Percent Cum.     
NO | 139 23.17 23.17 
YES | 461 76.83 100.00    








List of Guediawaye Quartiers 
(West to East) 
 




5. GUINTABA II 
6. GUINTABA I 





12. GOLF SUD 
13. HAMO I 
14. TAIBA 
15. DOUANES 
16. GOLF NORD 
17. NATIONES UNIES 
18. ATEPA 
19. IBRAHIMA DIOP 
20. HAMO III 
21. CITE DES ENSEIGNANTS 
22. FITH MITH 
23. HLM LAS PALMAS 
24. HLM PARIS 
25. DAROU SALAM II 
26. DAROU SALAM I 
27. SHS 
28. ADAMA DIOP 
29. BARRY & LY 
30. GOLF NORD I 
31. PYROTECHNIQUE/IBRAHIMA BA  
32. GOLF NORD II  
33. HAMO TEFESS  
34. MBODE II 
35. MBODE I 
36. GUELE TAPEE 
37. GUEULE TAPEE 
37. MBODE II 
38. MBODE I 
39. GIBRALTAR II 
40. URBANISME 
41. MBODE V 
42. MBODE VI 
43. NOTAIRE 
44. ROND POINT I 
45. ROND POINT II 
46.NDIAREME I 
47. NDIAREME II 
48. CHEIKH WADE 
49. HAMO IV 
50. HAMO V 




55. COUR SUPREME 
56. DAROU SALAM 
57. SOFRACO 
58. DAROUKHANE II 
59. DAROUKHANE I 
60. BAYE LAYE 
61. KPP COCO 
62. CHEIKH NGOM 
63. NIMZATT KAWSARA 




68. CITE TRESOR 
69. COMICO II 
70. ANGLE MOUSS II 
71. CITE MADIENG KHARY DIENG 
72. NIMZATT 
73. WAKHINANE II 
74. CITE ABDOU DIOUF 










Figure 4.9  














Appendix: Chapter 5 
Appendix Table 5.4.1 
Marginal Effects of Civic Engagement 
. margins, at(MF = (0 1) CvcEngmt = (0 1 3 5 9 11))   
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        550 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(GuedMayorVote2002), predict()   
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           1    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           3    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           5    
      
5._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           9    
      
6._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =          11    
      
7._at        : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           0    
      
8._at        : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           1    
      
9._at        : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           3    
      
10._at       : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           5    
      
11._at       : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           9    
      
12._at       : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =          11    
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |     .30877   .0277357    11.13   0.000     .2544091    .3631309 
          2  |   .3250184   .0247497    13.13   0.000     .2765098    .3735269 
          3  |   .3587808    .025886    13.86   0.000     .3080451    .4095165 
          4  |   .3940032   .0366785    10.74   0.000     .3221147    .4658918 
          5  |   .4674891   .0697426     6.70   0.000     .3307961    .6041822 
          6  |   .5049791    .087469     5.77   0.000      .333543    .6764151 
          7  |   .5239845   .0469508    11.16   0.000     .4319626    .6160064 
          8  |    .542667   .0429112    12.65   0.000     .4585626    .6267713 
          9  |   .5796235   .0400926    14.46   0.000     .5010434    .6582036 
         10  |   .6157085   .0444286    13.86   0.000     .5286301    .7027869 
         11  |     .68388   .0628944    10.87   0.000     .5606093    .8071507 
         12  |   .7154097   .0722224     9.91   0.000     .5738563    .8569631 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, at(MF = (0 1) CvcEngmt = (0 1 3 5 9 11))   
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        551 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(RegionalCouncil2002Vote), predict()  
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           1    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           3    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           5    
      
5._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           9    
      
6._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =          11    
      
7._at        : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           0    





      
. margins, at(MF = (0 1) CvcEngmt = (0 1 3 5 9 11))   
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        618 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(Legislate2007Vote), predict()   
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           1    
      
8._at        : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           1    
      
9._at        : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           3    
      
10._at       : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           5    
      
11._at       : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           9    
      
12._at       : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =          11    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |   .3084432   .0277128    11.13   0.000     .2541272    .3627593 
          2  |   .3189501   .0245514    12.99   0.000     .2708302      .36707 
          3  |   .3405177   .0253985    13.41   0.000     .2907375    .3902979 
          4  |   .3627669   .0356457    10.18   0.000     .2929026    .4326313 
          5  |   .4089884   .0677902     6.03   0.000     .2761221    .5418547 
          6  |   .4327755    .085934     5.04   0.000      .264348     .601203 
          7  |   .4785331   .0468341    10.22   0.000     .3867399    .5703263 
          8  |   .4907226   .0429834    11.42   0.000     .4064766    .5749686 
          9  |   .5151202   .0406764    12.66   0.000     .4353958    .5948445 
         10  |   .5394459   .0460997    11.70   0.000     .4490921    .6297997 
         11  |   .5874268   .0698864     8.41   0.000     .4504521    .7244016 




3._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           3    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           5    
      
5._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           9    
      
6._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =          11    
      
7._at        : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           0    
      
8._at        : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           1    
      
9._at        : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           3    
      
10._at       : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           5    
      
11._at       : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           9    
      
12._at       : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =          11    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |   .5013613   .0285727    17.55   0.000     .4453599    .5573627 
          2  |   .5096809   .0245878    20.73   0.000     .4614898    .5578721 
          3  |   .5262996   .0250462    21.01   0.000     .4772099    .5753892 
          4  |   .5428601   .0351614    15.44   0.000     .4739451    .6117751 
          5  |   .5756634    .064049     8.99   0.000     .4501297     .701197 
          6  |   .5918366   .0791808     7.47   0.000     .4366451    .7470281 
          7  |   .6675725   .0427651    15.61   0.000     .5837546    .7513905 
          8  |   .6749171   .0394969    17.09   0.000     .5975047    .7523296 
          9  |   .6893488   .0371699    18.55   0.000     .6164972    .7622004 
         10  |   .7034213   .0403544    17.43   0.000     .6243282    .7825145 
         11  |   .7304245   .0559384    13.06   0.000     .6207872    .8400617 





. margins, at(MF = (0 1) CvcEngmt = (0 1 3 5 9 11))   
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        637 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(RegionalElection2009), predict()   
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           1    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           3    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           5    
      
5._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =           9    
      
6._at        : MFever          =           0    
               CvcEngmt        =          11    
      
7._at        : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           0    
      
8._at        : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           1    
      
9._at        : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           3    
      
10._at       : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           5    
      
11._at       : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =           9    
      
12._at       : MFever          =           1    
               CvcEngmt        =          11    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |   .3770781   .0271535    13.89   0.000     .3238582    .4302981 
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          2  |   .4131983   .0240001    17.22   0.000      .366159    .4602375 
          3  |   .4879171   .0250264    19.50   0.000     .4388663    .5369678 
          4  |   .5631798   .0348693    16.15   0.000     .4948371    .6315224 
          5  |   .7024336   .0551723    12.73   0.000     .5942979    .8105694 
          6  |   .7615747   .0600029    12.69   0.000     .6439712    .8791782 
          7  |   .5852439     .04577    12.79   0.000     .4955364    .6749514 
          8  |   .6214123   .0416807    14.91   0.000     .5397196    .7031051 
          9  |   .6895391   .0373399    18.47   0.000     .6163543    .7627239 
         10  |    .750332   .0371286    20.21   0.000     .6775614    .8231026 
         11  |   .8462153   .0382657    22.11   0.000      .771216    .9212146 
         12  |   .8815968   .0368739    23.91   0.000     .8093252    .9538683 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix Table 5.4.2 
Marginal Effects of Trust in Social Networks 
. margins, at(MF = (0 1) SCTrust = (0 1 2 3 4))   
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        509 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(GuedMayorVote2002), predict()   
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           1    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           2    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           3    
      
5._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           4    
      
6._at        : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           0    
      
7._at        : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           1    
      
8._at        : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           2      
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9._at        : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           3    
      
10._at       : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           4    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |    .065166   .0308788     2.11   0.035     .0046446    .1256874 
          2  |   .1330749    .038292     3.48   0.001      .058024    .2081259 
          3  |   .2526272   .0324638     7.78   0.000     .1889994     .316255 
          4  |   .4267171   .0300722    14.19   0.000     .3677766    .4856575 
          5  |   .6210795   .0608308    10.21   0.000     .5018534    .7403057 
          6  |    .130249   .0587401     2.22   0.027     .0151205    .2453775 
          7  |   .2479888   .0655256     3.78   0.000     .1195611    .3764165 
          8  |   .4206814   .0512369     8.21   0.000     .3202589    .5211039 
          9  |   .6152451   .0417447    14.74   0.000     .5334271    .6970632 




. margins, at(MF = (0 1) SCTrust = (0 1 2 3 4)) 
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        510 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(RegionalCouncil2002Vote), predict()  
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           1    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           2    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           3    
      
5._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           4    
      
6._at        : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           0    
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7._at        : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           1    
      
8._at        : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           2    
      
9._at        : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           3    
      
10._at       : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           4    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |    .041226   .0207621     1.99   0.047      .000533     .081919 
          2  |   .1000145   .0309911     3.23   0.001     .0392732    .1607559 
          3  |   .2231262   .0308493     7.23   0.000     .1626627    .2835897 
          4  |   .4260422   .0302473    14.09   0.000     .3667585     .485326 
          5  |   .6573497   .0593484    11.08   0.000     .5410289    .7736704 
          6  |   .0694663   .0347171     2.00   0.045      .001422    .1375105 
          7  |   .1617324    .049292     3.28   0.001      .065122    .2583429 
          8  |   .3327283   .0478356     6.96   0.000     .2389722    .4264843 
          9  |   .5630751   .0434228    12.97   0.000      .477968    .6481822 
         10  |    .769089   .0521951    14.73   0.000     .6667885    .8713896 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, at(MF = (0 1) SCTrust = (0 1 2 3 4))   
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        618 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(Legislate2007Vote), predict()   
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           1    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           2    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           3    
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5._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           4    
      
6._at        : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           0    
      
7._at        : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           1    
      
8._at        : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           2    
      
9._at        : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           3    
      
10._at       : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           4    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |   .5381089   .0982263     5.48   0.000     .3455888     .730629 
          2  |   .5302248   .0637138     8.32   0.000     .4053481    .6551016 
          3  |   .5223257   .0327297    15.96   0.000     .4581766    .5864748 
          4  |   .5144153   .0268147    19.18   0.000     .4618596    .5669711 
          5  |   .5064978    .054976     9.21   0.000     .3987467    .6142488 
          6  |   .7041776   .0902174     7.81   0.000     .5273547    .8810005 
          7  |   .6975349   .0643289    10.84   0.000     .5714526    .8236172 
          8  |   .6908085   .0431983    15.99   0.000     .6061414    .7754756 
          9  |   .6840003   .0382859    17.87   0.000     .6089613    .7590393 
         10  |   .6771122    .055475    12.21   0.000     .5683832    .7858412 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      
 
. margins, at(MF = (0 1) SCTrust = (0 1 2 3 4))   
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        637 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(RegionalElection2009), predict()   
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           1    
240 
 
      
3._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           2    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           3    
      
5._at        : MFever          =           0    
               SCTrust         =           4    
      
6._at        : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           0    
      
7._at        : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           1    
      
8._at        : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           2    
      
9._at        : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           3    
      
10._at       : MFever          =           1    
               SCTrust         =           4    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |     .35557   .0885036     4.02   0.000     .1821061     .529034 
          2  |   .3898661   .0594701     6.56   0.000     .2733068    .5064253 
          3  |    .425287   .0314137    13.54   0.000     .3637172    .4868568 
          4  |   .4614919   .0263283    17.53   0.000     .4098893    .5130945 
          5  |   .4981077   .0539786     9.23   0.000     .3923116    .6039038 
          6  |   .5753819   .1031859     5.58   0.000     .3731412    .7776226 
          7  |   .6107849   .0706753     8.64   0.000     .4722639    .7493059 
          8  |    .645057   .0452666    14.25   0.000     .5563361    .7337779 
          9  |   .6779027   .0381222    17.78   0.000     .6031845    .7526209 






Marginal Effects of Political Discussion Networks 
. margins, at(MF = (0 1) PolDiscnNtwk = (0 2 4 6))   
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        509 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(GuedMayorVote2002), predict()   
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           2    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           4    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           6    
      
5._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           0    
      
6._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           2    
      
7._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           4    
      
8._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           6    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |   .2209668   .0307683     7.18   0.000      .160662    .2812715 
          2  |   .4100766   .0283645    14.46   0.000     .3544833    .4656699 
          3  |    .630123   .0540499    11.66   0.000      .524187    .7360589 
          4  |   .8067669    .060788    13.27   0.000     .6876246    .9259092 
          5  |   .3654971   .0516675     7.07   0.000     .2642307    .4667635 
          6  |   .5853583   .0417907    14.01   0.000     .5034501    .6672665 
          7  |   .7757732   .0453234    17.12   0.000     .6869409    .8646055 




. margins, at(MF = (0 1) PolDiscnNtwk = (0 2 4 6))   
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        510 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(RegionalCouncil2002Vote), predict()  
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           2    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           4    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           6    
      
5._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           0    
      
6._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           2    
      
7._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           4    
      
8._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           6    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |   .1970111   .0290594     6.78   0.000     .1400557    .2539665 
          2  |   .4022776   .0283803    14.17   0.000     .3466533     .457902 
          3  |   .6486506   .0535654    12.11   0.000     .5436644    .7536368 
          4  |   .8350997   .0546815    15.27   0.000     .7279259    .9422735 
          5  |   .2858163   .0466044     6.13   0.000     .1944733    .3771592 
          6  |   .5233096   .0430813    12.15   0.000     .4388717    .6077474 
          7  |   .7507101   .0490327    15.31   0.000     .6546078    .8468124 




. margins, at(MF = (0 1) PolDiscnNtwk = (0 2 4 6))   
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        618 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(Legislate2007Vote), predict()   
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           2    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           4    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           6    
      
5._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           0    
      
6._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           2    
      
7._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           4    
      
8._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           6    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |   .4010573   .0359658    11.15   0.000     .3305656     .471549 
          2  |   .5542763   .0252569    21.95   0.000     .5047738    .6037789 
          3  |   .6978309   .0456433    15.29   0.000     .6083717    .7872901 
          4  |   .8109225    .055628    14.58   0.000     .7018937    .9199513 
          5  |   .5642016   .0526604    10.71   0.000     .4609891    .6674141 
          6  |   .7062536   .0368737    19.15   0.000     .6339824    .7785248 
          7  |   .8170195   .0383144    21.32   0.000     .7419245    .8921144 







. margins, at(MF = (0 1) PolDiscnNtwk = (0 2 4 6))   
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        637 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(RegionalElection2009), predict()   
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           2    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           4    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           6    
      
5._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           0    
      
6._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           2    
      
7._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           4    
      
8._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PolDiscnNtwk    =           6    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |    .375897   .0337377    11.14   0.000     .3097722    .4420217 
          2  |   .4711274   .0245403    19.20   0.000     .4230293    .5192254 
          3  |    .568507   .0493807    11.51   0.000     .4717226    .6652914 
          4  |   .6608632   .0753894     8.77   0.000     .5131028    .8086237 
          5  |   .5893804    .050725    11.62   0.000     .4899612    .6887995 
          6  |   .6797854   .0374749    18.14   0.000     .6063359    .7532349 
          7  |   .7584439   .0437972    17.32   0.000     .6726029    .8442849 





Appendix Table 5.4.4 
Marginal Effects of Political Experts 
. margins, at(MF = (0 1) PoliticalFriend = (0 1))   
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        504 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(GuedMayorVote2002), predict()   
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PoliticalF~d    =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PoliticalF~d    =           1    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PoliticalF~d    =           0    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PoliticalF~d    =           1    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |   .2976342   .0312087     9.54   0.000     .2364662    .3588022 
          2  |   .4449761   .0349119    12.75   0.000       .37655    .5134022 
          3  |   .4648447   .0497207     9.35   0.000     .3673939    .5622955 
          4  |   .6216941    .043027    14.45   0.000     .5373627    .7060255 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, at(MF = (0 1) PoliticalFriend = (0 1))   
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        505 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(RegionalCouncil2002Vote), predict()  
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PoliticalF~d    =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PoliticalF~d    =           1    
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3._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PoliticalF~d    =           0    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PoliticalF~d    =           1    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |   .2694934   .0301136     8.95   0.000      .210472    .3285149 
          2  |   .4526954   .0349619    12.95   0.000     .3841712    .5212195 
          3  |   .3766388   .0477226     7.89   0.000     .2831042    .4701733 
          4  |   .5753146   .0445348    12.92   0.000     .4880279    .6626012 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, at(MF = (0 1) PoliticalFriend = (0 1))   
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        612 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(Legislate2007Vote), predict()   
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PoliticalF~d    =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PoliticalF~d    =           1    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PoliticalF~d    =           0    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PoliticalF~d    =           1    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |   .5435642   .0307743    17.66   0.000     .4832477    .6038807 
          2  |   .5036306   .0316273    15.92   0.000     .4416421     .565619 
          3  |   .7065481    .041612    16.98   0.000     .6249902    .7881061 





. margins, at(MF = (0 1) PoliticalFriend = (0 1))   
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        631 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(RegionalElection2009), predict()   
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PoliticalF~d    =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               PoliticalF~d    =           1    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PoliticalF~d    =           0    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           1    
               PoliticalF~d    =           1    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |   .3808543   .0291193    13.08   0.000     .3237816    .4379271 
          2  |   .5327268   .0311484    17.10   0.000      .471677    .5937766 
          3  |   .5861743   .0470067    12.47   0.000     .4940428    .6783057 





Appendix Table 5.4.5 
Marginal Effects of Discuss Politics 
. margins, at(MF = (0 1) DiscussPolitics = (0 1 2 3 4))  
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        508 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(GuedMayorVote2002), predict()   
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           1    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           2    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           3    
      
5._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           4    
      
6._at        : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           0    
      
7._at        : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           1    
      
8._at        : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           2    
      
9._at        : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           3    
      
10._at       : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           4    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |   .1663972   .0397634     4.18   0.000     .0884623    .2443321 
          2  |   .2366681    .034801     6.80   0.000     .1684594    .3048767 
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          3  |   .3250435    .026796    12.13   0.000     .2725244    .3775626 
          4  |   .4279196   .0305814    13.99   0.000     .3679812     .487858 
          5  |   .5374301   .0492023    10.92   0.000     .4409953    .6338649 
          6  |   .2880156   .0657691     4.38   0.000     .1591105    .4169207 
          7  |   .3858723   .0560171     6.89   0.000     .2760808    .4956638 
          8  |   .4939125   .0445521    11.09   0.000      .406592     .581233 
          9  |   .6025242   .0418499    14.40   0.000     .5204999    .6845486 
         10  |   .7018952    .047798    14.68   0.000     .6082129    .7955776 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, at(MF = (0 1) DiscussPolitics = (0 1 2 3 4))  
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        509 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(RegionalCouncil2002Vote), predict()  
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           1    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           2    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           3    
      
5._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           4    
      
6._at        : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           0    
      
7._at        : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           1    
      
8._at        : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           2    
      
9._at        : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           3    
      
10._at       : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           4    




             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |   .1547422   .0381472     4.06   0.000     .0799751    .2295092 
          2  |   .2238841   .0340702     6.57   0.000     .1571077    .2906605 
          3  |   .3124983   .0265562    11.77   0.000     .2604492    .3645474 
          4  |   .4173267   .0303316    13.76   0.000     .3578779    .4767756 
          5  |   .5302009   .0493718    10.74   0.000      .433434    .6269678 
          6  |   .2307076   .0579873     3.98   0.000     .1170547    .3443605 
          7  |   .3209059   .0523769     6.13   0.000     .2182489    .4235628 
          8  |   .4268037   .0439199     9.72   0.000     .3407222    .5128853 
          9  |   .5398662   .0431281    12.52   0.000     .4553367    .6243958 
         10  |   .6489694   .0516993    12.55   0.000     .5476407    .7502982 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      
 
. margins, at(MF = (0 1) DiscussPolitics = (0 1 2 3 4))  
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        616 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(Legislate2007Vote), predict()   
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           1    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           2    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           3    
      
5._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           4    
      
6._at        : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           0    
      
7._at        : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           1    
      
8._at        : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           2    
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9._at        : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           3    
      
10._at       : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           4    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |   .4751786    .060327     7.88   0.000     .3569399    .5934173 
          2  |   .4923341    .039973    12.32   0.000     .4139884    .5706798 
          3  |   .5095077   .0250383    20.35   0.000     .4604335    .5585819 
          4  |   .5266589   .0271929    19.37   0.000     .4733618     .579956 
          5  |   .5437474   .0437928    12.42   0.000     .4579151    .6295796 
          6  |   .6513719   .0670503     9.71   0.000     .5199558     .782788 
          7  |   .6668065    .050347    13.24   0.000     .5681282    .7654848 
          8  |   .6818915   .0393589    17.32   0.000     .6047494    .7590335 
          9  |   .6966042   .0377452    18.46   0.000      .622625    .7705834 
         10  |    .710925   .0451509    15.75   0.000     .6224309     .799419 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, at(MF = (0 1) DiscussPolitics = (0 1 2 3 4))  
      
Adjusted predictions                              Number of obs   =        635 
Model VCE    : OIM     
      
Expression   : Pr(RegionalElection2009), predict()   
      
1._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           0    
      
2._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           1    
      
3._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           2    
      
4._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           3    
      
5._at        : MFever          =           0    
               DiscussPol~s    =           4    
      
6._at        : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           0    
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7._at        : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           1    
      
8._at        : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           2    
      
9._at        : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           3    
      
10._at       : MFever          =           1    
               DiscussPol~s    =           4    
      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method    
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at |      
          1  |   .1941721     .03957     4.91   0.000     .1166163     .271728 
          2  |    .285057   .0339854     8.39   0.000     .2184468    .3516672 
          3  |   .3974977   .0245356    16.20   0.000     .3494089    .4455865 
          4  |   .5219133   .0273517    19.08   0.000      .468305    .5755216 
          5  |   .6436681   .0412654    15.60   0.000     .5627894    .7245468 
          6  |   .3604384   .0678368     5.31   0.000     .2274807     .493396 
          7  |   .4825445   .0557758     8.65   0.000     .3732259     .591863 
          8  |   .6067714   .0427017    14.21   0.000     .5230777    .6904651 
          9  |   .7185686   .0367341    19.56   0.000     .6465711    .7905661 





Appendix Table 5.5 
Marginal Effects of Variables in Extended Logit Model of  
Electoral Participation 
 
Marginal effects after logit 
      y  = Pr(GuedMayorVote2002) (predict) 
         =  .38217771 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx     Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MFever*|   .1271824      .05718    2.22   0.026   .015116  .239249   .282101 
CvcEngmt |  -.0021262      .01076   -0.20   0.843  -.023206  .018954   2.13035 
 SCTrust |   .1719115      .04877    3.53   0.000    .07633  .267494   2.67109 
PolDis~k |   .1085129      .02605    4.17   0.000   .057454  .159572   1.64397 
Politi~d*|   .0488104      .05452    0.90   0.371  -.058044  .155665   .538911 
Discus~s |  -.0109191      .03692   -0.30   0.767  -.083272  .061434   2.45914 
EndsMe~S*|  -.0064664       .0549   -0.12   0.906  -.114062  .101129   .692607 
 MaxEduc |   .0217132      .01257    1.73   0.084  -.002929  .046356   4.42607 
  Gender*|  -.0378564      .05411   -0.70   0.484  -.143917  .068204   .484436 
     AGE |   .0149961      .00237    6.32   0.000   .010346  .019646   37.9728 
PartiM~r*|   .0921185      .07494    1.23   0.219  -.054758  .238995   .167315 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
 
Marginal effects after logit 
      y  = Pr(RegionalCouncil2002Vote) (predict) 
         =  .34610579 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MFever*|   .0871091      .05751    1.51   0.130  -.025605  .199823   .279612 
CvcEngmt |  -.0152928      .01074   -1.42   0.154   -.03634  .005755   2.13592 
 SCTrust |   .2121074      .04902    4.33   0.000    .11603  .308184   2.66956 
PolDis~k |   .1230593      .02613    4.71   0.000   .071843  .174276    1.6466 
Politi~d*|   .0829299      .05331    1.56   0.120  -.021551  .187411   .537864 
Discus~s |  -.0379766      .03675   -1.03   0.301  -.109996  .034043   2.46408 
EndsMe~S*|  -.1122514      .05581   -2.01   0.044  -.221644 -.002858   .693204 
 MaxEduc |    .027797      .01246    2.23   0.026   .003384  .052209    4.4233 
  Gender*|   .0151962      .05311    0.29   0.775  -.088903  .119296   .485437 
     AGE |   .0142264      .00233    6.10   0.000   .009656  .018797   38.0233 
PartiM~r*|    .197732      .07664    2.58   0.010   .047516  .347948    .16699 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 







Marginal effects after logit 
      y  = Pr(Legislate2007Vote) (predict) 
         =  .57823002 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MFever*|   .0286989      .05605    0.51   0.609  -.081157  .138555   .253886 
CvcEngmt |   .0017221      .01001    0.17   0.863  -.017896   .02134   2.11054 
 SCTrust |  -.0289747      .04198   -0.69   0.490  -.111259  .053309   2.66245 
PolDis~k |   .0995246      .02485    4.01   0.000   .050822  .148227   1.60276 
Politi~d*|   -.068862      .05027   -1.37   0.171  -.167383  .029659   .519862 
Discus~s |  -.0370877      .03401   -1.09   0.275  -.103746  .029571   2.44387 
EndsMe~S*|  -.0194796      .04854   -0.40   0.688   -.11462  .075661   .670121 
 MaxEduc |   .0079796      .01119    0.71   0.476  -.013961   .02992   4.50777 
  Gender*|  -.0800018      .04852   -1.65   0.099  -.175107  .015103   .478411 
     AGE |   .0167183      .00233    7.17   0.000   .012149  .021288    36.209 
PartiM~r*|   -.006585      .07139   -0.09   0.927  -.146506  .133336   .151986 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




Marginal effects after logit 
      y  = Pr(RegionalElection2009) (predict) 
         =  .51526499 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MFever*|    .107406      .05463    1.97   0.049   .000332   .21448   .248739 
CvcEngmt |   .0278109      .00989    2.81   0.005   .008433  .047189   2.10084 
 SCTrust |  -.0183564      .04182   -0.44   0.661  -.100323   .06361   2.65554 
PolDis~k |   -.014135      .02374   -0.60   0.552  -.060664  .032393   1.58992 
Politi~d*|   .0069407      .04957    0.14   0.889  -.090219    .1041   .512605 
Discus~s |   .0725511      .03415    2.12   0.034   .005621  .139481   2.43361 
EndsMe~S*|   .1664892      .04716    3.53   0.000   .074056  .258922   .660504 
 MaxEduc |  -.0002321      .01126   -0.02   0.984  -.022309  .021845   4.53277 
  Gender*|  -.0165144      .04898   -0.34   0.736  -.112513  .079484   .477311 
     AGE |   .0071149      .00207    3.43   0.001   .003052  .011177   35.8118 
PartiM~r*|    .232545      .06294    3.70   0.000   .109195  .355895   .154622 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




Appendix Table 5.11 
Marginal Effects of Variables in Logit Model of  
Change in Political Participation 
 
Marginal effects after logit    
      y  = Pr(Post_Voter) (predict)    
         =  .50386043     
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X  
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MFever*|  -.0906659      .14072   -0.64   0.519  -.366475  .185143   .097938 
  Gender*|  -.0755988      .08129   -0.93   0.352  -.234919  .083721    .43299 
     AGE |   .0089513       .0048    1.86   0.062  -.000466  .018368   27.2474 
 MaxEduc |  -.0005762      .02014   -0.03   0.977  -.040042   .03889   4.67526 
EndsMe~S*|  -.0470765      .08077   -0.58   0.560  -.205375  .111222   .551546 
PartiM~r*|   .2034586      .13061    1.56   0.119  -.052525  .459442   .108247 
PolDis~k |   -.139016      .05782   -2.40   0.016  -.252343 -.025689    1.1701 
Politi~d*|    .142031      .08282    1.72   0.086  -.020285  .304347   .458763 
Discus~s |   .1337662      .06171    2.17   0.030    .01282  .254712   2.24742 
CvcEngmt |   .0310028      .01863    1.66   0.096  -.005506  .067512   1.52577 
 SCTrust |  -.0065203      .06271   -0.10   0.917  -.129435  .116395   2.59063 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
      
      
Marginal effects after logit    
      y  = Pr(PostGuedVisitorContact) (predict)   
         =  .02404649     
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X  
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MFever*|   .0146932      .03786    0.39   0.698  -.059511  .088897   .102041 
  Gender*|   .0378403      .02528    1.50   0.134    -.0117  .087381   .433673 
     AGE |  -.0003971      .00109   -0.36   0.716   -.00254  .001745   27.4694 
 MaxEduc |  -.0001211      .00382   -0.03   0.975  -.007613  .007371   4.67857 
EndsMe~S*|  -.0185323      .01961   -0.94   0.345  -.056977  .019912   .556122 
PartiM~r*|   .1189793       .0903    1.32   0.188  -.058001   .29596   .107143 
PolDis~k |   .0031383      .01045    0.30   0.764  -.017339  .023616   1.16837 
Politi~d*|    .019111      .02317    0.82   0.410  -.026307  .064529   .454082 
Discus~s |  -.0075203      .01276   -0.59   0.556  -.032531   .01749    2.2398 
CvcEngmt |   .0087859      .00412    2.13   0.033   .000702  .016869   1.53061 
 SCTrust |   .0169515      .01616    1.05   0.294   -.01473  .048633   2.59124 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
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Marginal effects after logit    
      y  = Pr(PostGovtVisitorContact) (predict)   
         =  .01081369     
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X  
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MFever*|  -.0020813      .01286   -0.16   0.871  -.027287  .023124   .102041 
  Gender*|   .0163966      .01545    1.06   0.289  -.013888  .046681   .433673 
     AGE |   .0002393      .00063    0.38   0.703  -.000989  .001467   27.4694 
 MaxEduc |   .0026274      .00245    1.07   0.283  -.002174  .007428   4.67857 
EndsMe~S*|  -.0196187      .01589   -1.23   0.217   -.05076  .011523   .556122 
PartiM~r*|   .0951384      .08261    1.15   0.249  -.066783  .257059   .107143 
PolDis~k |  -.0026959      .00532   -0.51   0.612   -.01312  .007729   1.16837 
Politi~d*|    .015498      .01611    0.96   0.336  -.016082  .047078   .454082 
Discus~s |  -.0007258      .00604   -0.12   0.904  -.012555  .011104    2.2398 
CvcEngmt |   .0058763      .00346    1.70   0.089  -.000903  .012655   1.53061 
 SCTrust |   .0098124      .00948    1.04   0.300  -.008761  .028385   2.59124 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
      
      
      
Marginal effects after logit    
      y  = Pr(PostLocalVolunteerorWork) (predict)   
         =  .02657461     
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X  
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MFever*|   .0261288      .05068    0.52   0.606  -.073196  .125454   .098446 
  Gender*|   .0314545      .02273    1.38   0.166  -.013101   .07601   .435233 
     AGE |  -.0029423      .00148   -1.99   0.046  -.005834  -.00005   27.2798 
 MaxEduc |  -.0010737      .00419   -0.26   0.798  -.009293  .007145   4.68394 
EndsMe~S*|  -.0026678      .01688   -0.16   0.874  -.035746   .03041   .549223 
PartiM~r*|   .0873903      .07425    1.18   0.239  -.058144  .232925   .108808 
PolDis~k |  -.0007655      .00968   -0.08   0.937  -.019747  .018216   1.17098 
Politi~d*|   .0318568      .02445    1.30   0.193  -.016072  .079785   .455959 
Discus~s |   .0281611      .01375    2.05   0.041   .001208  .055114    2.2487 
CvcEngmt |  -.0020658      .00357   -0.58   0.563  -.009067  .004936   1.53368 
 SCTrust |   .0207151      .01545    1.34   0.180   -.00956   .05099   2.58851 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
257 
 
Marginal effects after logit    
      y  = Pr(PostNationalVolunteerorWork) (predict)   
         =   .0244699     
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X  
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MFever*|   .0418259      .06223    0.67   0.501  -.080138   .16379   .098446 
  Gender*|   .0257419      .02085    1.23   0.217  -.015116  .066599   .435233 
     AGE |  -.0027715      .00139   -1.99   0.046  -.005498 -.000045   27.2798 
 MaxEduc |   .0013748      .00404    0.34   0.734   -.00655  .009299   4.68394 
EndsMe~S*|  -.0066698      .01651   -0.40   0.686  -.039033  .025694   .549223 
PartiM~r*|   .0700133      .06486    1.08   0.280  -.057118  .197145   .108808 
PolDis~k |  -.0004274      .00902   -0.05   0.962  -.018106  .017251   1.17098 
Politi~d*|   .0260877      .02247    1.16   0.246  -.017947  .070123   .455959 
Discus~s |    .025981      .01323    1.96   0.050   .000046  .051916    2.2487 
CvcEngmt |  -.0025986      .00353   -0.74   0.462  -.009527  .004329   1.53368 
 SCTrust |   .0122633      .01395    0.88   0.379  -.015079  .039606   2.58851 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
      
      
      
Marginal effects after logit    
      y  = Pr(PostWorkforPoliticalParty) (predict)   
         =  .01301857     
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X  
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MFever*|  -.0094646      .01146   -0.83   0.409   -.03193  .013001   .098446 
  Gender*|   .0082563      .01144    0.72   0.470  -.014158  .030671   .435233 
     AGE |  -.0008904      .00089   -1.00   0.317  -.002633  .000852   27.2332 
 MaxEduc |   .0009933      .00252    0.39   0.694  -.003953  .005939   4.68912 
EndsMe~S*|  -.0017122       .0104   -0.16   0.869  -.022093  .018669   .549223 
PartiM~r*|   .0657719      .06539    1.01   0.315  -.062397  .193941   .108808 
PolDis~k |   .0055418      .00617    0.90   0.369  -.006548  .017631   1.17098 
Politi~d*|   .0103412      .01414    0.73   0.465  -.017382  .038064    .46114 
Discus~s |   .0183422      .01058    1.73   0.083  -.002398  .039082    2.2487 
CvcEngmt |   -.000794      .00212   -0.37   0.708  -.004956  .003368   1.53368 
 SCTrust |   .0090082      .00936    0.96   0.336  -.009341  .027357   2.58937 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
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Marginal effects after logit    
      y  = Pr(PostProtestorDemonstrate) (predict)   
         =  .01190988     
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X  
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Gender*|   .0056639       .0117    0.48   0.628  -.017271  .028599   .431818 
     AGE |   -.000264      .00082   -0.32   0.747  -.001867  .001339   26.1875 
 MaxEduc |   .0054546      .00377    1.45   0.148  -.001934  .012843   4.72159 
EndsMe~S*|   .0246192       .0177    1.39   0.164  -.010077  .059315   .534091 
PartiM~r*|   .0259519      .03574    0.73   0.468  -.044103  .096007   .096591 
PolDis~k |  -.0060905      .00916   -0.67   0.506  -.024037  .011856   1.15909 
Politi~d*|   .0124023      .01533    0.81   0.418  -.017634  .042439   .443182 
Discus~s |   .0067242      .00816    0.82   0.410  -.009268  .022716   2.23295 
CvcEngmt |   .0028831      .00275    1.05   0.295  -.002515  .008282   1.50568 
 SCTrust |  -.0054251      .00892   -0.61   0.543  -.022914  .012064    2.5782 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
      
      
      
Marginal effects after logit    
      y  = Pr(PostCampaignContribute) (predict)   
         =  .01625351     
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X  
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Gender*|  -.0322113      .03125   -1.03   0.303  -.093459  .029037   .435897 
     AGE |  -.0009881      .00174   -0.57   0.571  -.004404  .002428   25.7179 
 MaxEduc |   .0002367      .00613    0.04   0.969   -.01177  .012243   4.80769 
EndsMe~S*|  -.0092873      .02551   -0.36   0.716  -.059278  .040704   .628205 
PartiM~r*|   .0172288      .04336    0.40   0.691  -.067752  .102209   .179487 
PolDis~k |   .0189931      .01735    1.09   0.274   -.01501  .052996   1.29487 
Discus~s |   .0039401      .01492    0.26   0.792  -.025304  .033185    2.5641 
CvcEngmt |  -.0006059      .00451   -0.13   0.893  -.009442   .00823   1.67949 
 SCTrust |   .0202882      .02346    0.86   0.387  -.025692  .066269   2.68095 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
